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THE STATE OF NATURE AND THE GENESIS OF COMMONWEALTHS
IN HOBBS'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

A Dissertation Presented

by

THOMAS J. FRYC

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

September 1997

Department of Philosophy

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
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
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
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Necesse est ut multos timeat, quem multi timent.

-Seneca, De Ira

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ABSTRACT

THE STATE OF NATURE AND THE GENESIS OF COMMONWEALTHS
IN HOBBS'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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A careful reading of Hobbes's philosophical writings reveals that this author forwards no fewer than three distinct conceptions of the pre-political situation which he labels "the natural condition of humankind," or "the state of nature." By examining the relevant passages from The Elements of Law, De Cive and Leviathan, Hobbes's three principal works of political philosophy, I demonstrate that Hobbes's state of nature should not be interpreted as a single invariant concept but rather as a series of three distinct heuristic or expository models. Further, I claim that distinctions between Hobbes's various conceptions of the state of nature reflect differing background assumptions concerning such factors as the prevailing degree of group stability and the level of abstractness with which representative human beings are characterized.

After establishing this framework, I examine why Hobbes chose to include three distinct conceptions of the state of nature within his writings, and explore the relationship

which appears to obtain among these three conceptions. I next examine the manner by which each of Hobbes's three types of commonwealth, namely commonwealth by institution, commonwealth by preservation and commonwealth by acquisition, can be understood to arise from each of Hobbes's three conceptions of the state of nature. In this section, I focus my analysis upon the transitions which occur when the unencumbered and isolated individuals who inhabit the state of nature (in its various forms) enter into the social contract by "transferring" their respective rights of nature to the sovereign of their incipient commonwealth. Moreover, I examine Hobbes's explanation of why each subject incurs an obligation to obey his sovereign's decrees and I address the apparent difficulty of maintaining the subjects' allegiance to their sovereign in light of Hobbes's portrayal of human beings as passionate and predominantly self-serving creatures. I conclude by arguing that given Hobbes's characterization of humans as passionate and predominantly self-serving creatures, one can probably not expect commonwealths to arise in the manner that Hobbes describes, and one can certainly not expect such commonwealths, if established, to endure for any substantial period of time.

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CHAPTER I
HOBBS'S PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

A. Introduction

Hobbes's theory of human sensation plays a significant role in his theory of motivation, and within Hobbes's system, human motivation significantly affects the behavior which human beings can be expected to exhibit when they confront one another in the state of nature.¹ Thus, by understanding Hobbes's beliefs concerning the nature of the individual human organism, we might better understand the character of Hobbes's pre-social or pre-political interactive state.

A discussion of Hobbes's conception of the human organism is also appropriate since the state of nature, political commonwealths, and all other types of human groups are composed of human beings, whom Hobbes alleged to possess a specific and inflexible nature. Indeed, in his introduction to De Cive, Hobbes contends that "everything is best understood by its constituent causes, . . . so to make a more curious search into the rights of states and the duties of subjects, it is necessary that we rightly understand what the quality of human nature is, [and] in what matters it is, in what not fit to make up civil government."²

Accordingly, I will devote the first chapter of this dissertation to an exploration of Hobbes's analysis of human

beings *in abstracto*, so that I might describe and consider, in the following chapters, the "social" or interactive condition which Hobbes thought likely to result when two or more human beings are forced to confront each other without the benefit of some coercive power that is sufficiently powerful to constrain or control the actions of these beings. Since Hobbes began the body of his masterwork Leviathan with a discussion of human sensory activity, and since this topic of human sensation plays a significant role in Hobbes's theory of human motivation and behavior, this is a fitting topic with which to begin.

B. Hobbes on Sensation

Before beginning my actual discussion of Hobbes's doctrine of sense, it should be mentioned that Hobbes uses the term 'sense' to refer to two related, though clearly different bodily processes. Specifically, Hobbes employs the term 'sense' to refer to (A) the process by which ideas, thoughts or phantasms come to be generated within, and come to be experienced by, the percipient subject; and (less familiarly) to (B) the process by which the sensations of pleasure and pain come to be generated within, and come to be experienced by, the percipient subject.

Further, it should be noted that Hobbes forwards a "dual-aspect" model of both of the abovementioned varieties of sense, according to which each instance of sensory

activity can be identified as both (C) a purely mechanical act occurring within the relevant sensory subject's body, and as (D) an appearance, "seeming" or feeling which is experienced, as an object of immediate conscious awareness, by the relevant sensory subject. Indeed, Hobbes identifies the first variety of sense (A) as both (C) "the reaction and endeavour outwards in the organ of sense caused by an endeavour inwards from the [perceptual] object,"³ and as (D) such phenomenal images or ideas as colors, shapes, etc.⁴ Moreover, Hobbes identifies the second variety of sense (B) as both (C) "the quickening or slackening, helping or hindering" of vital motion within the sensory subject's body and as (D) instances of pain or pleasure within the consciousness of the sensory subject.⁵

Unhappily, during his various discussions of the first type of sense (A), Hobbes frequently conflates (C) the notion of a phantasm of sense as motion within the sensory organ of a percipient subject with (D) the notion of a phantasm of sense as a phenomenal appearance or an immediate object of awareness. However, for the sake of brevity, I will forego presenting a needlessly extended discussion of this distinction. Nevertheless, the reader should be alerted that during my forthcoming presentation of Hobbes's first variety of sense (A), I will be using the term 'sense' [or phantasm of sense] to refer both to (C) a mechanico-

physiological action and to (D) the immediate object of conscious awareness.⁶

In this initial section of Chapter 1, I will concisely present Hobbes's theory of human sensation as this is set forward in Leviathan and De Corpore. I will be presenting a recapitulation of what Hobbes actually wrote about the physiological process which he identifies as human sensation. I will, however, refrain from commenting upon the specific difficulties which can be seen to emerge throughout Hobbes's discussions of this topic and instead concentrate upon what Hobbes believes it means for a human being to experience a sensory episode.⁷

In Leviathan, Hobbes begins his account of the human organism with a rather brief discussion of the human sensory faculties.⁸ In the opening sentences of the initial chapter of this work, Hobbes explains that each thought which arises in the mind of man "is the representation, or appearance, of some quality, or other accident of a body without [him], which is commonly called an object."⁹ In turn, the basis of each of these thoughts or ideas is that which Hobbes calls sense. Hobbes immediately explains that there exists no conception in a man's mind which "hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense."¹⁰ Hence, as we will go on to discuss in more detail later in this chapter, each consciously perceived

thought, idea, or mental image, whether it is perceived in the act of sensation, or stored in the mind and later recalled, as in the case of memories and "imagination,"¹¹ is ultimately derived from some instance of human sensory activity. Although the "raw data" which is presented in the form of sensory images may be combined, parcelled, separated and reorganized in a potentially limitless number of ways, and the human mind possesses the capacity to carry out these reorganizations, such operations can be carried out only upon those images which have at some earlier time been acquired through sense.

Hobbes introduces his account of the causes of sensation (A) in his 1656 work De Corpore by inviting his readers to notice that our "phantasms or ideas are not always the same; but that new ones appear to us, and old ones vanish, according as we apply our organs of sense now to one object, now to another."¹² Thus, we may notice that when we are awake, possess properly functioning organs of sense, and fail to experience any external hindrances to the functioning of these organs (such as, in the case of sight, blindfolds or other opaque objects), we experience a succession of phenomenal states which Hobbes refers to as "ideas," as "images," and sometimes as "phantasms."

Hobbes reasons that since we continually experience this successive flow of images (often against our will),

some cause must exist which accounts for the generation of new images and the "perishing" of old or formerly experienced ones. Hobbes concludes that these generations and perishings are ultimately due to "some change or mutation in the sentient," that is, in some portion of the body of the person who experiences such sensations.¹³

Throughout his various considerations of the topic of sensation, Hobbes is careful to distinguish between the subject of sensation, that is, the sentient being or subject in whom the aforementioned alteration is effected, and the object of sensation, which Hobbes takes, in all instances, to be some physical object which, by imparting motion within the sentient being, accounts for such alterations, and thus for the phenomena of sense.¹⁴ Indeed, Hobbes claims that sense is "some internal motion of the sentient, generated by some internal motion of the parts of the object and propagated through all the media to the innermost part of the organ," and that "the cause of sense is the external body, or object which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately . . . or mediately."¹⁵

(immediately in the case of touch or taste, and mediately in the case of sight, hearing and smell). In turn, this "pressure, by the mediation of the nerves and other strings and membranes of the body, continueth inwards to the brain and heart, causeth there a resistance or counterpressure of

the heart to deliver itself, which endeavour, because outward, seemeth to be some matter without."¹⁶

Thus, Hobbes maintains that once the impulse or "pressure" which had originally been generated by the object of sense reaches the innermost part of the organ, the end of the transit line, as it were, the organ generates a counterpressure, or reacts by producing a quantity of motion which Hobbes specifies as being opposite (though not necessarily equal) to the motion of the external object which initiated this process. As a result of the organ's endeavour outward, which may be construed as a reaction against an externally generated endeavour to the "innermost part of the organ," there occurs a phantasm or idea such as "light and color," and "heat and sound."¹⁷

Hobbes goes on to mention that "the motion of an organ, by which a phantasm is made, is not commonly called sense unless the object be present."¹⁸ "The phantasm remaining after the object is removed," he asserts, "is called *fancy* and in Latin *imaginatio*."¹⁹ Although he concedes that the Latin word 'imaginatio' properly refers to the image (or afterimage) made in seeing, he claims, nevertheless, that the term is often (though improperly) used to refer to the afterimage made by any of the five senses. Following common usage, however, he stipulates that he will use 'imagination' in this wider signification, that is, to describe the

phantasm or the motion remaining in any of the sensory organs after the object which caused it has been removed.²⁰ Thus, imagination, as Hobbes tersely defines it, is "nothing but decaying sense," or "sense decayed or weakened, by the absence of the object."²¹

Hobbes contends that imagination (or fancy) and memory differ only in "that memory supposeth the time past, which fancy doth not."²² Moreover,²³

[i]n memory, the phantasms we consider are as if they were worn out with time; but in our fancy we consider them as they are; which distinction is not of the things themselves, but of the considerations of the sentient.

Similarly, in Leviathan, Hobbes explains that "[t]his decaying sense, when we would express the thing itself, (I mean fancy itself), we call the *imagination*, . . . but when we would express the decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called memory."²⁴ Thus, the distinction between memory and the imagination consists not in the nature of the previously produced, and presently retained phantasm which is presented to the sentient, but rather in the sentient's consideration of that phantasm.

Interestingly, at the beginning of section 12 of chapter 25 of De Corpore, Hobbes announces that²⁵

there is another kind of sense. . . namely the sense of pleasure and pain, proceeding not from the reaction of the heart outwards but from the continual action of the outermost portion of the organ toward the heart. For the original of life being in the heart, that motion in the sentient which is propagated to the heart, must necessarily make some alteration or diversion of vital motion, namely by quickening or slackening, helping or hindering the same. Now when it helpeth, *it is* [my emphasis] pleasure, when it hindreth, *it is* pain, trouble, grief &c.

Though his description of this "second type of sense" (B) is rather brief, and not terribly detailed, what Hobbes appears to be saying is that when an external object presses upon, or transfers motion to the outermost portion of some sensory organ of a particular human body, and as this pulse of energy makes its way from the outermost, toward the innermost portion of that organ (viz, that human's heart), the motion associated with this pulse, by disturbing adjacent internal bodily tissue, sometimes has the effect of either helping or hindering the vital motion within that human body (when such vital motion is understood to be "the motion of the blood which circulates in the veins and arteries."²⁶)

Crucially, Hobbes notes that the sense of pleasure and pain should be distinguished from the variety of sense "which is made by the reaction of the organ." Thus, while the variety of sense which Hobbes associates with phantasms of colors, shapes, smells, etc. are said to be "made" (in

Hobbes's words) by the heart's reaction to externally generated motion, which is transferred to the heart through the internal bodily tissue which constitutes the sensory organ, the variety of sense which Hobbes identifies as pleasure and pain can be conceived of as being "made" as that pulse of energy moves from the outermost portion, to the innermost portion of the individual's relevant sensory organ. Specifically, if that parcel of externally generated motion, as it makes its way toward the innermost portion of the organ of sense, has the effect of enhancing the vital motion within that individual's body, then the individual will experience the sense of pleasure, and if that parcel of motion has the effect of hindering the vital motion within that individual's body, then the individual will experience the sense of pain. Clearly, however, before we can adequately understand the workings of this process by which the sensations of pain and pleasure are generated, it behooves us to examine Hobbes's descriptions of vital and animal motion.

C. Hobbes's Account of Vital and Animal Motion

Hobbes identifies, and goes on to discuss two types of motion specific to the human body, namely, vital motion and voluntary (or animal) motion. In Leviathan, Hobbes characterizes vital motion as that which is "begun in generation, and continued without interruption through

[one's] whole life; such as the course of blood, the breathing, concoction, nutrition, excretion, etc. to which such motions there needs no help of imagination."²⁷ In De Corpore, Hobbes describes vital motion as "the motion of the blood, perpetually circulating. . . in the veins and arteries."²⁸

Animal or voluntary motion, on the other hand, is characterized as "depend[ing] always upon a precedent thought of whither, which way and what," that is, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds.²⁹ As might be expected, Hobbes describes both types of bodily motion in terms of mechanical processes, and characterizes animal motion as a feature of the organism which functions primarily to enhance or preserve vital motion.

We might reasonably interpret Hobbes's vital motion as the sum of the involuntary or autonomic motions of the human body, which are necessary to sustain the proper functioning of the organism. If, to use a convenient example, the heart of a particular individual ceased to function, that is, ceased to circulate blood, and thus to provide oxygen to the various portions of that person's body, life in that person's body would come to an end. Indeed, within his writings, Hobbes identifies life with the vital motion which serves to distinguish living from inanimate matter (which is, nevertheless, subject to being moved). In fact, in the

Introduction to Leviathan, Hobbes characterizes life as "but motion of the limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within," and in De Corpore states that "the original of all life [is] in the heart."³⁰ Presumably, what distinguishes living objects such as men, dogs and insects, from such non-living objects as stones, metal ingots, and brick walls is not that objects of the former but not of the latter variety are subject to local motion or motion *simpliciter*, but rather that these former objects, unlike those of the latter type, are subject to vital and animal motion.

Hobbes asserts, in section 12 of chapter 25 of De Corpore, that vital motion is from time to time³¹

hindered by some motion made by the action of sensible objects, [and] may be restored again either by bending or setting straight the parts of the body; which is done when the spirits are carried now into these, now into other nerves, till the pain, so far as possible, be quite taken away. But if vital motion be helped by motion made by sense, then the parts of the organ will be disposed to guide the spirits in such manner as conduceth most to the preservation and augmentation by the help of the nerves. And in animal motion, this is the very first endeavour found even in the embryo, which . . . moveth its limbs with voluntary motion for the avoiding of whatsoever troubleth it, or for the pursuing of what pleaseth it.

Thus, for example, an appetite toward some object can be conceived as arising within a human being's body when a

sensation of pain (caused by a hindering of vital motion) motivates or moves that body in the direction of an object, the acquisition of which will, in the estimation of that human being, relieve his presently experienced sensation of pain by restoring to a healthy state his body's currently inhibited level of vital motion.³²

Crucially, both of the previously described varieties of Hobbesian sensation are involved in the process by which an appetite or an aversion, that is to say, a tiny motion toward or a tiny motion away from some external object, is generated or experienced. Thus, for example, a sensation of pain might be identified as the factor which initiates this sequence, since such a sensed pain essentially establishes a goal to be achieved (namely the alleviation of pain within the sensory subject's body) while a sensory survey of the objects within one's environment (that is, instances of sensation as it relates to the perception of external physical objects) can be understood to provide suggestions to the sensory subject regarding how the established goal can be achieved.

In fact, Hobbes characterizes this imagining (in this instance, the thought which arises in the mind of the sensory subject) as "the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion."³³ "These small beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in walking,

sleeping, striking, and other visible actions," maintains Hobbes, "are commonly called endeavours."³⁴ Though at this point, one might infer that all endeavours result in or lead to such visible actions as walking, speaking and striking, Hobbes's subsequent discussion makes clear that this is not the case.

Immediately after beginning his discussion of the interior beginnings of voluntary motion, Hobbes draws a distinction between the two types of such small interior motions, namely appetites (or desires) and aversions. An "endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it," Hobbes announces, "is called appetite or desire. . . [a]nd when the endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called aversion."³⁵ Hobbes further opines that while some appetites such as the appetite for food, the appetite for excretion "and some others not many" are born with man, all others, which are appetites of particular things, are acquired through experience. Moreover, Hobbes claims that "of things we know not at all or believe not to be," we can have a desire only "to taste and try."³⁶

Therefore, Hobbes believed that from birth, human beings possess (or generate) a small number of general (that is, generally directed) appetites, which are appetites for objects that are necessary to maintain the vital motion of

that organism. Indeed, in section 12 of chapter 25 of De Corpore, Hobbes claims that³⁷

little infants, at the beginning and as soon as they are born, have appetite to a very few things, as also they avoid very few, by their want of experience and memory; and therefore they have not so great a variety of animal motion as we see in those that are more grown. For it is not possible, without such knowledge as is derived from sense, that is, without experience and memory, to know what will prove pleasant or hurtful.

Hobbes contends further that "afterwards, by accustoming themselves little by little, they come to know readily what is to be pursued and avoided; and also, to have ready use of their nerves and organs, in the pursuing and avoiding of good and bad."³⁸

Thus, the ability to successfully maintain a pleasurable state of bodily constitution, or a condition of vigorous vital motion within one's body (through one's own efforts), is an acquired skill which depends upon or presupposes experience and memory. In turn, one's phantasms of memory depend upon the prior realization of phantasms of sense which are "made" when the innermost portion of the individual's sensory organ reacts to a pulse of energy which is transferred to it, through the now familiar pathway, from an external sensory object or stimulus.³⁹

The most prominent instance of an appetite which is born with man, namely the appetite for food, would be

characterized as a minute internal motion toward most any type of nutritive foodstuff which will sustain the life of that man, rather than a tiny motion toward a particular type of food such as cherry pie or Beef Wellington. Hobbes does contend, however, that the overwhelming majority of the particular appetites which a man's body possesses or experiences come to be developed as a result of the individual's interaction with the objects in his environment.

Thus, an individual (designated p) might be imagined to advance through the following sequence of events throughout the course of his life: at time t_1 , person p, who has never tasted a pineapple, is brought into contact with such a piece of fruit (object F_1), places the interior portion of a piece of this fruit in his mouth, and through the usual process, comes to experience a particular (pleasing) gustatory sensation, which Hobbes would describe as a type of phantasm. In turn, at some subsequent time, t_2 , person p might find himself in the vicinity of some object F_2 , which, as a result of comparing presently sensed with formerly sensed visual phantasms, he is able to identify as being sufficiently visually similar to F_1 , to establish a mental association between supposed objects F_2 and F_1 . P might recognize, in some not completely conscious manner, that the phantasms caused by F_2 bear a striking resemblance to those

which had been caused by F_1 , and that at time t_1 , ingesting a portion of F_1 provided him with a pleasurable sensation.

Hence, at time t_2 , p 's body can be conceived of as experiencing an endeavour, that is, a tiny movement in the apparent direction of object F_2 . Though this endeavour toward F_2 might eventually result in a fully-fledged, perceptually observable corporeal movement toward the object in question, it is crucial to understand that by appetite, Hobbes means merely an instance of minute movement (in this case, toward object F_2). Hobbes emphasizes this point by registering his disapproval of those Scholastic philosophers who "find in mere appetite to go, or move, no actual motion at all; but because some motion they must acknowledge, they call it metaphorical motion; which is but absurd speech."⁴⁰

In this example, at time t_1 , p had no *specific* desire for, and experienced no endeavour toward F_1 based upon a previous experience with a pineapple. This is true because, up to point t_1 , p had never tasted or experienced the gustatory sensation (or the visual sensation) specific to pineapples. Hobbes's doctrine would allow, however, that at time t_1 , p had a desire to "taste and try" the previously untasted type of object which was then situated before him. At time t_1 , for example, p might have been experiencing feelings of hunger (a specific feeling of uneasiness or pain),⁴¹ and might have decided to explore the possibility

of satisfying his (general) appetite for nourishment by consuming part of the still mysterious though present object F_1 . Hobbes cautions, nevertheless, that we have aversion for things "not only that we know have hurt us, but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not."⁴²

D. Hobbes on the Will

Appetites and aversions, which are tiny internal motions, respectively, toward and away from the apparent locations⁴³ of specific external objects, figure prominently in Hobbes's account of the will. For example, Hobbes contends that from time to time, human beings experience a succession of appetites and aversions for the same object. These successive appetites and aversions, hopes and fears concerning a single object, Hobbes explains, arise as one successively contemplates the "divers good and evil consequences of the doing, or omitting of the thing [he has] propounded,"⁴⁴ the thing propounded, for example, being to attempt to gain access to the object in question. In turn the whole sum of appetites and aversions which proceed through the mind when the thing propounded is either done or "thought impossible," is called *deliberation*.⁴⁵

Thus, if at time t_1 , person p has a desire to obtain object o , based upon his estimate of the pleasant consequences which are likely to redound to him as a result of obtaining o , and at time t_2 , p has an aversion to

obtaining object o based upon his estimate of the probable unpleasant consequences to himself of obtaining o, and if p has no further appetites or aversions with respect to the obtaining of o, then his deliberation with regard to attempting to obtain object o between times t1 and t2 would consist of the one appetite and the one aversion previously mentioned.

Deliberation comes to an end, "when that whereof [one deliberates] is either done or thought impossible; till then [one retains] the liberty of doing or omitting; according to [his] appetite or aversion."⁴⁶ Thus, each deliberation may come to an end in one of two ways. Specifically, one can opt to either perform the act propounded or to refrain from performing that act.

In turn, "the last appetite or aversion immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that which we call the WILL."⁴⁷ Hence, it is the case that some, though by no means all of the appetites and aversions which one experiences result in such observable actions as extending one's arm, or lurching one's body in the direction of a desired object. That is to say, the appetite of person p which is p's will or "last appetite in deliberation" is separate from the observable action which results from or is caused by the former. This is true simply because appetites and aversions are defined as endeavours or tiny, sensorially

imperceptible motions, rather than the voluntary motions themselves. In fact, in De Corpore, Hobbes details a three-step process by which these minute, internally generated motions lead to discrete, observable bodily motion. Hobbes claims that the "first endeavour" either toward or away from the object " is followed by a swelling and relaxation of the muscles; and lastly, these are followed by contraction and extension of the limbs which is animal motion."⁴⁸

One might be tempted to believe, especially in light of Hobbes's discussions of physical science or natural philosophy in De Corpore, that the will of a person, on any given occasion, constitutes a resolution of the various appetites and aversions which have affected him throughout the corresponding deliberation. However, this position, which construes the will as the vector sum or resultant of the various appetites and aversions which were experienced through the deliberative process, was not embraced by Hobbes. Rather, in his various discussions of deliberation and the will, Hobbes presents deliberation as the varying succession of appetites and aversions, and the will as simply the last appetite or aversion in the deliberative process.

We will now move on to examine and discuss two features of human nature which Hobbes believed to necessitate that the natural interactive state of human beings is (was, or

would be) characterized by unrestrained conflict and surreption, namely, (1) the apparently egoistic psychology which Hobbes attributes to humankind and (2) the approximate physical and intellectual equality of every human being with every other.⁴⁹

E. Hobbes and Predominant Egoism

Gregory Kavka has recently categorized the psychological theory which was held by Hobbes as "predominant egoism." Predominant egoism is the position "that self-interested motives tend to take precedence over non-self-interested motives in determining human actions [and that] non-self-interested motives usually give way to self-interested motives when there is a conflict."⁵⁰

I take it to be the case that from the standpoint of his political philosophy, what is interesting and significant is that Hobbes is committed to the position that in most instances, men will act so as to primarily benefit themselves, and will not primarily consider the effect that their action will have upon examples of human behavior which are motivated by a passion or a desire to benefit another person (when an alternative course of behavior open to the agent will, in the estimation of that actor, likely result in the realization of a greater benefit to the actor),⁵¹ even according to the most optimistic reading of Hobbes,

instances of such behavior can be assumed to be few and far between.

Stated somewhat crudely, what can be gathered from Hobbes's various discussions of this topic is that we should not expect Hobbesian men to enter into, or to remain parts of already established commonwealths because they possess a general desire to benefit their fellow humans. Rather, such men can be expected to enter into commonwealths, and thus to voluntarily subordinate themselves to the will of the established sovereign, precisely because they reckon that doing so will likely result in more advantageous (long-term) consequences to themselves than will any available alternative.⁵²

F. Hobbes on the Natural Equality of Human Beings

In the final section of this chapter, I will present what I take to be Hobbes's concept of the natural equality of human beings. I will base my presentation primarily upon Hobbes's discussions of the natural equality of human beings which are contained in Chapters 13 and 15 of Leviathan. (although I will, on a number of occasions, make reference to parallel passages in other of Hobbes's works of political philosophy) Throughout this section, I will be concerned not to critique the doctrine of natural equality forwarded by Hobbes, but rather, to explain precisely what this doctrine entails.

Once again, I am including this discussion because I believe that Hobbes's doctrine of the natural equality of human beings plays a significant role in determining the character that the state of nature or the natural condition of humankind assumes within Hobbes's writings.

Hobbes begins the thirteenth chapter of Leviathan by discussing the natural equality of human beings. He asserts that⁵³

[n]ature hath made men so equal in the faculties of the body, and mind; as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another might not pretend as well as he.

As is stated in this passage, Hobbes believes that the natural equality of humans consists in some combination of physical and mental capabilities (the combination of which he characterizes as "all . . . reckoned together.")

Curiously, however, rather than immediately discussing why the combined or "all reckoned together" type of natural powers of all human beings are basically equal, Hobbes chooses to consider, in turn, the two varieties of natural power.

With respect to physical strength, Hobbes claims that even the weakest of (fully grown) individuals possesses

strength sufficient to kill the strongest "either by secret machination or by confederacy with others."⁵⁴ Indeed, this concept of equality consists in (1) equality in so far as each man is capable of taking the life of any other man, either singly (i.e., by exercising merely his own power), or in league with other men, as well as, (2) equality in so far as each man is subject to being killed by either a single fellowman or by some combination of his fellowmen.⁵⁵

Hobbes contends that⁵⁶

as to the faculties of the mind. . . I find yet a greater equality among men than that of strength. For prudence is but experience; which equal time equally bestows upon those men in those things they apply themselves equally to.

In this passage, Hobbes is asserting that human beings are intellectually (roughly) equal, since all mature men possess a sense of prudence, of "know how," regarding the conduct of life, which their lives' experiences have bestowed upon them.

When discussing the natural human intellectual faculties, Hobbes contends "that prudence is but experience which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things they apply themselves equally to."⁵⁷ I wish to suggest that in this passage, Hobbes is attempting to further the claim that equal experiences affect all, or nearly all human beings partaking of those experiences in an approximately

equal manner. Further, as the quotation on page 24 of this chapter indicates, Hobbes is similarly forwarding the claim that the life's experiences of all mature human beings are sufficiently similar to allow one to posit the doctrine of mental or intellectual equality which he was interested to forward.

As we have seen, in the opening paragraphs of chapter 13 of Leviathan, Hobbes offers a series of relatively straightforward reasons for believing (1) that men are naturally equal to each other with respect to the faculties of the body, and (2) that men are naturally equal to one another with respect to the faculties of the mind. It seems clear, however, that Hobbes was similarly interested to advance the claim that human beings are naturally equal with respect to the "all reckoned together" sense of their physical and mental faculties. One is therefore naturally lead to wonder what this "all reckoned together" conception of the natural equality of humans is meant to entail.

It seems clear that Hobbes does not mean to suggest that all men in the state of nature are equal to each other with respect to the ability to perform any specific task. Indeed, this equality which Hobbes attributes to men in the state of nature, in the De Cive and Elements renderings, consists of the equal ability of men to do "the greatest of all things." Surely, Hobbes's frequent references to "the

weaker" and "the stronger" (in both strength and wit) make clear that Hobbes was not blind to the rather obvious fact that we do not all develop into a state of strict physical and intellectual equality.

In section 6 of chapter 11 of De Homine, Hobbes characterizes the greatest of goods for each man to be "his own preservation," and the greatest of "all evils" to be his own death (especially, Hobbes wryly adds, when the latter is accompanied by torture).⁵⁸ In light of this passage, we can understand why Hobbes characterized killing another person as "the greatest thing." If the preservation of person p's life constitutes p's greatest good, and the destruction or termination of p's life constitutes p's greatest evil, then causing the cessation of p's vital motion or vital functioning constitutes inflicting the greatest evil which p can suffer. Further, if person q can cause the termination of the vital motion within p's body (which given the brittleness of the human frame, Hobbes considered to be rather easy), then q can inflict upon p the greatest of evils or more colloquially, can do "the greatest thing" to p.

What is significant in Hobbes's analysis (and what Hobbes's "all reckoned together" sense of natural equality appears to entail) is that no man naturally possesses the power to secure his future good through his own physical or

intellectual capabilities.⁵⁹ In this sense, all men can be spoken of as being "naturally equal" to every other, since none is individually capable of guaranteeing the continuance of his own life. The possibility of securing such a position, and thereby, of protecting oneself against the danger of death as a result of the aggressive behavior of others, is clearly ruled out of the question by Hobbes, who continually emphasizes that the precivil condition is characterized by a lack of personal security on the part of each of its "members."⁶⁰ Thus, remarks Hobbes, "it is supposed from the equality of strength and *other natural faculties* of man, that no man is of might to assure himself for any long time of preserving himself thereby."⁶¹ Though in the state of nature, irresistible might (and only irresistible might) assures its possessor of such security (as well as natural dominion over others), because Hobbes judged no man to be naturally possessed of such might, he similarly believed that each man is naturally incapable of so guaranteeing his own future well-being.⁶²

Further, and in a related sense, human beings in the state of nature can be judged equal in so far as no man can be expected to assure to himself the possession and enjoyment of any socially desirable object or set of objects for any considerable period of time.

We may suppose, as above, that although in the state of nature, diverse men possess differing levels of probable success with respect to the activity of attaining the temporary possession of socially desirable objects (based upon considerations of physical strength, intellectual acuity, etc.), all men might nevertheless be spoken of as being equal in so far as no man possesses the natural power to secure his possessions against the united depredations of his opponents.⁶³ Significantly, this equality is to be measured not by the probability of one's success in either preserving one's life or in maintaining the possession of some desired good, but rather by the possibility of losing one's life or one's goods.

Interestingly, Hobbes touches upon the topic of the natural equality of human beings during his consideration of the law of nature "against pride" in chapter 15 of Leviathan⁶⁴. However, at this point in the text, Hobbes's commitment to the doctrine of natural equality seems a bit precarious, and the reason which he offers for regarding each of one's fellowmen as a natural equal appears somewhat peculiar.

Hobbes begins his discussion of this law of nature in Leviathan by reminding his readers that he has already shown that all men are by nature equal, and that the presently observable inequalities of "riches," "power," and "nobility

of kindred" have their basis in the civil law. He then opposes Aristotle's doctrine that some men are by nature more worthy to command while others are by nature more worthy to serve,⁶⁵ as being both against reason (as he claims to have demonstrated before), and against experience. For, announces Hobbes⁶⁶

there are very few so foolish that had not rather govern themselves than be governed by others; nor when the wise in their conceit contend by force with those who distrust their own wisdom do they always, or often, or almost any time get the victory.

In this passage, Hobbes registers the belief that nature does not divide men into two classes, namely, those who are created fit to govern (those who possess a certain kind of natural knowledge), and those who are born fit to serve (those who lack this type of knowledge) since (1) members of the second category seldom, if ever, acknowledge the supposed natural superiority of their "betters" and since (2) when contests or battles between the "naturally wise" and the "naturally strong" or "naturally ignorant" have occurred, the former have seldom if ever been able to emerge victorious. Let us now consider, in order, these two reasons forwarded by Hobbes.

First, Hobbes believes that if such natural divisions between natural governors and natural servants did exist,

then such divisions would be readily apparent to those people who occupy the latter, as well as to those who occupy the former category. That is to say, Hobbes appears to be harboring the implicit assumption that if such natural divisions existed, any human being (after due observation and reflection) would be able to determine whether he, or any other particular human person, was created to be a leader or a follower, and would be willing to acknowledge and assume the appropriate station (either that of a ruler or that of a ruled person) within the society which he occupies.

Simply, Hobbes is attempting to convince his readers that because almost no man judges it better to be ruled by another than to rule oneself, it is thereby the case that it is actually better for any man to rule himself than it is to be ruled by another.⁶⁷ Of course, Hobbes meant this argument to relate especially to those men who are supposed, or who would be supposed by "elitist" philosophers such as Aristotle, to be natural servants, but who, by their actions and their opinions, show themselves to be in disagreement with such a supposition. Since such men show themselves to disagree with the claim that they are natural servants (who would be better off if they were governed by natural rulers), it is thereby the case that such men are not natural servants.

Secondly, Hobbes is suggesting that if natural distinctions of the aforementioned types did exist, then when "contests" (presumably battles or skirmishes) between the wiser and the stronger occur, the wiser (that is to say, those who are presumed to be naturally fit to govern) would, through the imposition of clever strategies, find some way to defeat or control the stronger (that is, the presumed natural servants) all or most of the time. However, Hobbes observes that since in such contests, the wiser seldom if ever have the upper hand over the stronger, such natural distinctions must not exist.⁶⁸ As had been the case with Hobbes's first reason for denying this type of natural inequality, this second reason appears to be based upon some body of empirical evidence. That is to say, Hobbes is suggesting that throughout the history of humankind (or, at least, that portion of it of which he is aware), contests, battles, or one-on-one encounters have taken place in which those who have presumed themselves to be possessed of the kind of wisdom which allows them to govern well, have been haplessly unable to subdue those men who are physically stronger, but are less intellectually skillful. Unfortunately, Hobbes does not offer any *specific* instances of such occurrences, but merely assures his readers that such contests have often occurred in times of sedition and civil war.

Hobbes concludes his discussion of the ninth law of nature in Leviathan with the following curious passage:⁶⁹

If nature therefore have made men equal, that equality is to be acknowledged; or if nature have made man unequal; yet because men that think themselves unequal, will not enter into conditions of peace but upon equal terms, such equality must be admitted. And therefore for the ninth law of nature, I put this, That every man acknowledge other for his equal by nature.

What I find to be curious is that in this passage, as well as in parallel passages from his other political writings, Hobbes is saying that men should account each man equal by nature whether or not nature has made men equal. Indeed, during his treatment of this law of nature in The Elements, Hobbes forwards the astonishingly modest claim that since it cannot be imagined how peace can be achieved if men do not acknowledge equality with one another, men considered in mere nature ought, for peace's sake, to admit such equality.⁷⁰

On one level, we can see why Hobbes might have included such an injunction among his laws of nature. If men consider themselves to be superior to, or to value themselves more highly than they value others,⁷¹ then they will be more likely to "invade" and to contest for dominion. Roughly, if one man considers himself to be superior to another, he will likely think himself capable of gaining dominion over that

other, either by force or by wiles. In turn, if one thinks himself likely to gain the "upper hand" over another, he will have a tendency to attempt to exert (or demonstrate) his putative superiority over that person by adroitly employing his physical and intellectual powers. However, if one considers another to be his equal, he (the former) will be much less likely to attempt to overcome the latter through force and (especially) strategy. Nevertheless, we must remember that Hobbes had spent time and effort attempting to show that human beings are by nature equal. Why then did he feel it necessary to discuss the "contrary to fact" claim that even if men are significantly unequal by nature, they should, nevertheless be esteemed as equal?

Interestingly, what Hobbes appears keen to establish is that those such as Aristotle who claim that the wiser sort of men, those who claim to possess an inherent virtue or the appropriate type of "aptness" or natural knowledge, or worthiness to command are clearly wrong. Indeed, Hobbes's claim is that the skill of establishing dominion or of gaining and consolidating political power is not, and has never been based upon any variety of philosophical or technological know-how, but rather, is based upon one's ability to subdue one's opponent, principally through physical compulsion. As has been well documented, Hobbes believes that a science of politics, that is, a type of

philosophical or technological knowledge, can be devised and utilized to regulate the commonwealth.⁷² Nevertheless, Hobbes's claim that in the state of nature "there is no place for industry . . . no culture on earth, no arts and letters, [and] no society"⁷³ clearly indicates that he considered impossible the development of any such science of politics in mankind's natural condition.

The doctrine of the natural equality of humans is presented at the beginning of chapter 13 of Leviathan as one of the main causes of, as well as the basis for one of the potential solutions to, what Hobbes characterizes as the central problem of political philosophy. Specifically, the natural equality of human beings gives rise to a "social" condition which is unbearable, and from which all rational men desire to escape. Conceivably, if men were not created equal by nature, that is, if nature had created natural rulers and natural servants, men could live in harmony in a naturally hierarchical society. Nevertheless, the manner in which Hobbes treats the crucial claim of natural equality in chapter 15 of Leviathan suggests that the actual natural equality of human beings may not play the fundamental role which this author explicitly assigns to it.

Perhaps Hobbes was attempting to suggest that it is merely the "acknowledgement" of an in-principle potentially spurious natural equality on the part of all of the citizens

within a commonwealth, or of all the individuals within some geographic area, which is essential to provide the forces of social cohesion required to establish a commonwealth or to prevent a commonwealth from dissolving. That is to say, even though Hobbes continually stresses the claim that human beings are fundamentally equal to one another, perhaps it is the mere acknowledgement of a natural human equality by most or all of the citizens of the commonwealth which is of primary significance in maintaining conditions of peace and avoiding the calamity of the natural state.

After considering this conundrum, we must admit that with respect to his derivation of the state of nature, what emerges as the most significant feature of Hobbes's doctrine of the natural equality of human beings is the fact that since no man possesses the natural powers to successfully resist the (possibly united) depredations of one or more of his fellow men, and since each man possesses the natural power, either singly or in concert with other men, to put an end to the life of any man, then no man can be spoken of as possessing a natural dominion over any other. As we will be going on to see in chapter 2 of this dissertation, Hobbes believes that a recognition of this fundamental "equality of ability" on the part of all or most men gives rise to an "equality of hope in the attaining of [one's] ends,"⁷⁴ and

thus helps to determine that the character of the resulting natural condition will be a rather nasty one indeed.

However, from the standpoint of the formation and maintenance of such multiperson groupings as commonwealths, what emerges as the most significant feature of Hobbes's doctrine of the natural equality of human beings, is not the fact that human beings are naturally equal to one another (according to Hobbes's somewhat idiosyncratic conception of human equality), but rather, the fact that human beings can be persuaded, for the sake of fostering peace, and creating a tranquil and comfortable social setting, to acknowledge, and to behave in accordance with the claim that human beings are fundamentally equal to one another. Further, this admission of equality, and a concomitant willingness to act in accordance with this admission might rest upon the rather obvious and rather easily perceived fact that each human being is susceptible to having his life terminated by (for example) the attack of some other human being or human beings.

Provided as we are with an understanding of Hobbes's somewhat less than firmly-embraced belief in the natural equality of human beings, as well as a familiarity with Hobbes's predominantly self-interested, though not quite egoistic conception of human behavior, we may now proceed to examine the effect that these two features of Hobbes's

anthropology have upon the character of the natural, pre-social or pre-political state of human interaction.

NOTES

1. Specifically, I will be attempting to show how Hobbes's theory of human motivation and volition helps give rise to what has been termed "a predominantly egoistic psychology." As will become clear during the course of the first chapter of this dissertation, an adequate understanding of Hobbes's predominantly egoistic theory of human psychology depends, in part, upon an understanding of Hobbes's theory of human will and motivation, which, in turn, depends, in part, upon an understanding of the basic features of Hobbes's "dual aspect" theory of human sensory activity.

This developmental sequence can be understood in terms of the following linear representation:

Sensation → Motivation & Will → Predominant Egoism

so that human sensory activity (as understood by Hobbes) plays a significant role in determining the character of how an individual human being will act on any particular occasion, and in turn, the manner in which human beings are motivated to act helps give rise to a psychological theory which has been characterized as "predominant egoism."

2. Thomas Hobbes, Man and Citizen, Bernard Gert, editor, (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1978), pages 98-99.

3. Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes in 11 Volumes, William Molesworth, editor, (London: Bohn, 1839), Vol. I, page 391.

4.Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 405.

5.Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, pages 406-407.

6.Perhaps additional light can be cast upon the four categories discussed in this and the previous two paragraphs when one considers the following two-by-two matrix:

	A	B
	Thoughts, Ideas, Phantasms	Pleasure, Pain
	*=====	
	*	
C. Mechanico- Physiological Processes	* Minute reactions * at the innermost * portion of the * organ of sense. * (See p. 6-7) * *	Helping or hindering of the body's vital motion. (See pp. 9-10)
D. Seemings, or Representations (of C)	* Such ideas or * * immediate * objects of * awareness as * colors, sounds * and odors. * (See table in * endnote #12) *	The consciously perceived feeling of pain and pleasure. (See pp. 9-10)
	*=====	

Within his writings, Hobbes speaks of two relatively broad varieties of sense, namely (A) that variety which involves or includes such categories as colors, odors and sounds, and (B) that variety which involves or includes such categories as pain and pleasure. Further, Hobbes specifies that each individual instance of sensory activity (of both variety A and variety B) can be understood as both (C) a mechanico-physiological process that occurs within the sensory subject's body, and as (D) a representation, appearance, seeming, feeling or other immediate object of awareness which arises within the consciousness of the sensory subject. In each such instance, the pain, pleasure, color, sound, etc. of which the subject is consciously aware, is to be understood as a representation to that subject of some physiological process occurring contemporaneously within his own body.

7. Accordingly, I will discuss Hobbes's first variety of sense (A) on pages 4-8, and Hobbes's second variety of sense (B) on pages 8-10 of this chapter.

8. That is, of those faculties which relate directly to the first variety of sense (A) mentioned above.

9. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Edwin Curley, editor, (Hackett: Indianapolis, 1994), page 6.

10. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 6.

11. For a fuller explanation of Hobbes's thoughts concerning the imagination and memory, see below, pages 7-8.

12. Thomas Hobbes, De Corpore (English Works, Vol. I, page 389.) During the course of his various discussions of specific phantasms (or phantasm types) in Leviathan and De Corpore, Hobbes identifies the following phantasm types as being associated with the five conventionally recognized sense modalities:

SENSE MODALITY

		SIGHT	HEARING	SMELL	SAVOUR	TOUCH
		=====	=====	=====	=====	=====
C	*	Light	Sound	Odor	Taste	Hardness
H	*	Color				Softness
A	P	* Smoothness				Heat
R	H	* Roughness				Cold
A	A	* Rarity				Wetness
C	N	* Density				Oiliness
T	T	* (Figure)				Smoothness
E	A	* Motion				Roughness
R	S	* Rest				Rarity
I	M	* Magnitude				Density
S	S	*				(Figure)
T	*					Motion
I	*					Rest
C	*					Magnitude

It should be noted that Hobbes's most sustained discussions of the various types of phantasms occur in Chapters 7, 8 and 25 of De Corpore, and in Chapter 1 of Leviathan.

Interestingly, on page 405 of De Corpore, Hobbes contends that smoothness, roughness, rarity and density "refer to figure and are therefore common to both touch and sight." Thus, Hobbes *appears* to register a belief in the existence of so-called common sensibles.

13. Thomas Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, Page 391.

14. It should be noted that in chapter 25 of De Corpore, Hobbes presents his theory of human sensation not as an incontrovertibly true doctrine, but rather, as a "ways and means" by which "the appearances or effects of nature" (i.e., phantasms of sense) "may be, I do not say they are, generated." (Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 388.)

15. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 391; Hobbes, Leviathan, page 6.

16. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 6.

17. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 392.

18. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 396.

19. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 396.

20. Unhappily, as has already been seen to be the case with phantasms of sense, Hobbes frequently conflates (1) the notion of a phantasm of the imagination or of memory as residual motion within the sensory organ of the percipient subject with (2) the notion of a phantasm of the imagination or of memory as a phenomenal appearance or an immediate object of awareness. However, for the sake of brevity I will refrain from presenting a lengthy discussion of this distinction.

21. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 8; Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 396. Hobbes adds, somewhat surprisingly, that the decay of sense should not be understood as a decay or weakening of the motion made by the object. If this were the case, then phantasms would "always and necessarily" be less clear (or in the memorable words of Hume, less forceful and vivacious) than they are in sense.

However, Hobbes observes, our experiences of dreams should convince us that on some occasions, specifically, during exceedingly vivid or "convincing dreams," phantasms of the imagination, which are to be equated to or correlated with residual motion in the sensory organ after the perceptual object which caused it has been removed, are equally vivid to those which result when the object is present and imparting motion to the relevant organ.

Hobbes claims that dream images are often as vibrant as those which are immediately caused or imparted by the motion of currently present external objects, precisely because in sleep, the organs of sense are not moved at present external objects.

Indeed, Hobbes tersely defines 'sleep' as "the privation of the act of sense," and 'dreams' as "the imaginations of them that sleep." (Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law: Natural and Politic, Tönnies, Ferdinand, editor, 2nd ed. (London: Cass, 1968), page 8.) Thus, in this slumbering condition, the motions which had been previously caused or transferred by external objects, and which remain, in some not precisely specified sense, in the sensory organs, are not obscured by immediate motions, and can thus give rise to rather vivid phantasms in dreams. Hence, in dreams, the previously experienced phantasms of sense of waking life are reexperienced as often as their corresponding internal motions come to be predominant. (Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 398).

22. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 398.

23. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 398.

24. Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 8-9.

25. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 406. It should be noted that in Chapter 6 of Leviathan, Hobbes *does* mention "the pleasures of sense," and *does* contend that the "motion which is called appetite, and for the appearance of it delight and pleasure, seemeth to be a corroboration of vital motion and a help thereunto." (Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 29-30) Unhappily, the description of this second type of sense (B) which is contained in Leviathan is even less detailed than that which can be found in De Corpore.

26. See my discussion of vital motion, below, pages 10-12.

27. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 27.

28. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 407. It should be noted that, within his writings, Hobbes does not, to the best of my knowledge, specifically discuss the distinction between vital motion, which applies specifically to (the bodies of) living organisms, and motion *simpliciter* which relates to living, as well as to non-living material bodies.

Nevertheless, on page 109 of De Corpore (Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 109.), Hobbes defines motion (*simpliciter*) or local motion as "the continual relinquishing of one place and acquisition of another," and on page 407 of the same work defines vital motion as "the motion of the blood perpetually circulating in the veins and arteries." (Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 407.)

Thus, we can see that according to Hobbes, vital motion constitutes a subset of motion *simpliciter*. Cf. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 204.

29. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 27. Since Hobbes proclaims that any instance of human voluntary (or animal) motion depends always upon a (previously existing) thought which arises or is fancied in the mind (that is, upon the incidence of a phantasm of sense or imagination or of memory), we can reasonably infer that an individual's having a phantasm of sense (or of memory or of the imagination) stands as a necessary prerequisite for that individual's engaging in a voluntary act or an act of voluntary motion. For a fuller discussion of the relationship between phantasms of sense and voluntary motion, see below, pages 15-18.

30. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 3. Indeed, in light of Hobbes's somewhat brief discussions of what this author terms "vital motion," one is led to conclude that vital motion is appropriate to those physical objects which can be classified as (living) biological organisms. What Hobbes does not mention but can reasonably be expected to have believed is that non-living, non-conscious physical objects such as brass ingots and brick walls are subject to being moved by the action of external physical stimuli and are thus subject to what might be termed "local motion," or motion *simpliciter* but are not subject to such internal processes which characterize living organisms such as the movement of blood through the human circulatory system, the movement of oxygen throughout the human respiratory system or the movement of physical matter through the human digestive system.

It should be noted that I am presenting a discussion of Hobbes's conception of vital motion only because this author's description of human voluntary motion makes specific reference to the type of human motion which he terms "vital."

31. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 407.

32. Given what Hobbes has to say about pleasure and pain in Chapter 25 of De Corpore, we might reasonably forward the following claim:

From a physiological standpoint, if some activity in the individual's sensory organ supports or enhances vital motion, then that activity results in a conscious feeling of pleasure to the individual.

Conversely, if some activity in the individual's sensory organ constricts or limits vital motion, then that activity results in a conscious feeling of pain to the individual. It should be noted that the sensation of pleasure or pain within the consciousness of the individual is caused directly by the enhancement or restriction of vital motion in the body and only indirectly by the fact that the organ's motion causes such enhancement or restriction.

Further, it is not necessary that the individual in question recognizes that his experienced feeling of pleasure or pain results from the enhancement or constriction of vital motion in some portion of tissue within his body. Even though Hobbes would probably expect anatomists and other relevant specialists to recognize that pleasure or pain is caused by the enhancement or constriction of vital motion, it is doubtful that he would expect non-specialists or "men-in-the-street" to recognize the relationship between sensations such as pleasure and pain, and such vital bodily motion as the circulation of blood throughout the body.

It would seem that in this process, the individual consciously pursues an object because he believes that the acquisition or consumption of that object will result in his realization of some quantity of pleasure. For example, if under such circumstances, we were to ask the individual why he pursues the object in question, the individual would likely respond that he does so because he believes that the acquisition or consumption of the object will make him feel better or will produce some quantity of satisfaction or pleasure, and not because he believes that the acquisition or consumption of the object will likely have the effect of enhancing the vital motion (i.e., the circulation of blood, etc.) within his body.

Thus, we can understand that in a purely physiologico-mechanical sense, the individual's attraction to, or motivation toward the object in question is a physical reaction which has as its goal the preservation or enhancement of the vital motion within the individual's body. (and hence, the preservation of that individual's life)

However, when we consider the individual as a sentient or conscious being, we can understand that the enhancement of the body's vital motion results in the individual's experiencing pleasure, so that the individual consciously pursues a desired object (of which kind he recalls having had previously extracted pleasure) *precisely because* he expects its acquisition or consumption to provide him with some degree of pleasure.

33. See Hobbes, Leviathan, page 27, where Hobbes states that "it is evident that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion."

34. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 28.

35. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 28.

36. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 28.

37. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, pages 407-408.

38. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 408.

39. Thus, an experienced actor, that is, one who has "come to know readily what is to be pursued and avoided" and who has "a ready use of his nerves and organs, in the pursuing and avoiding of good and bad" (i.e., pleasures and pains) can be conceived of as being one who has attained a high level of facility in (1) producing or maintaining the sense of pleasure and in (2) eliminating or avoiding the sense of pain within his body. Since this skill is characterized as depending upon experience and memory, we may infer that phantasms of sense and phantasms of memory play a significant role in the process of creating appetites and aversions in the body of a human being and eventually of determining how that individual will act on a given occasion.

40. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 28.

41. Hunger might be characterized as pain caused by a slackening of the type of vital motion related to the nutrition of the human body. (see Hobbes, Leviathan, page 27.)

In turn, such a feeling of discomfort might give rise to an appetitive passion, which minutely moves the individual's body in the direction of some object, the possession of which that individual believes will have the probable effect of alleviating his present state of discomfort or pain by enhancing the vigorousness of the vital motion within (the appropriate portion of) his body.

42.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 28. Interestingly, Hobbes is asserting that human beings possess a (second order) desire to sensorially experience hitherto unexperienced objects which might eventually be discovered to prolong or enhance life by promoting vital motion, as well as a general aversion to heretofore unexperienced objects, the latter of which appears to be grounded upon a desire to avoid any object, the contact with which might result in a hindering of the body's vital motion. Thus, with respect to this matter, the human organism is endowed with a general inquisitiveness or curiosity regarding the effects of unexperienced objects, as well as a general diffidence regarding the effects of such objects, that is to say, a general tendency toward, as well as a general tendency away from these unfamiliar potentially life enhancing, yet potentially destructive objects.

43.It should be noted that when one asserts that an individual experiences an endeavor toward some object o, what he means to suggest is that that individual experiences an endeavor toward the apparent location of o. This is true since the location of the object cannot be directly known or discerned, but can only be indicated to the sensory subject *via* representative phantasms of sense.

44.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 33. Hobbes maintains that "[t]hat which men desire, they are also said to love: and to hate those things for which they have an aversion." (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 28.) Thus, Hobbes rather unremarkably defines love of an object or hatred of an object to be relative to the individual who either loves (that is, experiences a motion toward) or hates (that is, experiences a motion away from) the object in question. Somewhat more remarkable, however, is Hobbes's claim that the terms 'good' and 'evil' are to be defined in terms of the preferences, appetites and aversions of the person who uses those terms.

For example, Hobbes states that when a person refers to some object x as 'good,' the latter person is simply expressing the fact that he has a desire or appetite for the object in question, and when he designates some object y 'evil,' he is expressing the fact that he finds y to be an object of hate or aversion. Hence, Hobbes contends that "we all measure good and evil by the pleasure or pain we either feel at present or expect hereafter," and that "the words 'good' and 'evil' . . . are ever used with relation to the person that useth them." (Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 28-29.)

Thus, as we will be going on to discuss in greater detail in chapter 3 of this dissertation, in the absence of a coercive power sufficiently strong to guarantee compliance with sovereign commands, in the prepolitical social condition which Hobbes variously refers to as the Natural State of Mankind and the State of Nature, each person is permitted to fix the referents of the terms 'good' and 'evil' based upon his own individual appetites and aversions, that is based upon how he is "moved" by the various objects, the ideas or images of which come into his mind.

Indeed, Hobbes denies that there exists anything which is simply or absolutely good or evil, "nor any common rule of good or evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man, when there is no commonwealth." He does concede, however, that within a commonwealth, a "common rule of good and evil" is to be taken from the judgment of "the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof." (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 29.)

Clearly, Hobbes does not mean to suggest that while in a pre-political condition, the nature of the objects which are variously called 'good' and 'evil' do not serve to determine the manner in which such objects are designated, once the commonwealth has been established, the rules governing good and evil are to be taken from the nature of such objects. Rather, what he is claiming is that, once a commonwealth has been erected, the definitions and measures of what is to be deemed 'good' and what 'evil' are to be determined by the will of the person who has been authorized to fix such definitions and to determine such rules (i.e., the sovereign).

However, since in this initial chapter I intend merely to present a discussion of the salient features of Hobbes's conception of the human organism, I will postpone a more robust account of the process by which men surrender, among other things, the right to fix the definitions of good and evil until a later chapter.

45.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 33.

46.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 33.

47.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 33.

48.Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 408.

49. Perhaps at this juncture, it should be noted that a scarcity of desired material resources is to be reckoned as an additional contributory factor in determining that the state of nature is (was, or would be) one of "wholesale conflict and surreption."

Indeed, I believe it to be true (and notable) that some element of scarcity is apparent in each of Hobbes's three accounts of the derivation of the state of nature. By this, I do not mean to suggest that within the state of nature, the necessary objects of human survival (such as food, water, etc.) are present in insufficient supply to support the lives of this condition's inhabitants. Rather, Hobbes's descriptions appear to render it the case merely that since men's respective appetites for the same desirable, nonshareable and indivisible objects (which in some instances, might be characterized as nonessential or "luxury" items) cannot all be satisfied, some conception of scarcity must be associated with this milieu.

For example, while describing the character of the natural condition of humankind in The Elements, Hobbes states that "many men's appetites carry themselves to one and the same end; which end can neither be enjoyed in common nor divided." (Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 71.) He claims that in such cases, "the stronger must enjoy it alone, and that it must be decided by battle who is stronger." (Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 71.)

In De Cive, Hobbes mentions that very often the objects which men commonly desire can be neither enjoyed in common, nor divided. Thus, it is clear that, at least in some cases, the objects which men commonly desire are either in short supply, or are not easily accessible, that is, are properly characterizable as scarce resources. It does not appear to be the case, however, that these scarce objects are necessarily resources which must be possessed by the appropriate desirous or appetitive man in order to facilitate his continued survival. (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 115.)

Finally, we may note that in Leviathan, Hobbes presents the common appetite for a single object as the most significant factor in determining that the natural interactional condition of humankind is properly characterizable as a "war of each against all." A comprehensive examination of Hobbes's Leviathan derivation of the state of nature will be presented on pp. 61-75, below.

50. Gregory Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), page 64.

51. See, for example, Hobbes's discussion of the passions designated 'love' and 'charity' in sections 16 and 17 of Chapter 9 of The Elements of Law. (Hobbes, Elements of Law, pages 43-44.)

52. This point is forcefully confirmed in Section 2 of Chapter 1 of De Cive, where Hobbes asserts that "[w]e do not therefore by nature seek society for its own sake, but that we may receive some honour or profit from it." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 111.)

53. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 74.

54. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 74.

55. Indeed, in chapter one of De Cive, we find Hobbes commenting upon the brittleness of the frame of the human body, and in chapter fourteen of The Elements we find him observing how little force is needed to effect the "taking away of another man's life." See Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 114; and Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 70.

56. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.

57. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75. Since "prudence is but experience," and since experience is ultimately reducible to sequences of sensory perception(s), we can see that Hobbes's theory of human sensation plays a crucial foundational role in Hobbes's theory of prudence or natural wit.

58. Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 48.

59. Recall Hobbes's claim that "when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another might not pretend as well as he." (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 74.)

60. For a more robust description of the state that interpersonal relationships are likely to assume in the state of nature, see my extended discussion in chapter 2 of this dissertation.

61. Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 74.

62. See Hobbes's statement that men cannot "expect any lasting preservation, continuing thus in the state of nature, that is, of war, by reason of the equality of power, and other human faculties they are endued withal" in section 15 of chapter 1 of De Cive (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 119.) Further, see Hobbes's claim that "it is supposed from the equality of strength and other natural faculties of man, that no man is of might sufficient, to assure himself for any long time, of preserving himself thereby, while he remaineth therefore in the state of hostility and war" in section 14 of chapter 14 of the Elements. (Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 74.) Cf. Hobbes's assertion in paragraph 4 of chapter 14 of Leviathan that "as long as the natural right of every man to everything endureth, there can be no security to any man, so strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time, which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live." (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 80.)

63. See my discussion of competition for desired physical objects among men in the state of nature on pp. 65-66 of Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

64. As well as in chapter 3 of De Cive and chapter 17 of The Elements of Law.

65. A doctrine which effectively denies that human beings are fundamentally naturally equal to one another.

66. Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 96-97.

67. In this matter, I construe Hobbes's argument to be roughly the following:

1. (Almost) every person judges it to be the case that it is better for him (understood reflexively) to rule himself than it is to be ruled by another.

2. If (1), then for each person, it is better to rule oneself than it is to be ruled by another.

3. Therefore, for each person, it is better to rule oneself than it is to be ruled by another.

or, if you prefer,

1. (Almost) every person judges it to be the case that it is better for him (understood reflexively) to rule himself than it is to be ruled by another.

2. If (1), then for each person, it is better to rule oneself than to be ruled by another.

3. If, for each person, it is better to rule oneself than it is to be ruled by another, then natural servants do not exist (and human beings are fundamentally equal to one another (in the relevant sense)).

4. Therefore, natural servants do not exist (and human beings are fundamentally equal to one another (in the relevant sense)).

This argument can be seen to embody the informal fallacy commonly referred to as *argumentum ad populum*, or an appeal to popular opinion, to wit, the conditional statement in premise (2) asserts that if (virtually) every person judges it better to rule himself, than to be ruled by another, it is thereby the case that, for each person, it is actually better for him to rule himself than it is to be ruled by another. Obviously, however, an opponent of Hobbes might enquire as to why the united opinion of mankind should guide us in making decisions about what is true in this matter.

Moreover, premise (1), apparently an empirical premise, is subject to debate. Surely Hobbes presents us with no incontrovertible (or even compelling) evidence that this statement is true.

68. See, for example, Hobbes's claim in The Elements of Law that "when there was any contention between the finer and the coarser wits (as there hath been often in times of sedition and civil war) for the most part these latter hath carried away the victory," (Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 88.)

as well as his assertion in De Cive that "neither if the wiser and the stronger do contest, have these ever or after the upper hand of those." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 143.)

69. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 97.

In the parallel passage from De Cive, Hobbes contends that

[w]hether therefore men be equal by nature, the equality is to be acknowledged, or whether unequal, because they are like to contest for dominion, it is necessary for the obtaining of peace that they be esteemed as equal. . . .(Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 143.)

And lastly, in the corresponding passage from The Elements, Hobbes urges that

as long as men arrogate to themselves more honour than they give to others, it cannot be imagined how they can possibly live in peace: and consequently we are to suppose, that for peace sake, nature hath ordained this law, *That every man acknowledge other for his equal*.(Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 88.)

70. See endnote # 69.

71. Which Hobbes believed at least some men had a strong tendency to do; see below, ch. 2, pages 56-57.

72. For example, see Quentin Skinner's discussion of Hobbes's "science of politics" in Chapter 8 of Quentin Skinner's Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pages 294-326.

73. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 76.

74. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.

CHAPTER II

HOBBS'S DERIVATION OF THE STATE OF NATURE

A. Introduction

Each of Hobbes's three major works of political philosophy contains a chapter in which he purports to derive or deduce the bellicose state of nature from a consideration of (1) the natural equality of human beings, and (2) the passions which motivate human beings to act in particular ways.¹ In this chapter of my dissertation, I will carefully examine the derivation of the state of nature (or the natural condition of mankind) which can be found in Chapter 13 of Leviathan.

By considering this derivation, I will explain why Hobbes believes that the interactional situation which would result from the placement of two or more men (each of whom possesses the previously described human character) within the same geographic region would be a rather uncertain, belligerent and licentious state. I will devote a healthy portion of this chapter to a discussion of the two types of human beings whom Hobbes respectively designates "moderate men" and "dominators," and to an analysis of the function that each plays in determining the character of the state of nature.² Even though I will concentrate my presentation upon the account which is set forward in Leviathan, I will, from time to time, make reference to interesting similarities and differences between the Leviathan

derivation and those derivations which can be found in De Cive and in The Elements of Law. I will reserve for chapter 3 a discussion of the three conceptions of the state of nature which I believe can be legitimately culled from Hobbes's various political writings.

Despite the differences which are apparent among the various "deductions" of the state of nature, Hobbes's strategy remains essentially the same in his three major political works. Specifically, Hobbes begins each "derivation" by remarking upon the natural equality of the physical and intellectual qualities of all human beings, and proceeds thereafter to draw a distinction between two types of men, which distinction is purportedly based upon a corresponding diversity of passions, or diversity of bodily constitution. Specifically, Hobbes contends that some men [sc. "dominators"] are frequently affected by overwhelming passions which cause them to challenge, perturb, and eventually to lash out against other men. Hobbes describes such men as being affected by "a vain glory" and a false esteem of their own powers [inani gloria et falsa virium æstimatio].³ This combination of passions⁴ has the following effects upon those men who are bedeviled by them: Primarily, such men are convinced of the falsity of the doctrine of the fundamental natural equality of human beings, in so far as they believe themselves to be significantly superior to all or most of those men who

happen to be around them. Secondly, such men are intent upon validating their own feelings of, and claims to superiority over others by actively "challenging" those others for publicly acknowledged "respect and honors." Thirdly, such men purportedly "take pleasure in contemplating their own powers in acts of conquest," that is, enjoy "demonstrating" their supposed superiority above others by undertaking (voluntary) acts of physical aggression.

Hobbes contrasts men of the former variety with those men [sc. "moderates"] who "rightly value their own powers," who "look for but an equality of nature," and who would "be glad to be at ease within modest bounds."⁵ Thus, while dominators refuse to acknowledge an equality of their powers with those of other men, moderates freely admit an equality of nature. Moreover, while dominators are eager to engage in physical battles with other men for the purpose of garnering honors, respect and praises, moderates are described as being disinclined to undertake such potentially dangerous battles for the mere purpose of buttressing the level of esteem with which they are regarded by their peers.⁶ Finally, while dominators are described as sometimes endeavoring to conquer other persons "for delectation only," that is, because they genuinely enjoy doing so, moderates can be expected to engage in such imperious and "anticipatory" activity only for the purpose of preserving their goods and their lives (i.e. "for conservation.")⁷

A significant point in Hobbes's analysis is that the presence of (some) dominators within a social milieu increases the incidence of acts of interpersonal violence, and moreover, that the presence of dominators within that milieu can be understood to have a pervasive and deleterious effect upon the voluntary behavior not only of other dominators, but of moderate men as well. Importantly then, even though dominators are described as constituting merely part of the social milieu, their presence can, nevertheless, be understood to have a profound effect upon the behavior of most or all of the men in their vicinity.⁸

Dominators and moderates differ not only because the actions of the members of the former category are more likely than are those of members of the latter to be motivated by such passions as anger and vain-glory, but moreover, because the opinions and actions of members of the former category are much less liable to be affected by rational arguments than are the opinions and actions of members of the latter category. In light of the various comments Hobbes makes about this issue, I believe that dominators can be properly understood as men whose violent passions predominate over their faculties of reason.⁹

Before presenting Hobbes's Leviathan derivation of the state of nature, I will briefly discuss Hobbes's explicitly acknowledged distinction between dominators and moderates.

B. Some Thoughts on the Distinction between Moderates and Dominators

It appears certain that the widespread known presence of dominators within a social milieu has the effect of coloring the character which the resulting interactional situation among those constituent individuals assumes. As will become clear during the course of chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this dissertation, the known presence of dominators within a population can be similarly understood to have enormous consequences upon (1) the willingness of the members of that population to enter into collective organizational units such as commonwealths, as well as (2) the willingness of members of already established organizational units such as commonwealths to remain members or parts of such units. Thus, my immediately forthcoming exploration of the distinction between dominators and moderates can be seen to be relevant to my subsequent discussions of the formation and maintenance of the commonwealth, and should thus be included in this present chapter.

It is apparent that we can trace much of the disharmonious temper of the condition which Hobbes designates "the state of nature" or "the natural condition of mankind" to the presence of certain antisocial passions, most notably 'pride' and 'vain glory,' within the bodily constitutions of some of the men who populate this

condition. As we have seen, this is true both in Hobbes's earlier political treatises, in which vanity or vain glory is explicitly identified as the prime generating factor of the bellicose natural condition of mankind, and in Leviathan, where the pernicious influence of such passions is somewhat more carefully, if not intentionally, concealed.

Given the aforementioned equality of human intellectual facilities, dominators presumably possess the ability to reason from premisses to conclusions (which Hobbes describes as a rather mechanical faculty).¹⁰ However, either because of the overwhelming influence of their antisocial passions (such as anger and a desire for vengeance), because of their inclination to significantly overrate their own level of power *vis-à-vis* that of other men, or because of a disinclination to exercise their faculties of reason, dominators do not make full active use of these rational faculties. Thus, it would seem that dominators are frequently prompted to act in an antisocial or imperious fashion for the following two reasons:

(1) Although dominators can formulate and practically use (i.e., employ through voluntary activity) valid arguments, they have a tendency to insert in their arguments (or instances of practical reasoning) premises which are based upon false estimates of their own status *vis-à-vis* those of other men. Such premises might be understood as statements or claims based upon the belief that the reasoner is

significantly more valuable or more worthy of respect than those men around him.

(2) Dominators are often unable to benefit from the conclusions of reason because of the presence of such violent passions as anger and an inveterate desire for vengeance.¹¹

In the first instance, (1), it might be true that although dominators can reason correctly, they often arrive at false conclusions due to the faulty nature of their presuppositions, and the falsity of the corresponding premises. Consequently, when dominators use such a conclusion to guide or work in conjunction with a motive passion, the resulting voluntary action, though perhaps effective in securing the actor temporary access to some desired good, will, in the long term, likely lead to mistrust, social instability, and a rather unenviable living situation.

In the second case, (2), it might be true that even though dominators can, and often do, reason correctly by employing valid arguments and true premises, the results (or true conclusions) of this reasoning process cannot be properly employed or put into practice either because (2A) such men possess insufficiently strong passions or endeavors to comply with or motivate the course of action associated with the result of this reasoning process or (2B) on those occasions when such conclusions could be profitably put into

action, the voluntary actions of such men are motivated by such perturbations as anger and *μήνις* which effectively bypass the conclusions of reason. In cases of type (2A), the dominator can be understood as failing to act in compliance with the conclusion or dictate of reason because he fails to possess *any* sufficiently strong desire or other passion to "carry" or "assist" that conclusion. In cases of type (2B), the dominator can be understood as failing to act in compliance with such a dictate because the passion or desire *which would otherwise* motivate acting in such a manner is notably weaker or less persistent than the more violent passion which, in a sense, overwhelms the former. In cases of the former type (2A), the difficulty lies simply in the reasoner's lacking a sufficient motive for acting in accordance with his dictate of reason, while in cases of the latter type (2B), the difficulty lies in the predominance of violent passions which interfere with the reasoner's internal process of translating the dictate of reason into the utility of practice.

Thus, we may conclude that the voluntary actions of dominators are less amenable than those of moderates to the suggestions or precepts of reason. This will be true if we understand precepts of reason to be those which, if faithfully followed by all or most men, will lead to a condition of peace, an avoidance of a violent death, and in all likelihood, a maximization of one's life span. Because

the moderate is not frequently affected by the disruptive passions (of the above described type), he is better able than the dominator to act in accordance with the laws of nature which Hobbes describes as "precepts of reason," and which we might understand as rules for interpersonal conduct which, if widely observed, will foster a condition of social peace. By contrast, since the disruptive passions have a profound effect in determining the behavior of the dominator, we might reasonably infer that such passions are frequently of sufficient force to overpower or overrule whatever (comparatively weak) "passions toward peace" the dominator might experience, and hence to cause him to refrain from acting in accordance with the precepts toward peace (or laws of nature) which reason suggests.

C. The Leviathan Derivation

In his various derivations of the state of nature, Hobbes endeavors to imagine how a number of solitary human beings would most likely behave if they were forced to confront one another in a condition bereft of a common sovereign mechanism that is of sufficient strength to *guarantee* a condition of peace and safety. In his derivations, Hobbes presupposes a conception [or understanding] of human beings as fundamentally equal, predominantly egoistic creatures. Moreover, Hobbes believes that some (never precisely specified) proportion of men can be properly characterized as dominators, whose violent

passions frequently affect the character of their voluntary behavior.

When he begins his actual Leviathan derivation of the state of nature, Hobbes speculates that the natural equality of human beings would give rise to a recognition of such equality on the part of many or most men. This, in turn, would foster an equality of hope for the attainment of those physical objects which one desires. Further, this equality of hope, coupled with the influence of Hobbes's predominantly egoistic psychology, would give rise to a general willingness to enter into interpersonal competition for the purpose of establishing sole control over desired objects. This, in turn, and would eventually lead to the occurrence of actual, perhaps violent competitive struggles. Further, since each man in this condition would eventually come to recognize that those around him harbor a willingness to enter into competitive struggles, and would eventually come to observe (or be involved in) such struggles, then each man would develop a general diffidence or uncertainty regarding the future behavior of those around him. Such an attitude of diffidence, coupled with (1) a recognition that the behavior of those men around him could result in the termination of his own life and (2) an intense fear of losing his life, would eventually lead each man to recognize that he must engage in "anticipatory" activity in order to make more likely the continuance of his own life (and to

make less likely his own violent death). Finally, Hobbes contends that the social condition which would result from these circumstances could properly be characterized as a condition of war, since he understands war to consist "not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known."¹²

Even though Hobbes gives his reader the initial impression that this derivation constitutes a direct unilinear sequence of steps, it quickly becomes clear that there are various elements or factors which impact upon this process, but nevertheless are not directly caused by the immediately prior step. Indeed, several of these elements or factors are directly related to the presence of dominators within the social mix.

For example, we might reasonably maintain that the presence of dominators will make the competitive struggles for material goods more intense or more frequent than would be the case if the population were composed exclusively of moderates. This would be due primarily to the fact that a dominator can be expected to act unsociably by striving to obtain and retain those goods "which to himself are superfluous and to others necessary."¹³ Moreover, we might reasonably contend that the presence of dominators will result in a greater number of aggressive acts intended to assure to the actor honor, glory or praise than would be the

case if the population were composed exclusively of moderates.

Further, Hobbes contends that the right of nature licenses men to do anything which they consider necessary to preserve their own lives, even though some of the individuals in the social mix, (that is, dominators) can be expected to engage in violent acts *even when* they do not sincerely believe that such acts constitute necessary means to their own self-preservation. This third point is forcefully confirmed when Hobbes asserts that some men can be expected to engage in violent acts not for the sake of conservation or self-preservation, but merely because such activity provides them with some degree of "delectation."¹⁴

Thus, the character of the derivation of the state of nature as a direct linear sequence is undermined by the following three considerations: (A) dominators (whose influence would seem to fall outside of such a direct linear sequence) can be expected to increase the number and intensity of interpersonal competitive struggles by attempting to gain access to and retain those goods which they recognize to be necessary to support the "conservation" of their rivals but not of themselves; (B) dominators can be expected to add to the index of violent acts by engaging in strategies designed to assure to themselves greater honor and respect; and (C) dominators can be expected to initiate violent acts even when they do not sincerely believe that

such acts constitute necessary means to guarantee their own preservation. None of these three elements can be seen to fit neatly into the direct unilinear developmental sequence described on pp. 62-63 above.¹⁵

Moreover, the right of nature, which also does not fit neatly into Hobbes's Leviathan derivation, can be seen to play a somewhat enigmatic role. Specifically, the right of nature is introduced as licensing men to engage in whatever acts they consider necessary to preserve their lives, yet Hobbes specifies that some men can be expected to act in violently aggressive ways even when they do not sincerely believe that such acts are necessary to preserve their own lives.¹⁶

This being said, I will now proceed to examine Hobbes's actual Leviathan derivation of the state of nature.

In paragraph 6 of chapter 13 of Leviathan, Hobbes enumerates three principal causes of quarrel among men in their natural state, namely, competition, diffidence, and glory.

Regarding the first, Hobbes was of the opinion that man's equality of ability¹⁷ naturally gives rise to an equality in hope for the attainment of one's ends. Thus, if two men desire an object which only one of the two can possess, the two become enemies with each endeavoring to "destroy or subdue"¹⁸ the other, since destroying one's adversary will allow one free (albeit, temporary) access to

that *desired* object. Hobbes suggests that a recognition of the fundamental equality of human beings will encourage men to enter into such competitive struggles. For example, in the state of nature, if both individual A and individual B desire some object O, if A recognizes that B desires O, if B recognizes that A desires O, if A recognizes that he is roughly equal to B,¹⁹ and if B recognizes that he is roughly equal to A, then in all likelihood both A and B would be willing to enter into a battle with the other for the sole possession and control of O. This would be true since each would think himself to be reasonably assured of victory (or, at the very least, at no disadvantage) in such a battle. Further, such an orientation toward the acquisition and consumption of desired objects can be understood to be fostered (or encouraged) by Hobbes's predominantly egoistic psychology which specifies that "self-interested motives tend to take precedence over non-self-interested motives in determining human actions."²⁰ This tendency to be willing to enter into competitive battles for the sole control of desired objects will be even stronger if we take seriously Hobbes's claim that most men have a tendency to overvalue themselves *vis-à-vis* other humans.²¹

Moreover, Hobbes claims that given the previously described ("all reckoned together" type of) equality among human beings, if any man "plant, sow, build or possess a

convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united to deprive him of"²² his goods as well as his life. Further, Hobbes contends that after such plunder has occurred, the invader may expect to be in like danger of invasion by another. Hence, there naturally arises a general DIFFIDENCE of one's fellow men among persons in this precarious condition.²³ This diffidence, in turn, gives rise to acts of "anticipation."

Hobbes notes that by 'anticipation' he understands the activity "by force or wiles, [of mastering] the persons of all men that one can so long, till he see[s] no other power great enough to endanger him."²⁴ Seemingly, anticipation can take either of two forms. The first consists of striking out against one (or more) of one's rivals because one believes that that rival has designs upon attacking him (the former).

For example, we might imagine that individual A has secured possession of some physical object which he believes individuals B and C desire. Further, we might suppose that A believes that B and C (either individually, or more likely, collectively) are planning to attack him for the purpose of dispossessing him of this coveted object. In this first variety, anticipation might consist of A's attacking B and C (presumably separately) before they can attack him. We can quite easily see that the dynamics of the state of nature, encouraged by a universal fear of death and a widespread

suspiciousness fostered by uncertainty (regarding how one's fellow inhabitants will voluntarily act), could give rise to instances of "higher order" anticipation in which, for example, B will attack A because he thinks that A will soon attack B in order to prevent B's attack on him (A).

Though it does seem plausible that such instances of "striking first" would occur in the state of nature, Hobbes consistently characterizes anticipation as an activity wherein one attempts to systematically "master or subdue" (rather than simply to kill, destroy or harm) the "persons of all the men he can." Therefore, the fundamental aim of anticipation is not simply to destroy one's fellow man,²⁵ but rather, to conquer, and consequently, to use the latter's power for one's own defensive purposes.

Indeed, when discussing this issue, Hobbes claims that even men "who would be at ease within modest bounds," i.e. moderates, must seek to increase their power by invasion since "they would not be able, long time standing on their own defense to subsist."²⁶ Further, he contends that "such augmentation or dominion over men [is] *necessary* to a man's conservation."²⁷ [my emphasis]

As has already been mentioned in chapter 1 of this dissertation, Hobbes regards the termination of one's own life (or the termination of the vital motion within one's own body) as the *summum malum* or greatest evil that can befall any man. Thus, because Hobbes attributes such

importance to the passion which he designates "a fear of death," we might safely infer that this passion plays a significant role in determining the character of the voluntary actions of men in the state of nature. Indeed, in the Elements of Law, Hobbes lucidly states that²⁸

forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and desire *bonum sibi*, that which is good for themselves, and to avoid that which is hurtful: but most of all that terrible enemy of nature, death . . . it is not against reason that a man doth all he can to preserve his own body and limbs both from death and pain.

Certainly, in light of Hobbes's various pronouncements concerning the fear of death and the desire to preserve one's life, it would be difficult to overestimate the significance that these two passions have in determining the voluntary behavior of individuals, and the eventual interactional character of the state of nature.

Thirdly, Hobbes introduces and describes what I find to be the most intriguing of the principal causes of quarrel in the state of nature, namely, a desire for glory. Specifically, Hobbes contends that in the state of nature (where there exists no central authority or sovereign power which is of sufficient strength to "overawe" all men), "[e]very man looketh that his companion should value him at the same rate he sets upon himself: and, upon all signs of contempt, naturally endeavors . . . to extort a greater value from his contemners by damage, and from others by the

example."²⁹ However, because most men set a higher value upon their own intellectual powers than they set upon the intellectual powers of nearly any other man, and because we might reasonably assume that men who would be willing to attack others in order to obtain "trifles, as a word, a smile [or] a different opinion,"³⁰ would require but the flimsiest of excuses in order to begin carrying out such acts of "invasion," the state of nature would clearly be one of unrestrained, unpredictable, and in many cases, frivolously based violence.

With respect to the latter point, it is conceivable that after becoming aware of the presence of dominators within his vicinity, a moderate man will attempt to garner honors and respect, but will do so for the sake of obviating the offensive attacks of the other men in his vicinity. (the latter of whom will, if the stratagem is successful, stand in awe of the recipient of such honors and respect and will, in consequence, be discouraged from assailing that recipient).

Hobbes is quick to emphasize that such instances or voluntary acts of invasion or preemptive violence are no more than what the invader's conservation requires and are generally allowed. Presumably, what Hobbes is saying is that since in the state of nature, invasion is generally required for a man's self preservation, it is generally allowed or sanctioned by the right of nature. However, Hobbes states

that "some men," namely, those men we have called dominators, take pleasure in contemplating their own power in acts of conquest, and pursue such conquering activity "further than their security requires."³¹

Thus, in Leviathan, (as in Hobbes's earlier political works), engaging in the type of conquering activity which some men pursue farther than they sincerely believe their security requires is allowed (in a weak sense) to all men in the state of nature (and exercised specifically by dominators), but is not sanctioned by the right of nature. Hence, the distinction apparent in Hobbes's earlier works between an action's being sanctioned by the right of nature, and an action's being permitted merely in virtue of not being forbidden by any extant sovereign authority again emerges in Leviathan.

In Leviathan, Hobbes defines the 'right of nature' as³²

the liberty each man has to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his nature; that is to say, of his life, and consequently of doing any thing which in his own judgment, and reason, he shall conceive the aptest means thereunto.

For example, since the use of force or wiles, that is, of anticipatory strategies, to master the persons of other men is necessary to insure one's safety or conservation, Hobbes claims it is "generally allowed."³³ However, he does not, in this location, specify who allows such activity (i.e.,

God or other men), and why the adjective 'generally' is used. (Does Hobbes mean to suggest, e.g., that some "specific" instances exist in which self preservation requires the dominion over other men but in which attempting to gain such dominion is not allowed?)³⁴

Further, in De Cive, when Hobbes discusses the desire and will to hurt which all men in the state of nature possess, he announces that this will is "not equally to be condemned."³⁵ That is, those men who are caused to desire to harm others by vain glory and excessive self-esteem, are worthy of a greater degree of condemnation than are those whose desire to harm is caused by the necessity of preserving their lives.

A unique feature of Hobbes's Leviathan derivation of the state of nature concerns the apparent prominence of place given to the common appetite for a single object among two or more men in helping to generate a social condition which is properly characterizable as "a war of each against all." Though while in his earlier political works, Hobbes had discussed the conflict caused by a common desire for a single object, he had discussed the generation of such conflicts only after having described the conflicts generated by "vain glory" and "comparison," and had done so in a rather cursory fashion. By contrast, in Leviathan's natural state chapter, a common appetite for a single object is presented as the predominant interactional feature which

fosters the generation of a wholesale war of each against all.³⁶

Strikingly, what uniquely emerges in Hobbes's Leviathan derivation of the state of nature is an orientation among its inhabitants toward the bases of a commodious existence and the presence of a desire to obtain the corresponding goods (rather than a desire for the bare necessities of life or the bases for a mere subsistence level of existence). For example, one will notice that when Hobbes discusses the competition for desirable material goods, he lists as examples of the latter a convenient seat, which a man can be conceived of as building and possessing, as well as agricultural crops which a man can be conceived of as planting, sowing and harvesting.

In essence, in his Leviathan derivation, Hobbes imbues his state of nature's inhabitants with somewhat more sophisticated or highly developed desires and tastes than had been explicitly included within his earlier derivations. In fact, in an illuminating passage from the final paragraph of chapter 13 of Leviathan, Hobbes asserts that "the passions that incline men to peace are fear of death; *desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living and a hope by their industry to obtain them.*"³⁷

Thus, according to Hobbes's Leviathan derivation, a fundamental equality of human powers (and a widespread recognition of such) coupled with some degree of

interpersonal competition for desired goods, a widespread and intense fear of death and a recognition of the presence of dominators within one's vicinity gives rise to a general diffidence among men. Such diffidence might be interpreted as stemming from a widespread inability to reliably predict the voluntary actions of one's fellow men, and as embodying an attitude of justifiably chary suspicion and a tendency to expect (or to actively prepare for) rapacious or violently antisocial behavior from such men. Moreover, Hobbes believed that this general diffidence would gradually give rise to acts of "anticipation," and eventually, to a condition of war of every man against every other man.

Nevertheless, it might serve us well to regard Hobbes's Leviathan derivation of the state of nature as constituting a *change of emphasis* from his earlier works, rather than a wholesale change of the doctrine by which the state of nature as a war of each against all can be imagined to be generated.

Even though on one level, the war of each against all can be traced to the enmity and finally to the physical conflicts which arise due to a common appetite among two (or more) men for a single desired object, which eventually prompts those two (or more) men to attempt to obtain that object through some voluntary activity, it appears that on a deeper level this process can be understood as being predicated upon the necessity of adopting a confrontational

mode of action in response to the presence of dominators in one's vicinity. In turn, the behavior (i.e., the voluntary activity) of dominators can be understood to be motivated by the frequent presence, within their own bodies, of such perturbational passions as those which cause "a vain esteem of one's own powers."³⁸

It is therefore due to the presence of men who are bedeviled by the passions of vain esteem, pride and a desire for glory that an augmentation of dominion of persons becomes a necessary means to each man's conservation, and it is for this reason that such passions (and the voluntary acts which the latter motivate) can be understood to determine the interactional character of Hobbes's Leviathan presentation of the state of nature.

D. Concluding Remarks

To recapitulate, we have seen that Hobbes includes within each of his three major works of political philosophy a derivation of the interactional state of nature which is based upon his construal of the nature of individual human beings. Further, we have commented upon the significant role which the natural equality of human beings plays in this derivation, as well as the importance which can be attributed to Hobbes's predominantly egoistic psychological theory. Moreover, we have emphasized the importance which the presence of so-called dominators in the interactive milieu has in determining the character of Hobbes's state of

nature and, as such, the role which the perturbational passions play in determining the interactional character of this condition.³⁹

Although Hobbes initially presents a distinction among men in the state of nature between those who are content with an equality of nature and those who are eager to demonstrate their supposed superiority over others in acts of predation and conquest, by the end of each of Hobbes's three natural state chapters, all men can, for the reasons indicated above, be expected to behave in roughly the same manner.⁴⁰ We will now move on to consider the three conceptions or varieties of the state of nature which I believe can be found in, or reconstructed from Hobbes's writings.

NOTES

1. Following François Tricaud, I will collectively refer to these three chapters, namely chapter 13 of Leviathan, chapter 1 of De Cive, and chapter 14 of Part I of the Elements of Law, as the 'natural state chapters.'
2. This discussion will deal specifically with the topic of the passions which motivate men to act in particular ways (element (2), above), and is intended to show how the differing bodily constitutions of dominators on the one hand, and of moderates on the other, can be understood to motivate those various men [moderates and dominators] to act in varying ways.
3. Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 114; Thomas Hobbes, Opera Philosophica Quae Latine Scripsit Omnia in Unum Corpus, Molesworth, William, editor, (Bohn: London, 1839), Vol. II, page 162.
4. See Hobbes's claim that "[g]lory, or the internal gloriation or triumph of the mind, is that passion which proceedeth from the imagination or conception of our own power, above the power of him who contendeth with us," (Hobbes, Elements of Law, pages 36-37.) as well as Hobbes's contention that "[e]xcessive self esteem impedes reason; and on that account is a perturbation of the mind." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 70.)
5. "... vires suas recte æstimatis." See De Cive in Hobbes, Opera Latina, Vol. II, page 162. See also Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 71, and Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.
6. Even though it is conceivable that some moderate men in the state of nature will choose to attempt to garnish honors, respect and praises, we must nevertheless understand that they will do so not because of the influence of their own perturbational passions and the incidence of the accompanying vainglorious beliefs, but rather because such men sincerely judge this activity to be a necessary means to preserving their own lives. See below, pages 70-72.
7. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.
After discussing, in section 2 of chapter 14, of The Elements of Law the natural equality of human beings, Hobbes begins section 3 by drawing a distinction between two types of men, which distinction is purportedly based upon or caused by a corresponding "diversity of passions."

Specifically, Hobbes claims that "some [men] are vainly glorious, and hope for precedency and superiority above their fellows," "while other men are moderate and look for no more but equality of nature." (Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 71.)

Similarly, Hobbes proceeds, in section 4 of chapter 1 of De Cive, to present and discuss the aforementioned distinction between the temperate man who rightly values his power (i.e., the moderate), and the vainglorious man who supposes himself naturally superior to others (i.e., the dominator). In this section, Hobbes proclaims that the temperate man "according to that natural equality which is among us, permits as much to others as he assumes to himself." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 114.) By contrast, the vainglorious man who possesses a "fiery spirit" and who supposes himself above the rest, will have a license to do as he lists and to "[challenge] respect and honors as due to him before others." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 114.) Hence, the "moderate" or temperate man would appear to possess a rather more realistic assessment of the natural character of men, since he, unlike the "dominator," recognizes the natural equality of humans. As a consequence of possessing this realistic view of the natural human powers, the temperate man is disinclined to challenge others for "respect and honors." Since the moderate man recognizes that he is fundamentally equal to other men with respect to his physical powers, he would appear to be less likely than the vainglorious man to confront situations in which he believes that others are undervaluing his abilities. Because the vainglorious "dominator" considers himself to be superior to others, he will believe that he is being undervalued (or treated with less than the appropriate level of respect) even on those occasions when he is being treated no less respectfully than are his fellows.

Moreover, the "dominator" is more willing than the "moderate" to "do as he lists" by taking more than he allows others and by aggressively challenging those whom he believes have slighted him precisely because he is more convinced than the moderate that he will be capable of demonstrating his *supposed* superiority over a rival in a physical conflict. That is to say, since the moderate man correctly judges that the prospect of emerging victorious in any one-on-one physical battle is rather uncertain, he will, in all likelihood, take steps to avoid the possibility of defeat (which might result in the loss of his life) by endeavoring to eschew such battles. By contrast, since the vainglorious man is likely to hold unrealistically optimistic beliefs concerning his ability to defeat others in battle, it seems that he will be willing to initiate and engage in such battles somewhat more frequently than will the moderate.

8. Though Hobbes does not, in any of his three works on political philosophy, specify the precise percentage of dominators (who are liable to act upon the desire to provoke others through taunts or other signs of contempt or upon the desire to gain sole access to putatively scarce material goods) within the human population, he does nevertheless state in the Elements that the "greatest part of men do, upon no assurance of odds, through vanity or comparison or appetite provoke the rest who would otherwise be contented with equality." (Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 71.) This opinion should, however, be contrasted with Hobbes's claim in The Author's Preface to De Cive that men are not evil by nature, and that "the wicked [are] fewer than the righteous." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 75.) Additionally, note well Hobbes's somewhat troubling asseveration in Chapter 13 of Leviathan that "almost all men possess a vain conceit of [their] own wisdom." (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 74.)

Though Hobbes does waver a bit on the question of the exact proportion of dominators among humankind, what does emerge as significant in his various discussions of this topic is that each sizable group of human beings contains some proportion of men who might properly be designated 'moderates,' as well as some proportion of men who might appropriately be labeled 'dominators.'

9. The point made in this paragraph will be discussed at greater length in the section entitled "Some thoughts on the distinction between dominators and moderates" which begins on page 57 of this dissertation.

10. See Hobbes's discussion of reason as a mechanical human faculty in the opening paragraphs of Chapter 5 of Leviathan (Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 22-23.), as well his discussion of the relationship between reason and the passions (specifically those which he designates the "perturbations of the mind which frequently obstruct right reason") in Chapter 12 of De Homine. (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, pages 55-56.)


11. See Hobbes's discussion of the specific perturbations of the mind such as anger, pride, excessive self esteem and $\mu\eta\nu\iota\varsigma$ in Chapter 12 of De Homine. (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, pages 55-61.)

12.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 76. Moreover, since Hobbes believes that human beings will eventually recognize that they must engage in anticipatory activity if they wish to secure their own continued survival, we might reasonably contend that the fully developed state of nature will include many actual instances of violent interpersonal conflict and not just a mere willingness on the part of men to engage in such violent conflict.

13.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 95. See Hobbes's discussion of the law of nature concerning mutual accommodation and endnote #36, below.

14.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.

15.Perhaps this developmental sequence can be diagrammed in the following manner:



Though we might initially conceive this developmental sequence as encompassing only the elements on the left side of this page, when we more closely consider Hobbes's derivation, we find that the presence of dominators within the social mix has the effect of (A) increasing the frequency with which competitive struggles occur, of (B) increasing the number of "glory based" acts of violence and thus fostering a widespread diffidence of one's fellow men (which, in turn, will foster a recognition of the need to engage in anticipatory acts), and of (C) increasing the number of violent acts which are performed "for delectation only." (and of further fostering a widespread diffidence, etc.)

16. See my discussion of the right of nature on pages 70-72.

17. Construed, most rudimentarily, as an ability to strike out against, and to take away the life of any other person.

18. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.

19. In which case the rough equality which B recognizes relates to the equal ability of A and B to take away the life of the other (and, of course, the equal vulnerability of A and B to have his life taken away by the other).

20. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, page 64.

21. Though perhaps only "slightly stronger." Since the natural powers of one's own mind, which, in Leviathan, Hobbes thinks nearly all men have a tendency to overvalue, might enable its possessor to concoct clever strategies with which to outsmart his opponent, such (putatively superior) intellectual powers would certainly not directly enable him to defeat his opponent in hand-to-hand combat. See Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.

22. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.

23. In the Elements, Hobbes expressed a belief that in the absence of any coercive restrictions, dominators will actively take measures to demonstrate their supposed "precedency and superiority over others through the use of force." (Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 71.)

24. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.

25. Which nevertheless, does have its place in the state of nature.

- 26.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.
- 27.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75. Curiously, at this point in the text, Hobbes fails to discuss the possible defensive benefits of being conquered and subdued by other men in the state of nature.
- 28.Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 71.
- 29.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.
- 30.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 76.
- 31.See Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75, paragraph 4. Such a man can be thought of as stepping beyond the bounds of the liberty assured to him by the right of nature (and of violating the fundamental law of nature which enjoins him to seek peace as far as he has hope of attaining it) when he does not sincerely believe that engaging in the plunderous or conquering attacks which he initiates are necessary to guarantee his own survival.
- 32.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 79.
- 33.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75, paragraph 4, line 5. Hobbes makes this claim during his explanation of how a widespread diffidence leads to a condition of war. See my discussion of this point, and my accompanying explanation of Hobbes's concept of "anticipation" on pages 67-68, above.
- 34.As mentioned earlier, Hobbes claims that some men in the state of nature "take pleasure in contemplating their own power in acts conquest which they pursue farther than their security requires." (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.) Tellingly, however, he does not state that the actions of this type are "allowed" to men, even though there is a clear sense in which such acts are physically possible and thus able to be performed (and hence, allowed). By contrast, when Hobbes discussed those acts of invasion which men "who would otherwise be glad to be at ease within modest bounds" (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.) must employ in order to preserve their lives and physical soundness, he proclaims that "such augmentation of dominion over men . . . ought to be allowed. . . ." (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.)
- 35.Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 114. Additionally, see my discussion of diffidence and anticipatory strategies on pages 66-68, above.
- 36.During his discussion of the fifth law of nature, "that every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest," in Chapter 15 of Leviathan, Hobbes points out

that there is in men's aptness for society, a diversity of nature, rising from their diversity of affections; not unlike that we see in stones brought together for building an edifice For as that stone which by the asperity and irregularity of figure, takes more room from others, than it itself fills; and for the hardness, cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindreth the building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable and troublesome: so also, a man that by the asperity of nature, will strive to retain those things which to himself are superfluous and to others necessary; and for the stubbornness of his passions *cannot be corrected*, is to be left or cast aside, as cumbersome thereunto. For seeing that every man, not only by right but also by necessity of nature is supposed to endeavour all he can, to obtain that which is necessary for his conservation; he that shall pose himself against it for things superfluous is guilty of the war that thereupon is to follow. (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 95; Cf. Psalms 118:22)

In this passage, Hobbes is asserting that there exist some men whose incorrigible tendency to take more than their fair share from the stock of available material resources makes them particularly unsuited for life within cooperative social groupings. When he speaks of those men whose stubborn passions cannot be corrected, "who will strive to retain those things which to himself are superfluous and to others necessary," and whose nature forces them to (figuratively) take more room than they are entitled, Hobbes appears to be making a clear reference to dominators. In turn, when Hobbes contends (in Chapter 13 of Leviathan) that a common desire for some coveted material object gives rise to competitive conflicts among men, and that such conflicts will eventually lead to a wholesale condition of war, we might, in light of the abovequoted passage, plausibly infer that Hobbes considered dominators to bear special responsibility in this process. That is to say, the presence of dominators might be considered to make competitive conflicts for desired objects more widespread than it would be in their absence since such men would be willing to enter into competitive conflicts for the control not only of those objects which they believe to be necessary to sustain their continued existence, but moreover, for those objects which they recognize to be necessary to sustain the existence of other men in their vicinity (their likely rivals), but not to sustain their own lives.

37.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 78. Moreover, in Leviathan, Hobbes emphasizes to a greater degree than he had in his earlier works, the necessity of engaging in the types of activity which he calls "anticipation" in order to guarantee or make more probable one's continuing survival. Indeed, in Leviathan, Hobbes especially emphasizes that if an inhabitant of the state of nature were to attempt to preserve his life without striving (successfully) to conquer other men, whose combined natural powers the former could use for his own defensive purposes, that inhabitant would stand a negligible chance of surviving for any sustained period of time.

38.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 76. Indeed, Hobbes describes dominators as "taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest which they pursue farther than their security requires, while in the Latin version of Leviathan, Hobbes claims "that there are those who from pride and a desire for glory would conquer the whole world." (Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 76.)

39.An issue which remains questionable in my mind, however, concerns the character which social relations in the state of nature would assume if dominators were excluded from this social milieu. I raise this issue because although Hobbes consistently draws a distinction between moderates and dominators, he nevertheless claims that since all men think well of themselves and hate to see the same in others, "they must needs provoke one another by words, and other signs of contempt and hatred." (Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 71.) One naturally becomes curious as to whether Hobbes here means to suggest that (1) because all human beings hate perceiving others to be superior, or even equal to themselves, and because some men experience strong antisocial passions which they cannot or will not suppress, there will necessarily arise verbal taunts, insults and presumably acts of interpersonal violence which will be perpetrated by dominators; or whether he means to suggest that (2) because all human beings hate perceiving others to be superior, or even equal to themselves, it is necessarily true that even within a natural state populated wholly by moderates, verbal taunts, insults, etc. would be initiated. A careful (albeit isolated) reading of this passage seems to reveal that Hobbes intended the second interpretation, though it is unlikely that Hobbes was interested to discuss such a counterfactual situation.

Since he appears to have believed that a rather sizable proportion of men can be properly categorized as dominators, and since he appears committed to the further belief that the presence of some dominators within a social milieu will, in some way, affect the behavior of all or nearly all of the moderates within that milieu, one might aver that Hobbes would likely consider an analysis of this "counterfactual" state of nature to be an exercise in idle speculation, and hence unprofitable.

40. Albeit for different motivational reasons.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF THE STATE OF NATURE

A. Introduction

In this chapter, I will examine the expository feature or heuristic device employed in Hobbes's political philosophy which is commonly referred to as "the state of nature" or the "natural condition of humankind." The state of nature plays a prominent role in Hobbes's philosophy, since it is meant to represent the pre-political state of human interaction, that is, an interactive condition which is characterized by the absence of an effective common sovereign power and the retention of a "right to all things" on the part of each individual inhabitant or "natural man," or, as we shall see later in this chapter, on the part of each multiperson sovereign unit.¹

Admittedly, Hobbes's account (or more properly, "series of accounts") of the state of nature will strike the attentive reader as being somewhat sloppily organized and desultorily presented. In fact, an uncharitable critic might judge that, taken together, Hobbes's various references to, and descriptions of, the state of nature represent a hodgepodge of inconsistent, mutually contradictory, and seemingly *ad hoc* pronouncements concerning a concept which this author forwards as a significant expository device, but which he seemingly expended little effort to clearly develop and perspicuously express. For example, at times Hobbes

insists that the state of nature has never existed in the course of human history, yet at other times he remarks that such a state not only existed in the histories of "our ancestors" but continues to exist in the savage parts of America, as well as in the contemporary international arena. Thus, I do not mean to suggest that within each of his three major political works, Hobbes presents a *systematic* discussion of the three conceptions of the state of nature which I will discuss below, or that Hobbes makes a special effort to describe, compare and contrast the three conceptions which I will mention. I do mean to suggest, however, that each of Hobbes's various references to, and discussions of "the state of nature" can be associated with one of three relatively broad conceptions of a pre-political state. Each of these three conceptions can be designated "pre-political" precisely because each lacks a common coercive mechanism or common sovereign authority which is of sufficient power to command obedience from or maintain a condition of peace among the various individuals or "persons"² who inhabit, or constitute the "matter" of this interactional condition.

I do contend further that Hobbes believed the state of nature to be an abiding condition of human interaction. By this I mean that Hobbes believed that given the nature of the human organism, a condition approximating the state of nature will be observable in the arena of human interaction,

regardless of whether the entities interacting are natural persons or such artificial entities as sovereign states.

B. Preliminary--A Note on Method³

In chapter 1 of De Corpore, Hobbes defines philosophy as "such knowledge of effects or appearances, as we acquire by true ratiocination from the knowledge we have first of its causes or generations: and again, of such causes or generations as may be had from knowing first their effects."⁴ In turn, he asserts that⁵

the subject of philosophy, or the matter it treats of, is every body of which we can conceive any generation, and which we may, by any consideration thereof, compare with other bodies, or which is capable of composition or resolution; that is to say, every body of whose generation or properties we can have any knowledge.

Finally, Hobbes claims that the principal parts of philosophy are two,⁶

[f]or two chief kinds of bodies, and very different from one another offer themselves to such as search after their generation and properties; one whereof being the work of nature, is called a natural body, the other is called a commonwealth, and is made by the wills and agreements of men.

Indeed, he asserts that "from these parts spring" the two types of philosophy, namely, natural philosophy and civil philosophy.⁷

While attempting to elucidate the manner in which "the knowledge of any effect may be gotten from the knowledge of

the generation thereof," Hobbes offers as an example the two-dimensional geometric figure known as a circle. Hobbes contends that if a man were to visually examine a plane figure resembling a circle which is drawn on a piece of paper, that man could not, merely by exercising his sense of sight, determine whether that figure is a circle or is merely a figure which greatly approximates the shape of a circle.⁸ He contends, however, that "nothing is more easy to be known by him that first knows the generation of the propounded figure,"⁹ that is, whether the propounded figure is an actual circle or simply a figure which is shaped very similarly to that of a circle. Thus, if the onlooker were aware of the fact that the figure in front of him "was made by the circumduction of a body whereof one end remained unmoved,"¹⁰ he would be certain that this figure is a true circle, rather than a figure which merely appears to the sense of sight to be, or significantly approximates the shape of, a circle.

By considering Hobbes's example of the generation of a circle, as well as his definition of philosophy, we might reasonably forward the following claim concerning the significance of Hobbes's state of nature and Hobbes's various discussions of the generation of commonwealths:

Hobbes believed that, *from a methodological standpoint*, all philosophy can be characterized as being of one of two broad types, namely analytic (or resolute) philosophy and

synthetic (or compositive) philosophy.¹¹ When discussing the state of nature, and the generation of commonwealths from out of that state, Hobbes can be understood to be engaging in the variety of philosophy characterized as synthetic, in which one acquires knowledge of a body by true ratiocination from the knowledge which he first has of its causes or generation. Specifically, Hobbes begins his project with a knowledge of the "dispositions, affections and manners of men," imagines a situation in which a number of men with such dispositions, affections and manners are forced to confront one another without the benefit of an effective peace-preserving sovereign power, and subsequently reasons how such a collection of "masterless" men (or, as we shall go on to see later in this chapter, masterless collective sovereign persons)¹² can reasonably be understood to generate durable political groupings or political bodies which contain (more or less) effective¹³ sovereign mechanisms.

If a man were to contend that one is able to acquire adequate philosophical knowledge concerning the nature of political bodies merely by studying the history of such bodies as have existed throughout the ages, Hobbes would clearly disagree. Knowledge of this latter type would constitute mere prudence or experiential knowledge and would not be properly characterized as sapience, scientific knowledge or exceptionless knowledge of effects from known

causes. Hence, although Hobbes includes accounts and descriptions of actually existing historical commonwealths within the corpus of his philosophical writings, one should not conclude that in doing so he is attempting to equate political history with political philosophy. Rather, one should recognize and acknowledge Hobbes's claim that a study of the history of political bodies will provide one with insight into the nature of what must be true of any unit of political organization.

Therefore, when Hobbes discusses the nature of the organizational units of the types described on pages 86-104, below, he can be understood to be describing units which bear similarities to, but are not simply identical with the various patrimonial units and fully-fledged COMMONWEALTHS which have appeared on earth at various times and in various places.¹⁴

Significantly, then, although Hobbes believes that specific sovereign multiperson units (of the types described on pages 99-119, below) have existed at various times and places throughout the course of human history, the analytical models of such units which Hobbes forwards in his philosophical writings should be looked upon as examples of "ideal limiting cases"¹⁵ and not as examples of actually existing states.

Perhaps significantly (and perhaps fortunately, for our own purposes), in chapter 6 of De Corpore, Hobbes alters his

definition of philosophy to read that philosophy is "the knowledge we acquire by true ratiocination of appearances or apparent effects, from the knowledge we have of such possible production or generation of the same; and of such production, as has been, or may be, from the knowledge we have of the effects."¹⁶ In light of this definition, we can understand that when Hobbes discusses the modes of the generation of commonwealths from out of the state of nature, he is not attempting to describe the actual manner in which historically existing commonwealths were formed out of some previously existing "natural" interactional state, but rather, the manner in which various political bodies can be conceived as being created from out of previously existing matter (viz, human beings, or less stable organizational units). Thus, in a famous passage from chapter 17 of Leviathan, Hobbes claims that the unity of the natural persons who constitute the commonwealth¹⁷

is made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man . . . on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner.

Even though it may not be, and probably is not the case that any particular existing commonwealth was established as a result of an explicit contract of the type of which Hobbes speaks, one can, nevertheless, conceive of commonwealths (either of the actually existing (historical) variety, or of

the ideal general (philosophical) variety) being generated in the manner that Hobbes describes. Thus, the explicit entering into of a social contract among the natural persons in the state of nature can best be understood as the result of an exercise in philosophical speculation by which one attempts to imagine how an ideal type of (political) body can be generated from out of preexisting matter.¹⁸

C. Hobbes's Three Conceptions of the State of Nature

Unfortunately, attempting to understand precisely what Hobbes meant to describe as the state of nature in his political writings is somewhat complicated by the fact that he does not use this term univocally. In fact, within his writings, Hobbes uses the designation "state of nature" to refer to (at least) the following three concepts:

(1) a rational construct or construal of humankind's natural condition "wherein particular men are in a condition of war, one against another," that is, of each person against every other person. (Leviathan, p. 78) Significantly, Hobbes believed that "there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of war against another." (ibid.)

(2) A social condition in which small groups of human beings contend against each other, and in which no common power (i.e., no mechanism of sovereign authority which is common to all individuals who populate this condition) exists. Hobbes referred to the small groups of individuals which are to be found in this condition as "families."¹⁹

(3) The "condition of war [of] one against another," which "in all times" exists between "kings and persons of sovereign authority." (Leviathan, page 101.) Hobbes referred to the large multiperson units which are to be found in this condition as *bona fide* principalities or fully sovereign states.

As has been noted above, François Tricaud, following Paul Johnson, suggests that Hobbes might have offered the state of nature as a 'tendential law' a 'limiting concept,' or 'an ideal limiting case,' so that one might understand "the state of nature as a representation that need not be assigned to any definite moment in historical or prehistoric time."²⁰ Though I believe that such an interpretation, by itself, fails to capture the complexity of Hobbes's state of nature, I further believe that, in a sense, all three conceptions of the state of nature which I have hitherto presented can be looked upon as ideal limiting cases. The character of these three respective ideal limiting cases can be understood to vary as a function of the background assumptions which Hobbes builds into each of the respective conceptions. Thus, for example, one might suppose that the state of nature-2 represents Hobbes's descriptive analysis of the social condition which would obtain if a number of small paternal or despotical groups were forced to interact with each other in the absence of any terrestrial sovereign which could determine the character of such encounters. Hobbes's analysis of this condition (which should, I believe, be reckoned as the result of a series of thought experiments) was probably affected by his observations of the behavior of men in civil societies, his observation of the behavior of men during the English Civil Wars of the mid-seventeenth century, his understanding of the character

of primitive societies in seventeenth century America, and his reading of the histories of "the now civilized," though previously "savage parts of the world."²¹ If my objectives come to be realized, the following detailed discussion of these three conceptions of the state of nature will make clear their character as paradigm units or ideal limiting concepts.

D. The State of Nature-1

The first conception of the state of nature is similar to the conception employed by such twentieth century commentators on Hobbes as Gauthier, Kavka and Hampton, who have interpreted Hobbes's political philosophy according to the norms of contemporary game theory and who, for the most part, consider the state of nature to embody the relationship between and among participants (or unitary actors) which is commonly known as the "prisoners' dilemma." These commentators, for the sake of analysis, consider the participants in the state of nature to be rational actors who are interested in maximizing their own utility and who possess no interpersonal attachments of a familial, a friendship-based, or any other variety. When discussing this conception of the state of nature, Hobbes makes clear that the actors in this state possess various civilized qualities or "marks of civilization." Hence, even though Hobbes contends that "there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against

another," he nevertheless believed that "it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, were there no common power to fear; by the manner of life, which men that had formerly lived under a peaceful government use to degenerate into, in a civil war."²²

Indeed, we might reasonably conclude that the state of nature-1 represents the result of a thought experiment in which Hobbes attempted to envision the participants in this state as rational (and passionate)²³ actors who have had the benefit of living under civil conditions but who find themselves presently bereft of a sovereign mechanism which can successfully maintain such peaceful (or non-warlike) conditions. Hobbes himself suggests that the probable behavior of men in such a condition is based upon his observations of the modes of behavior assumed by men during the English Civil Wars of the mid-seventeenth century. However, the state of nature-1 appears to be ideal or abstract in so far as all distinctions between master and servant among human beings are denied. Thus, I contend that the state of nature-1 represents Hobbes's most abstract model of how human beings, who share many of the civilized qualities of modern men, would interact with each other if their social condition were reduced to one in which no contractually established relationships of subordination and domination were to exist.²⁴

As a prelude to his discussion of paternal commonwealths in each of his three principal treatises on political philosophy, Hobbes presents a somewhat more detailed description of the state of nature-1 than can be found in that work's natural state chapter. For example, in paragraphs 4-9 of Chapter 20 of Leviathan, Hobbes presents a description of the state of nature-1 in which he specifies that (1) gender-based differences between males and females exist, and that (2) human reproductive activity occurs, so that infants can be expected to be biologically generated within such a state. Further, in the same section of Chapter 20 of Leviathan, Hobbes specifies that within the state of nature-1, (3) "the natural inclination of the sexes one to another and to the children" exists, (4) age-based differences are present and a distinction is drawn between (A) adults and (B) infants and small children and (5) a significant difference with respect to the level of physical and intellectual powers is drawn between (A) adults and (B) infants and small children. Finally, Hobbes informs his readers that within the state of nature-1, there exist neither (6) laws of matrimony nor (7) laws for the education of children.²⁵ It should be noted that these seven additional characteristics are presumably always present among the human beings who constitute the state of nature-1, even though Hobbes chooses to mention and discuss them only in those chapters of his political writings which

specifically concern the topic of paternal dominion. What appears to be significant about the state of nature-1 is that (1) it is a highly abstract rendering of the natural human interactional condition and (2) it appears that Hobbes believed it to be a rather contrived and potentially, a rather evanescent condition which would quickly be superseded or replaced by an interactional condition of the type which I will call the state of nature-2. The second of these two points does stand in need of further explanation.

Although I believe that Hobbes did not mean the state of nature-1 to embody or describe an actually existing historical condition, I do believe that Hobbes would endorse the claim that if the circumstances which characterize the state of nature-1 were to be artificially created, this state would quickly develop into a condition characterized by small (if, at first, only two-person) groups within which relationships of servitude exist. This would be predominantly due to two factors which encourage the formation of groups, namely the persistence of anticipatory activity, and the presence of human reproductive activity.

Thus, even though Hobbes famously denies the existence of a natural sociability or gregariousness among human beings (interpreted as "a natural fitness to form societies"²⁶) he does, nevertheless, strongly suggest that there exists a tendency for human individuals to form small groups (due to procreation or conquest), and for smaller

groups to coalesce (principally through conquest) into larger ones.

I feel justified in treating the state of nature-1 as a conception distinct from the state of nature-2 since the state of nature-1, unlike the state of nature-2 represents the analytical units which occupy this condition as natural human beings or natural persons rather than as defensive groups made up of two or more natural persons.

E. The State of Nature-2

While the state of nature-1 is intended to represent a condition in which each natural person is understood to have retained his/her right of nature, and in which no person has (either explicitly or tacitly) subordinated him/herself to another, the two conceptions of the state of nature which remain to be considered do clearly support interpersonal relationships of domination and subordination, as well as multiperson groupings.

For example, at various locations throughout his writings, Hobbes describes a state of perpetual war which persists in America "even in the present age," and which had existed in other nations "in former ages."²⁷ In fact, Hobbes includes within the natural state chapter of each of his three major political works a description of this bellicose state which he identifies as the state of nature.²⁸ Thus, in Leviathan, Hobbes claims that "the savage people in many places of America, except the

government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all; and live in that brutish manner as [he had] said before."²⁹ Indeed, in each of the three natural state chapters, Hobbes's strategy is similar. Specifically, in each of these chapters, Hobbes briefly discusses the natural equality of human beings, presents (or deduces) the natural interactional state of human beings as a war of each against all, discusses the inconveniences which attend such a state, then goes on to claim that the state of nature has existed in the history of now-civil nations and continues to exist in some portions of the world. Interestingly, however, with respect to his three principal political works, it is only in the Leviathan presentation that Hobbes explicitly identifies the units which are engaged in this historically instantiated perpetual war as "small families."³⁰

At a later point in each of these works, Hobbes describes a historical period in which "men have lived by small families to rob and spoil one another," and in which "rapine was a trade of life."³¹

Clearly, the concept of family which Hobbes has in mind in these descriptions differs a bit from that which we normally associate with a twentieth century nuclear family. For example, in Leviathan, Hobbes contends that a family might consist of "a man and his children," or "a man and his servants," or "a man and his children and servants

together."³² Interestingly, Hobbes does not indicate that the mother or mothers of the aforementioned children is/are normally reckoned to be part of families. Perhaps in Hobbes's scheme such female members are normally to be reckoned among servants, i.e., those who are subject to the decision-making authority of the "man."

Nevertheless, Hobbes believes that from the standpoint of history, those patrinomic groupings which he designates "families" constitute the earliest basic unit. For example, in A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England, Hobbes deems it "evident that dominion, government and laws are far more ancient than history or any other writing, and that the beginning of all dominion amongst men was in families."³³ In fact, in the section from the Dialogue entitled "On the laws of meum et tuum," Hobbes presents a fairly detailed sketch of the social conditions which characterize such "families." Specifically, Hobbes states that³⁴

1. The father of the family by the law of nature was the absolute lord of his wife and children,
2. The father of the family made what laws amongst them he pleased,
3. The father of the family was judge of all their controversies,
4. The father of the family was not obliged by any law of man to follow any counsel but his own,

5. What land soever the lord sat down upon and made use of for his own and his family's benefit, was his propriety by the law of first possession, in case it was void of inhabitants before, or by the law of war, in case they conquered it,
6. In this conquest, what enemies they took and saved, were their servants.
7. Such men as wanting possessions of lands, but furnished with arts necessary for man's life, came to dwell in the family for protection, became their subjects, and submitted themselves to the laws of the family.

Hobbes confidently asserts that "all this is consonant, not only to the law of nature, but also to the practice of mankind set forth in history."³⁵

In chapter 20 of Leviathan, Hobbes claims that³⁶

a great family, if it be not part of some commonwealth, is of itself, as to the rights of sovereignty, a little monarchy; whether that family consist of a man and his children; or a man and his servants; or of a man and his children, and servants together: wherein the father or master is the sovereign. But yet a family is not properly a commonwealth; unless it be that power by its own number, or by other opportunities, as not to be subdued without the hazard of war.

In the Elements, Hobbes further obscures the distinction between "families," which I interpret to be characteristic of the state of nature-2 and fully-fledged COMMONWEALTHS, which I interpret to be characteristic of the state of nature-3, when he states that "when a man hath dominion over another, there is a little kingdom. And to be a king by acquisition, is nothing else, but to have acquired a right

of dominion over many."³⁷ Though the text is not entirely clear on this point, what Hobbes appears to be saying is that a tiny kingdom, if you will, a proto-commonwealth or state of nature-2 type grouping, can be understood to arise whenever a person gains dominion over a single (other) person. However, it would seem that a fully-fledged COMMONWEALTH or a COMMONWEALTH in the proper sense can only be understood to arise once a sufficient (though not precisely stated) number of servants or subjects are acquired by a single master or sovereign.³⁸

Nevertheless, Hobbes claims that³⁹

where a number of men are manifestly too weak to defend themselves united, every one may use his own reason in time of danger to save his own life either by flight or by submission to the enemy as he shall think best; in the same manner as a very small company of soldiers, surprised by an army may cast down their arms, and demand quarter or run away, rather than be put to the sword.

Thus, the crux of the distinction between state of nature-2 and state of nature-3 type groupings concerns the effectiveness of the group to repulse attacks from external aggressive units. We might imagine that if a four member state of nature-2 type grouping were to confront an imperialistically-minded twenty member family, then each of the four persons who comprise the smaller of the two groups is justified in doing whatever he deems necessary to preserve his life, including disobeying the directives of that small group's leader.⁴⁰

What I find to be somewhat troubling in Hobbes's presentation of the distinction between families and COMMONWEALTHS, however, concerns the statement that a family is not properly a COMMONWEALTH unless "it be of that power of its own number . . . as not to be subdued without the hazard of war."⁴¹ Presumably, even when a twenty member group launches an attack upon a four member group, the members of the former group face the prospect of death while attempting to subdue or destroy the members of the latter. Thus, even when a group of twenty men strikes out against a group of four, it is conceivable that in launching such an attack, the members of the former group will be actively involving themselves in the hazards associated with war. Perhaps, Hobbes merely meant it to be the case that the master of one group can be spoken of as being in a position to conquer the members of another group without risking the hazards of war when the members of that latter group (sovereign and subjects included) decide (individually or in unison) that attempting to defend the integrity of their group would, in all likelihood, lead to the termination of their natural lives, and thus opt to transfer allegiance to the sovereign of that latter group without offering a shred of resistance.

F. The State of Nature-3

In a famous quotation from Leviathan's natural state chapter, Hobbes maintains that⁴²

in all times kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbors; which is a posture of war.

Hobbes hastens to add, however, that because such kings and persons of sovereign authority "uphold thereby the industry of their subjects; there does not follow from it that misery, which accompanies the liberty of particular men."⁴³

Thus, I contend that Hobbes envisioned as one conception of the state of nature an interactional condition composed of *bona fide* principalities or fully sovereign states. In this construal of the state of nature (which I will henceforth refer to as the state of nature-3), each sovereign COMMONWEALTH is to be looked upon as being an interactional unit and as being headed by some institutional sovereign authority (which need not be a single natural person). Moreover, I believe that the state of nature-3 can be regarded as differing from the remaining two conceptions in that the various natural persons who compose the several sovereign states are capable of living relatively safe, in some cases, relatively comfortable and flourishing lives. In fact, Hobbes emphasizes this point when he responds to the criticism that the lives of subjects within COMMONWEALTHS are "miserable" and extremely deprived of liberty by

claiming that (A) the state of man can never be without some incommodities, and that (B) the greatest incommodity⁴⁴

in any form of government that can possibly happen to the people in general is scarce sensible in respect of the miseries. . . of that dissolute condition of masterless men, without subjection to laws, and a coercive power to tie their hands from rapine and revenge.

Further, in Leviathan's natural state chapter, Hobbes claims that the state of nature is a rather incommodious condition indeed, and bereft of the conveniences and comforts (both material and psychological) which characterize *bona fide* COMMONWEALTHS.

The state of nature-3 is similar to the two remaining construals of this state to the extent that within this condition, there exists no terrestrial sovereign mechanism which can force the relevant individuals or units (in this case (the heads of) sovereign states) to keep the covenants which they had previously made. It is the case that within the state of nature-3, the heads of each independent political unit retain their respective rights of nature to exercise whatever strategies they deem necessary to preserve the existence and vitality of their respective political units. It is thus not the case that within this state the head of each unit has transferred his right to exercise all the means necessary to preserve its survival to some pan-national sovereign authority. Rather, Hobbes clearly

envisioned each state of nature-3 unit to maintain its sovereign independency.

This does not, however, mean that covenants between the heads of sovereign states cannot be entered into or that such covenants will not bind the covenantors to the performance of the terms to which they had agreed. Indeed, Hobbes claims that "if a weaker prince, make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for fear; he is bound to keep it; unless. . . there ariseth some new, and just cause of fear, to renew the war."⁴⁵ Absent the incidence of such a "new fear," the covenant made is valid, i.e. binds both covenantors, even though no terrestrial supra-natural mechanism to insure such compliance exists.

An additional feature that characterizes the elemental units (i.e., the COMMONWEALTHS or sovereign states) which comprise the state of nature-3 is that within such units, a good deal of organized effort is expended upon, and a robust stock of resources is devoted to, the aggressively active defense of that unit. Recall, for example, Hobbes's previously quoted claim that "in all times," heads of COMMONWEALTHS are "in the posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms,"⁴⁶ as well as his assertion that the heads of states "live in a condition of *perpetual war* [my emphasis] and upon the confines of battle, with their

frontiers armed, and cannons planted against their neighbors round about."⁴⁷ Presumably, the conditions of peace which obtain within a COMMONWEALTH make possible not only the development of the arts and industries which provide a basis for commodious living, but moreover, the arts and industries which provide a basis for the development of a sophisticated and redoubtable system of defense against external aggressors. Indeed, the extensive systems of forts, garrisons, guns and cannons which are utilized by the heads of sovereign states can hardly be imagined to be available to the "fathers" or "masters" who command the "families" that characterize the somewhat aspersory state of nature-2. In fact, it seems that the presence of vast stocks of (desired and easily transferable) commodities within the boundaries of sovereign states increases the likelihood that the rulers of one's neighboring states will take the steps required to establish adequately sturdy means of fortification (and, it seems equally likely, the resources required to launch a successful offensive invasion). This, in turn, will give rise to a desire on the part of each ruler to eschew being overrun by the armies of neighboring states which, in all likelihood, will encourage the development and utilization of such hardy and sophisticated systems of defense.

In "A Review and Conclusion" of Leviathan, Hobbes somewhat awkwardly forwards a twentieth law of nature which

enjoins "that every man is bound by nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect in war the authority, by which he is himself protected in time of peace."⁴⁸ Further, proclaims Hobbes "he that pretendeth a right of nature to preserve his own body, cannot pretend a right of nature to destroy him by whose strength he is preserved[.]"⁴⁹ However, it appears that these directives apply only in cases where the individual judges that his endeavoring to protect the established authority will not lead to his (the former's) certain or probable ruin. Further, it would appear that these directives apply only where there exists a sovereign authority which is of sufficient strength to establish conditions of internal peace. Thus, if the sovereign has been able to maintain conditions of peace within a COMMONWEALTH, and if the sovereign's continuing ability to maintain such conditions directly depends upon the active support of his citizens, then those citizens are obligated to preserve sovereign power by taking an active part in defensive (or offensive) war. Hence, occasional active fighting might be interpreted as an unpleasant pastime which must be pursued in order to insure future conditions of peace.

Crucially, it appears that the war engaged in by men living within (and fighting on behalf of) established COMMONWEALTHS (1) is conducted in an organized manner, (2) occurs somewhat less frequently than does war engaged in

by men who do not live within established COMMONWEALTHS and (3) contains a degree of predictability which cannot be attributed to the war which affects men who live beyond the pale of fully-fledged COMMONWEALTHS.

With respect to the first factor, Hobbes's already mentioned references to the hardy means of defense which are developed and employed within COMMONWEALTHS strongly suggests that a standing army capable of carrying on an effectively conducted battle will be at the disposal of many or most successful established sovereigns. By contrast, one would imagine battles waged outside the confines of a COMMONWEALTH, that is battles waged between families, to be rather disorganized, rather primitively conducted, and rather less smoothly executed than are those which are conducted under the auspices of COMMONWEALTHS.

Secondly, Hobbes claims that sovereigns can generally maintain conditions of peace and safety within their COMMONWEALTHS, and can thus make possible the development of the arts which provide the technological basis for the various industries. These industries, in turn, furnish the basis for a comfortable or commodious mode of life. Moreover, by dwelling within the COMMONWEALTH, subjects can expect to spend much less of their time engaged in actual preemptive or defensive battle, and much less of their time concerning themselves with the prospect of being attacked by men in their vicinity. Of course, men who live within

COMMONWEALTHS, can, from time to time, be expected to be called upon to perform military service, though it must be remembered that defending one's COMMONWEALTH is the price one normally pays for living under conditions of peace, enjoying a comfortable life, and so forth.

Thirdly, when a subject within a COMMONWEALTH is inducted into the armed forces, he must, while enduring the conditions of battle, maintain a stance of vigilance. However, when he is not situated within the precincts of battle, he can normally expect not to be harassed by the offensive (and defensive or anticipatory) acts of other men.

Thus, men who are called upon to perform military service might be expected to obey this sovereign directive for a variety of reasons: First, considerations of fairness or reciprocity might be thought to dictate that since the sovereign has made actual a social condition in which the subject can live a relatively peaceful and comfortable life, the latter owes to the former a debt of military service. More importantly, by entering into the COMMONWEALTH, each subject has submitted himself to the will and judgment of the sovereign, and has agreed to be bound by the decisions and directives of the latter.

However, a problem arises when we turn to consider that within the "families" or small groups characteristic of the state of nature-2, a man can "use his own reason in time of danger to save his own life either by flight or by

submission to the enemy as he shall think best[.]⁵⁰ Men residing within "families" are afforded this privilege despite the fact that they have consented to be ruled by the master of their respective family. Thus, one might object that considerations of justice dictate that even within state of nature-2 type "families," subjects have an obligation to obey the directives of their family head, including the directive to defend the integrity of that group.

What differentiates the situation of a person who lives within a fully-fledged COMMONWEALTH, from that of a person who lives within a "family," depends upon the latitude allowed to the latter, but not to the former, to determine whether his endeavor to preserve the integrity of his group will seriously threaten or endanger his life. Presumably, it is taken as given that within a COMMONWEALTH, the previously-remarked-upon robust means of defense will furnish the subject with a reasonable assurance that the fighting in which he is ordered to engage will not lead to his probable demise. Of course, by engaging in actual fighting, the subject thereby places himself in a position of physical danger, and thus risks the loss of his life. However, the willingness to engage in such fighting might be encouraged by an awareness of the relatively low probability that one will lose his life in this fighting, as well as by a recognition of the benefits which one realizes by virtue

of living within a COMMONWEALTH (accompanied, of course, by a desire to enjoy the benefits of a civil existence). In essence, the citizen exchanges his *de facto* right to determine whether to defend his commonwealth for the benefits and security which are normally provided by conditions of peace.

Unfortunately, Hobbes fails to offer a compelling reason why a man is obligated to obey his sovereign's order to engage in a battle in which that man stands a reasonably good chance of losing his life. Hobbes clearly indicates that⁵¹

no man is bound . . . either to kill himself or any other man; and consequently, that the obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the command of the sovereign to execute any dangerous or dishonorable office, dependeth not upon the words of our submission; but on the intention, which is to be understood by the end thereof.

"When therefore our refusal to obey," Hobbes continues, "frustrates the end for which sovereignty was ordained then there is no liberty to refuse: otherwise there is."⁵² Thus, even citizens within COMMONWEALTHS are allowed some latitude in refusing to bodily defend the COMMONWEALTH of which they are part. Furthermore, Hobbes contends that "[u]pon this ground, a man that is commanded as a soldier to fight against the enemy, though his sovereign have right enough to punish his refusal with death may nevertheless in many cases refuse without injustice."⁵³

For example, Hobbes admits that a man called upon to perform military duty may substitute a "sufficient soldier" in his place.⁵⁴ Moreover, Hobbes directs that allowance should be made for "natural timorousness; not only to women . . . but also to men of feminine courage."⁵⁵ Further, he contends that since avoiding battle is not injustice but cowardice, some allowance must be made for those who are naturally fearful of or averse to engaging in battle.

However, the manner in which Hobbes words these exemptions suggests that he believed most men would not be eligible for exemption from military service based upon considerations of natural timorousness. Clearly, given Hobbes's claim that for each man his own death represents the *summum malum*,⁵⁶ few sensible men can be expected to embrace military combat as an especially desirable pastime. In fact, fear would appear to be an appropriate passion for a man to be affected by when he is confronted with the prospect of entering into an activity as threatening to life and limb as war. Seemingly, Hobbes believed that a desire to maintain a commodious mode of life, as well as fear that civil conditions will break down (and, perhaps, a strong aversion to being ruled or dominated by the officials of a rival conquering power) would, for most men, outweigh the fear of losing one's life even in a rather precarious military battle.

I therefore contend that the following conditions characterize the three respective conceptions of the state of nature:

- A₁. In the state of nature-1, no sovereign multiperson associational groupings exist
- A₂. In the state of nature-2, small multi-person groups which are headed by an absolute ruler or leader exist
- A₃. In the state of nature-3, large multi-person groups called "COMMONWEALTHS," each of which is headed by an authentic effective sovereign power, exist
- B₂. In the state of nature-2, individuals living within such groups are bound by self-incurred contractual agreements to follow the rules and directives of the (absolute) group leader, so that laws established by the heads of groups exist and oblige members of these groups
- B₃. In the state of nature-3, individuals living within COMMONWEALTHS are bound by self-incurred contractual agreements to observe the laws of their sovereign, so that laws established by the sovereign exist and bind subjects of the COMMONWEALTH
- C₂. In the state of nature-2, the multi-person groups are described as being comparatively unstable units which can be easily conquered by, and thus incorporated into, slightly larger groups
- C₃. In the state of nature-3, the multi-person group or "COMMONWEALTH" is described as being a stable unit whose sovereign devotes a good deal of resources to the defense of its borders
- D₁. In the state of nature-1, a war of every man (and woman) against every man (and woman) exists
- D₂. In the state of nature-2, a war of every group against every other group (or of every group leader against every other group leader) exists
- D₃. In the state of nature-3, a war of every COMMONWEALTH against every other COMMONWEALTH (or of every sovereign against every other sovereign) exists

- E₁. In the state of nature-1, no common power to "keep them all in awe" exists
- E₂. In the state of nature-2, outside such small groups, no common power able to keep all men (or all group leaders) "in awe" exists
- E₃. In the state of nature-3, outside such COMMONWEALTHS, no terrestrial common power able to keep all men (or all sovereigns) "in awe" exists. That is, no effective terrestrial supra-national sovereign exists
- F₁. In the state of nature-1, there exists a common disposition (presumably, among all) to fight
- F₂. In the state of nature-2, there exists a common disposition among all group leaders to fight (in order to preserve the integrity of their respective group)
- F₃. In the state of nature-3, there exists a common disposition among all sovereigns to fight (in order to preserve the integrity of their respective COMMONWEALTH)
- G₁. In the state of nature-1, no laws of "mine and thine" exist
- G₂. In the state of nature-2, laws of "mine and thine" established by the respective group leader, exist within, though not between and among (the leaders of) such groups
- G₃. In the state of nature-3, laws of "mine and thine" exist within, though not between and among (the sovereigns of) such COMMONWEALTHS
- H₁. In the state of nature-1, the laws of nature exist (and purportedly bind)⁵⁷
- H₂. In the state of nature-2, the laws of nature exist and purportedly bind group leaders (as well as those who are not group leaders)
- H₃. In the state of nature-3, the laws of nature exist and purportedly bind sovereigns (as well as those who are not sovereigns)

- I₁. In the state of nature-1, contracts can be made, and are binding, between adults
- I₂. In the state of nature-2, contracts can be made, and are binding, between group leaders (as well as between natural persons living within such groups)
- I₃. In the state of nature-3, contracts can be made, and are binding, between sovereigns (as well as between natural persons living within COMMONWEALTHS)
- J₁. In the state of nature-1, a "commodious existence" is not available to men living in this condition
- J₂. In the state of nature-2, a "commodious existence" is not available to men living within such groups
- J₃. In the state of nature-3, a commodious existence is available to men living within COMMONWEALTHS
- K₁. In the state of nature-1, gender-based differences are present
- K₂. In the state of nature-2, gender-based differences are acknowledged but are not emphasized by Hobbes. Wives or women are sometimes regarded as being subject to the absolute rule of their group leader, though there is no in principle reason why a woman could not be a group leader either in a "family" by acquisition, or (especially) in a "family" by preservation.⁵⁸
- K₃. In the state of nature-3, gender-based differences are acknowledged but are not emphasized by Hobbes. Men and women appear to be equally regarded as citizens of their respective COMMONWEALTHS
- L₁. In the state of nature-1, human reproductive activity is conducted
- L₂. In the state of nature-2, human reproductive activity is conducted, and the offspring of such unions are to be regarded as subject to the absolute rule of the leader of the group into which they are born.
- L₃. In the state of nature-3, human reproductive activity is conducted, and the offspring of such unions are to be regarded as members of the COMMONWEALTH of which their parents are citizens⁵⁹

- M₁. In the state of nature-1, the "natural inclination of the sexes, one to another, and to the children" exists
- M₂. In the state of nature-2, the "natural inclination of the sexes, one to another, and to the children," exists
- M₃. In the state of nature-3, the "natural inclination of the sexes, one to another, and to the children" presumably exists

- N₁. In the state of nature-1, age-based differences are present and a distinction is drawn between infants (or smaller children) and adults
- N₂. In the state of nature-2, age-based differences exist, though the distinction between infants (and smaller children) and adults does not seem to play a significant role in Hobbes's discussion(s) of this condition
- N₃. In the state of nature-3, age-based differences exist, though the distinction between infants (and smaller children) and adults does not seem to play a significant role in Hobbes's discussion(s) of this condition

- O₁. In the state of nature-1, differences with respect to the levels of physical and intellectual powers are drawn between (A) adults and (B) infants and small children
- O₂. In the state of nature-2, differences with respect to the levels of physical and intellectual powers are drawn between (A) adults and (B) infants and small children, but does not seem to play a significant role in Hobbes's discussion(s) of this condition
- O₃. In the state of nature-3, differences with respect to the levels of physical and intellectual powers are drawn between (A) adults and (B) infants and small children but does not seem to play a significant role in Hobbes's discussion of this condition

- P₁. In the state of nature-1, no laws of matrimony exist
- P₂. In the state of nature-2, laws of matrimony, as specified by the group leader, may exist within groups
- P₃. In the state of nature-3, laws of matrimony, as established by the sovereign, may (and in all likelihood, do) exist within COMMONWEALTHS⁶⁰

- Q₁. In the state of nature-1, no laws for the education of children exist
- Q₂. In the state of nature-2, laws for the education of children as established by the group leader, may exist within groups
- Q₃. In the state of nature-3, laws for the education of children, as established by the sovereign, may (and in all likelihood, do) exist

G. Concluding Remarks

Before concluding this chapter, a number of cautionary notes or caveats are in order. First of all, I do not claim that Hobbes anywhere sets forth the three conceptions of the state of nature in a perspicuous and systematic fashion. Indeed, as I asserted in the opening paragraphs of this chapter, Hobbes's respective discussions of the state of nature might strike the casual reader as being sloppily organized, and indeed as being internally inconsistent.

Secondly, I must admit that the model of the state of nature presented in this chapter represents a reconstruction of material which can be found in various of Hobbes's philosophical writings.

I do not claim that Hobbes anywhere refers to the respective conceptions of the state of nature in the way that I have (namely, as the state of nature-1, the state of nature-2, etc.), or that Hobbes was especially interested to draw clear boundaries between the state of nature-1 and the state of nature-2, the state of nature-2 and the state of nature-3, and so forth. Moreover, I do not claim that the model of

the three conceptions of the state of nature presented in this chapter represents the sole faithful reconstruction of Hobbes's state of nature which can be culled from the latter's various pronouncements on this issue.⁶¹

Nevertheless, I do contend that my presentation does accurately capture a sense of the various interpretations of the state of nature or natural condition of humankind which Hobbes offers in his various writings.

My presentation in this chapter was motivated by a desire to impose a sense of coherence upon the various passages from Hobbes's *oeuvre* which advert to the natural condition of humankind, and to defend Hobbes of the charge that his state of nature represents a confused and perhaps valueless philosophical contrivance. Within his writings, Hobbes draws a clear distinction between historical and hypothetical accounts of the state of nature, as well as an explicit distinction between "families" and *bona fide* COMMONWEALTHS. Thus, I believe that I possess a firm textual basis for claiming that the three previously described conceptions of the state of nature can be drawn or reconstructed from Hobbes's various philosophical writings.

I will now move on to discuss the three methods by which Hobbes believed a commonwealth can come into existence or arise from out of the state of nature. Thus, chapter 4 of this dissertation will contain descriptions of the three types of Hobbesian commonwealth which I have respectively

designated "commonwealth by institution," "commonwealth by acquisition," and "commonwealth by preservation."

NOTES

1. For a description of multiperson sovereign units, see my discussion on pages 99-119, below.
2. be they artificial or natural persons
3. It should be noted that I am including this rather elongated discussion of Hobbes's understanding of philosophical method in order to show that the activity of attempting to imagine how political bodies can be conceived as being generated from the state of nature is a properly philosophical (as opposed, for example, to a merely historical) one, and in fact, is an activity which can properly be characterized as an exercise in synthetic philosophy.
4. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 3.
5. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 10.
6. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 11.
7. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 11.
8. Of course, Hobbes is speaking somewhat loosely when he claims that a true circle can be drawn or inscribed on a sheet of paper. Since true (ideal) geometric figures such as squares and circles are composed of lines which have no width, and since any graphic representation of a circle must be composed of lines which have some width, we must look with some suspicion upon Hobbes's use of this example.
Nevertheless, when Hobbes describes the construction of a circle, the significance and cogency of his example becomes somewhat more compelling.
9. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 6.
10. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 6.
11. As we have seen above, from the standpoint of the matter, or the *type* of body studied, Hobbes draws a distinction between natural and civil philosophy. See above, page 88.
12. For a discussion of masterless collective sovereign persons, see my discussion on pages 99-119, below.

13. More in the case of state of nature-3 type groupings (or fully fledged) COMMONWEALTHS, less in the case of the relatively unstable organizational units which are characteristic of the state of nature-2. In this and following chapters, I will employ the term 'commonwealth' to refer to the groups characteristic of either the state of nature-2 or the state of nature-3, and the term 'COMMONWEALTH' [printed in capitals] to refer specifically to the groups characteristic of the state of nature-3. For my respective discussions of the state of nature-2 and the state of nature-3, see below, pages 99-104 and pages 104-114.

14. See, for example, his description of "the several kinds of commonwealth" in chapter 19 of Leviathan and his discussion of paternal and despotical dominion in Chapter 20 of Leviathan. (Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 118-127 and pages 128-135.)

15. In an article entitled "Hobbes's Conception of the State of Nature," François Tricaud suggests that "the state of nature is a model (taking the word in such sense as physicists and economists make use) whose function is not to reproduce the true condition of mankind but to illuminate it." (François Tricaud, "Hobbes's Conception of the State of Nature From 1640 to 1651: Evolution and Ambiguities," in G.A.J. Rogers and Alan Ryan, editors, Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), page 110.) Similarly, in "Hobbes and the Wolf Man," Paul Johnson claims that "the state of nature for Hobbes is not a real state presenting men with practical problems, but what we would now call an ideal limiting case like the concepts of a pure inertial state or a frictionless plane are in physics." (Paul Johnson, "Hobbes and the Wolf-Man," In J.G. Van der Bend, editor, Thomas Hobbes: His View of Man, (Amsterdam: Rodolpi, 1982), page 42.) Though I will present a more robust discussion of the concept of the state of nature as "an ideal limiting case" later in this chapter, at this point in the discussion, I wish only to suggest that the single individual persons or collective organizational units which occupy (the various conceptions of) the state of nature can similarly be understood to represent 'ideal limiting cases' (akin to frictionless surfaces and widthless one-dimensional lines) rather than any actually existing men and women or historically instantiated governmental organizations.

16. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, pages 66-67 (my emphasis).

17. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 109.

18.It should be noted that the three methods by which Hobbes believes a commonwealth can be generated will be discussed in chapter 4 of this dissertation.

19.Seemingly, the condition of civil war which follows the dissolution of a (civilized) COMMONWEALTH can be identified as an instance of the state of nature-2, since we would reasonably expect some sort of multiperson coalitions or defensive groups to be manifested under such conditions.

20.François Tricaud, "Hobbes's Conception of the State of Nature from 1640-1651: Evolution and Ambiguities," in G.A.J. Rogers and Alan Ryan, editors, Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, page 111.

21.Indeed, with respect to the fourth source listed in the previous sentence, the opening pages of Thucydides' History of the Peloponesian Wars, an English translation of which was executed and published by Hobbes during his early years, contains a description of the social condition in ancient Greece which fairly well approximates the descriptions of the state of nature-2 which can be found in the thirteenth and seventeenth chapters of Leviathan, as well as in various other locations throughout Hobbes's writings. See Hobbes, English Works, Vol VIII, pages 1-8.

22.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 77.

23.It is the opinion of the present writer that the conventional interpretation of the prisoners dilemma (such as that set forward by Gauthier in The Logic of Leviathan) does not adequately reflect Hobbes's analysis of the state of nature since such an interpretation insufficiently reflects the influence of the antisocial passions upon the voluntary behavior of the inhabitants of that state. Thus, while discussions of game theoretical strategies likely to be employed by the paradigmatically rational actors who find themselves in prisoners dilemma type situations, while significant and interesting in their own right, nevertheless fail to capture the passionate character and the resulting behavioral strategies which are likely to be employed by the individuals involved. Thus, throughout the course of this chapter, I will concern myself not with how human beings considered as paradigmatically rational creatures would choose to voluntarily act under such conditions, but rather with how we would expect human beings of the constitutional and behavioral character described by Hobbes to voluntarily act if they were forced to interact with one another under said conditions.

24. Students of twentieth century social contract theory will recognize that the state of nature-1 shares important similarities with John Rawls's "original position."

Indeed, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls chooses to consider men in his original position as situated behind a "veil of ignorance" which effectively denies to them "certain kinds of particular facts." For example, Rawls claims that behind the veil of ignorance "no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortunes in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like." See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Belnap, 1972), page 137.

25. Descriptions of this more robust characterization of the state of nature-1 can be found in sections 2-7 of Chapter 9 of De Cive (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, pages 212-215.), sections 1-8 of Chapter 4 of Book 2 of The Elements of Law (Hobbes, Elements of Law, pages 131-134.), and perhaps most illuminatingly, in the sections entitled "Dominion Paternal, How Attained. Not by Generation but by Contract," and "On Education" in the early pages of Chapter 20 of Leviathan. (Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 128-130.)

26. See, for example, Hobbes's footnote to Section 2 of Chapter 1 of De Cive, in Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 110.

27. Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 118.

28. Further, in De Cive, Hobbes describes this condition of war as "perpetual in its own nature," "because in regard of the equality of those that strive, it cannot be ended by victory." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 118.), and in the Elements, Hobbes claims that our knowledge of the behavior of men in their natural condition is derived "both by the experience of savage nations that live at this day, and by our ancestors the old inhabitants of Germany, and other now civil countries." (Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 73.) In the corresponding passage from De Cive, Hobbes cites as an example of those who dwell in a perpetual condition of war, even in the present, "those of America," and as examples of those who had previously endured such a condition those of "other nations which now indeed are become civil and flourishing, but were then few, fierce, short-lived, poor, nasty, and deprived of all that pleasure and beauty of life, which peace and security are wont to bring them." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 118.)

29. Leviathan, page 77.

30. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 77.

31. Hobbes offers the opinion that "in all places where men have lived by small families, to rob and spoil one another has been a trade. . . and man observed no other laws therein but the laws of honor; that is, to abstain from cruelty. (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 106.) Similarly, in the corresponding passage from the Elements, Hobbes claims that "in old time, we read that rapine was a trade of life," even though "cruelty was forbidden by the law of nature." (Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 100.) And finally, in De Cive, Hobbes asserts that "in old time there was a manner of living, and as it were a certain economy, which they called ληστροικὴν, living by rapine; which was neither against the law of nature nor void of glory to those who exercised it with valor, not with cruelty." Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 166.)

Similarly, the opening pages of Hobbes's 1628 English translation of The History of Thucydides contains a brief description of the nomadic, precarious, and rather unprofitable way of life practiced by the ancient inhabitants of the land "which is now called Hellas." It is clear even to the casual reader that this description, bears a more than superficial resemblance to the condition which I have designated Hobbes's state of nature-2.

32. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 132.

33. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. VI, page 147.

34. Hobbes, English Works, Vol VI, page 147.

35. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. VI, page 147. An interesting feature of the Dialogue account of the state of nature-2 concerns the inclusion within families of those men who desire to possess land and who have acquired skills or "the arts necessary for a man's life" which will presumably foster the development of commodious living within the family. Thus, according to the Dialogue account, families are comprised of a father or lord, his children and wife, his servants who have been acquired and "saved" through conquest, and (unlike the earlier accounts) subjects who have voluntarily submitted themselves to the laws of the family. Thus, an element of commonwealth (or perhaps, proto-commonwealth) by institution enters into Hobbes's Dialogue account of the patrimonial grouping which he designates 'a family.'

36. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 132.

37. Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 127. Cf. Hobbes's claim from chapter 8 of De Cive, that "to be a king, is nothing else but to have dominion over many persons; and thus, a great family is a kingdom and a little kingdom a family." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 205.)

38. This sovereign can, of course, be an artificial person, and can be composed of a number of natural persons.

39. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 132.

40. For example, in The Elements of Law, Hobbes proclaims that servants immediate to the supreme master (or subjects within a commonwealth by acquisition) are discharged of their servitude or subjection

by a new captivity, where the servant having done his endeavor to defend himself, hath thereby performed his covenant to his former master, and for the safety of his life, entering into a new covenant with the conqueror, is bound to his best endeavour to keep that likewise.
(Hobbes, Elements of Law, pages 129-30.)

Similarly, in De Cive, Hobbes contends that

if the servant be taken prisoner, the old servitude is abolished by the new; for as all other things, so servants are also acquired by was, whom in equity the lord must protect, if he will have them to be his.
(Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 209.)

41. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 132.

42. Leviathan, p. 78. It should be noted that in the author's preface to De Cive, Hobbes claims

that the dispositions of men are naturally such, that except they be restrained through fear of some coercive power, every man will distrust and dread each other; and as natural right he may, so by necessity he will be forced to make use of the strength he hath, toward the preservation of himself. (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 99.)

As confirmation of this, he observes that

[w]e see all countries, though they be at peace with their neighbors, yet guarding their frontiers with armed men, their towns with walls and ports, and keeping constant watches. To what purpose is all this, if there be no fear of the neighboring power? (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 99.)

Further, in the dedication to the same work, Hobbes contends that the saying "man to man is an arrant wolf" is true "if we compare cities." With respect to relations between cities, Hobbes asserts that "good men must defend themselves by taking to them for a sanctuary the two daughters of war, deceit and violence: that is, a mere brutal rapacity." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, pages 89-90.)

43.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 78.

44.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 117.

45.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 86. See also page 140 of Leviathan where Hobbes states that

in states and commonwealths not dependent upon one another, every commonwealth, not every man, has an absolute liberty, to do what it shall judge most conducing to their benefit. But withal, they live in a condition of perpetual war, and upon the confines of battle, with their frontiers armed, and cannons planted against their neighbors round about.

46.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 78.

47.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 140. Similarly, while discussing the mutual fear men have of each other in Chapter 1, Section 2 of De Cive, Hobbes observes that "[k]ingdoms guard their coasts and frontiers with forts and castles; cities are compact within walls: and all for fear of neighboring kingdoms and towns." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 113.)

48.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 490.

49.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 490.

50.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 132.

51.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 142.

52.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 142.

53.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 142.

54.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 142.

55.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 142.

56.Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 48.

57.According to at least some passages in Leviathan.

58.See my discussions of commonwealths (and families) by acquisition and by preservation on pages 131-152 of chapter 4 of this dissertation.

59.But note well Hobbes's claim that

[i]f a man and woman, monarchs of two several kingdoms, have a child, and contract concerning who shall have the dominion of him, the right of the dominion passeth by the contract. If they contract not, the dominion followeth the dominion of the place of residence. For the sovereign of each country hath dominion over all that reside therein. (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 130.)

60.See, for example, Hobbes's claim that within commonwealths, the dominion over a child

is decided by the civil law; and for the most part but not always, the sentence is in favor of the father; because for the most part commonwealths have been erected by the fathers, not by the mothers of families. But the question lieth now in the state of mere nature; where there are supposed no laws of matrimony. . . .
(Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 128-29.)

such as those which exist within commonwealths.

61.In fact, a problem would seem to arise when we come to consider Hobbes's occasional references to "multitudes of lawless men" (Hobbes, English Works, Vol. V, page 184.) and "the manner of life there would be were there no common power to fear [based upon] the manner of life, which men that have formerly lived under peaceful governments use to degenerate into, in a civil war." (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 78.)

Specifically, a critic of my reconstruction of Hobbes's state of nature might urge that a separate conception of this state which is historical (rather than hypothetical) and which construes the actors or individuals who inhabit this condition as utterly solitary (i.e. without any sorts of social ties) should be included within my taxonomy.

To such a critic, I would reply that even in those circumstances in which society has broken down, there do nevertheless remain some residual social ties among men and women. Thus, it is inconceivable that Hobbes would have considered as a historical possibility an actually instantiated *war of each against all*. Indeed, on page 78 of Leviathan, Hobbes denies that "there has even been" a condition of war of this type.

CHAPTER IV

VARIETIES OF HOBBSIAN COMMONWEALTH

A. Introduction

In the opening section of chapter 8 of De Cive, Hobbes draws a distinction between a natural government "which may also be called acquired because it is that which is gotten by power and natural force," and an instituted or framed government "which receives its original from the consent of many, who by contract and faith mutually given have obliged each other."¹ In this fourth chapter of my dissertation, I will examine Hobbes's conceptions of a natural commonwealth (which he divides into a commonwealth by acquisition or a despotical government, and a commonwealth by preservation or a paternal government), and a commonwealths by institution.² I will begin by discussing Hobbes's conception of a commonwealth by acquisition.

B. Commonwealth by Acquisition

In Leviathan, Hobbes proclaims that "dominion acquired by conquest, or victory in war, is that which some writers call despotic, from Δεσπότης which signifieth a lord or master; and is the dominion of the master over the servant."³ Hobbes specifies that⁴

this dominion is then acquired to the victor when the vanquished, to avoid the present stroke of death covenanteth, either in express words or other sufficient signs of the will, that so long as his life and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the victor should have the use thereof at his pleasure.

Significantly, the relationship which obtains between the servant and the master (or between the citizen and the sovereign in a COMMONWEALTH by acquisition) can properly be characterized as a contractual one. Thus, in a commonwealth by acquisition (though as we will later see, not in a commonwealth by institution), the sovereign enters into a contractual agreement with his subject(s) and is bound to perform the terms to which he has agreed.

Moreover, in Leviathan, Hobbes asserts that it is not⁵

the victory which giveth the right of dominion over the vanquished, but his own covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is conquered, that is to say beaten or taken, or put to flight; but because he cometh in and submitteth to the victor.

In all three of his principal political works, Hobbes is quick to distinguish between a servant, who is trusted with his corporal freedom, and a slave who is not so trusted. Thus, in De Cive, he specifies "that there is a confidence and trust which accompanies the benefit of pardoned life, whereby the lord affords him his corporal liberty," and that "not everyone who is taken in the war and hath his life spared," is supposed to have "contracted with his lord."⁶ Indeed, Hobbes claims that those who have been taken in war, who have had their lives spared, and who continue to serve within "prisons" or "bound within irons," i.e. slaves, "offend not against the laws of nature if they fly or kill their lord."⁷ Thus, Hobbes attempts to show

that the contractual bonds which characterize the relationship between the servant and the master (or between the subject and the sovereign within a COMMONWEALTH by acquisition) are incurred as a result of a free choice on the part of each of the contracting parties.

Although in each of his three principal political works, Hobbes specifies that the sovereign by acquisition enters into a contractual agreement with each of his subjects, it is clear that such an agreement is not entered into by both contractors upon equal terms. This claim is most forcefully asserted in Leviathan where Hobbes states that the victor is not "obliged by an enemy's rendering himself, without promise of life, to spare him from this his yielding to discretion; which obliges not the victor longer than in his own discretion he shall think fit."⁸ Thus, if M has S at the point of a sword, and S offers to "strike a deal" with M, M can choose to decline S's offer without seriously endangering the loss of his life. Indeed, in this situation M can immediately kill S if he chooses to do so. Even if M does enter into a contractual agreement with S, Hobbes seems clearly to be asserting in Leviathan, M can discontinue honoring the covenant into which he has entered, whenever he thinks it discreet to do so.⁹

Indeed, Hobbes defines or describes 'quarter,' taking alive, or zoogria (Ζωγρία) as evading "the present fury of the victor by submission and [compounding one's] life with

ransom and service."¹⁰ Further, Hobbes specifies that the person who "hath quarter, hath not his life given but deferred till farther deliberation; for it is not yielding on condition of life but to discretion."¹¹

In the Elements of Law, and especially in De Cive, Hobbes clearly underplays the sovereign-by-acquisition's/master's "discretion" in determining how long he will refrain from killing or placing his servant in chains, and instead emphasizes that the subject's obligation to obey the sovereign is contingent upon the latter's continuing to honor the terms of the contract into which he had entered. Thus, in De Cive, Hobbes contends that¹²

[t]he obligation therefore of a servant to his lord, ariseth not from the simple grant of his life; but from hence rather, that he keeps him not bound or imprisoned. For all obligation derives from contract; but where is no trust there can be no contract. . . . There is therefore a confidence and trust which accompanies the benefit of pardoned life, whereby the lord affords him his corporal liberty. . . . Wherefore such kinds of servants as are restrained by imprisonment or bonds, are not comprehended in that definition of servant given above; because those serve not for contract's sake, but to the end that they might not suffer. And therefore if they fly or kill their lord, they offend not against the law of nature.

Thus, the servant is contractually bound to obey the master so long as the latter refrains from placing the former in chains or prison. Since contractual bonds presuppose trust, the servant who is committed to chains and custody, and is thus no longer trusted, is thereby

discharged of the obligation *in foro interno* to his *quondam* master.¹³ Despite the unequal power relationship which characterizes the agreement into which the sovereign or master and the citizen or servant enter, it is significant that in establishing a COMMONWEALTH by acquisition (or its corresponding smaller scale analog), the sovereign does enter into a contractual relationship with his subject or servant. As we will later see, this is clearly not the case when the commonwealth by institution is established.

C. Commonwealth by Preservation

Hobbes continues his presentation of natural (as opposed to artificial) governments by discussing the "Rights of Parents over their Children." In De Cive, Hobbes begins this discussion by criticizing those earlier writers who had attempted to prove that a parent enjoys dominion over his child simply because the former begat the latter "as if it were of itself evident, that what is begotten by me is mine."¹⁴ In Leviathan, he stoutly asserts that¹⁵

the right to dominion by generation is that which the parent hath over his children . . . [a]nd is not so derived from the generation, as if therefore the parent had dominion over his child because he begat him; but from the child's consent, either express or by other sufficient arguments.

Hobbes explains that mere generation does not confer dominion since dominion is indivisible (i.e., since no man can serve two masters). However, since two persons, namely, a male and a female, "must concur in the act of

generation,"¹⁶ it is impossible that dominion should be acquired by generation only.

Thus, Hobbes begins his argument against the claim that generation automatically confers dominion of the generator over the generated (i.e., of the parent over the child) by claiming that dominion is indivisible since no man can serve two masters. Indeed, he begins by stipulating that no human being can be ruled by more than one natural person. Secondly, Hobbes introduces the factual empirical claim that two persons, namely a male and a female, are required to generate or to bring into existence any individual child. Thus, since two persons are jointly required to generate a child, if mere generation of that child were sufficient to confer dominion upon the generator, then both the father and the mother would have a right to dominion over their child. However, since sovereign power is indivisible, i.e., cannot be distributed between two or among more than two people, then it is not the case that merely generating a person automatically confers dominion upon the generator.

Hobbes then informs his readers that "some" who have recognized the indivisibility of sovereignty have attributed such dominion "to man only as being of the more excellent sex," or have ascribed "dominion over the child to the father only, *ob præstantium sexus*," or have, "by reason of the pre-eminence of sex," attributed lordship to the father.¹⁷ He claims, however, that those who hold this

position are clearly wrong, since "there is not always that difference of strength or prudence between the man and the woman as the right can be determined without war."¹⁸ Thus, Hobbes's belief in the natural equality of human beings, which was discussed in some detail in chapter 1 of this dissertation, can again be seen to play a part in his theory of sovereignty. Specifically, Hobbes claims that if there existed significant natural differences between men and women with respect to levels of physical strength or (intellectual) prudence, then such differences would render it the case that dominion over the child naturally attaches to the stronger or the wiser (i.e., the male) parent. However, since such natural divisions do not exist, dominion over the child does not, "by reason of the pre-eminence of sex,"¹⁹ naturally attach to the male parent.

Strikingly, Hobbes claims that in "the condition of mere nature," if the mother and the father make no contract to establish dominion over their child, the dominion lies "with the mother." For example, in De Cive, he claims that²⁰

by right of nature the conqueror is lord over the conquered. By the right of nature, therefore, the dominion over the infant first belongs to him who is first in his power. But it is manifest that he who is newly born is in the mother's power.

Thus, not only does Hobbes deny that dominion over the child naturally adheres to that child's father, but moreover, he

claims that dominion does, in some *natural* sense, belong to the mother. Though one might initially be perplexed by Hobbes's claim that dominion naturally belongs to that child's mother, rather than to his father, one must remember that Hobbes's discussion here concerns the relationship between the mother, the father and the child in the state of nature, specifically, in what I have earlier characterized as the state of nature-1.

During his discussion of the origins of the commonwealth by preservation, Hobbes specifies that in the state of nature "it cannot be known who is the father, but by the testimony of the mother."²¹ Thus, the state of nature (i.e., the state of nature-1) is a condition not only bereft of marital institutions, but moreover, a condition in which relationships between men and women are, for the most part, rather fleeting ones. Nevertheless, Hobbes explicitly states that in order to retain the right of dominion over the child, the mother must perform actions beyond that of merely giving birth. Indeed, he remarks that since "the infant is first in the power of the mother. . . she may either nourish it or expose it. If she nourish it, it oweth its life to its mother; and is therefore obliged to obey her."²² Thus, the obligation of the child to obey his mother arises not from her having given birth to, but rather, from her having taken the steps necessary to preserve the life of her child.

On the other hand, Hobbes claims that if the mother exposes her child and if another person finds and nourishes that child, then the child incurs an obligation to obey his preserver. Hobbes explains that the child "ought to" obey the person by whom his life is preserved "because preservation of life being the end, for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience to him, in whose power it is to save or destroy him."²³

Hobbes contends that in the "mere state of nature,"²⁴ where there are supposed no laws of matrimony and no laws for the education of children, "either the parents between themselves dispose of the dominion over the child, or do not dispose thereof at all. If they dispose thereof, the right passeth according to the contract."²⁵ Thus, it is conceivable that in the state of nature-1, a male and a female who are jointly responsible for the generation of an infant can contract to transfer dominion over the child from the mother to the father. Moreover, such a contract can be conceived as transferring dominion over the child without transferring the right of nature of either of the contracting parties. That is to say, such a contract can be understood as transferring dominion over the child to one of the parents (usually the father) without transferring dominion over the mother. Indeed, Hobbes mentions that if a man and a woman, who are monarchs of "two separate kingdoms"

and thus, who confront each other in the state of nature²⁶ have a child "and contract concerning who shall have dominion over him, the right of dominion passeth by the contract."²⁷ Moreover, he cites the *erroneous* historical example of the Amazons who (he claims) "contracted with the men of neighboring countries to whom they had recourse for issue."²⁸

What I take to be an interesting feature of this contract is that it is not necessary that both (or even one) of the contracting parties be the parents of the child. By this, I simply mean to point out that the mother (or by the person who currently has the child under his/her control), may enter into such a contractual relationship with any (fully grown) person whatever, and thus it is not necessary that she enter into this contract with the child's father. (Indeed, as I suggested in the previous sentence, it is not necessary that even one of the two persons who enters into such a contract be the biological parent of the infant whose proprietorship is being transferred. Thus, if a mother abandons her child, the latter of whom is found and preserved by person p (who, we may stipulate, is not biologically related to the child), person p may enter into a covenant with person q (who, we may also stipulate, is not related to the child) through which guardianship of the child is transferred to q in exchange for some other benefit).²⁹

Thus, Hobbes presents a rather involved account of the manner by which a fully grown person comes to have dominion over a child which may be summarized in the following fashion: When a woman gives birth to a child, she may either breed up, that is, support the preservation of that child, or she may expose it to the elements, i.e., abandon it. If she decides to exercise the former option, she thereby retains dominion over her child by virtue of having supported the latter's preservation. If she decides to exercise the latter option, and if another person finds and "breeds up" the abandoned child, that other person acquires dominion over the child for the same reason. After having acquired dominion over the child in one of these ways, the mother or preserver may contract to transfer such dominion to another person (presumably, in exchange for some other benefit). Thus, dominion over an infant can be exchanged through contract, provided that both of the contracting parties are adults (and hence, capable of understanding the mechanics of contract making and keeping), and that one of the two contracting parties has dominion over the infant by virtue of present possession.

Importantly, when the child comes to enjoy the full use of his intellectual and physical faculties, he continues to owe obedience to his preserver since, as Hobbes contends, "it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved."³⁰ Thus, even though the infant child cannot be conceived of as

entering into a contract with his preserver, once that child reaches adulthood or the age of reason (or in any case, the age at which he can be conceived of as understanding the mechanism of a contract) he is to be understood as having entered into a tacit contract to obey the person who has preserved him.³¹

We can therefore observe that Hobbes's account of patrimonial dominion or commonwealth by preservation contains discussions of two distinct types of contract, the first of which is employed to determine or "fix" dominion over an infant child, and the second of which results from the child's acceptance of benefits which had been bestowed upon him during his nonage.

D. Commonwealth by Institution

Hobbes claims that while in natural commonwealths, the lord or the sovereign "acquires to himself such citizens as he will," in institutive commonwealths "citizens by their own wills appoint a lord over themselves, whether he be one man or a company of men, endued with the command in chief." He begins his discussion of a commonwealth by institution by inviting his readers to consider the process by which a multitude of men join together "of their own free will." In fact, he commences chapter 18 of Leviathan by asserting that³²

[a] commonwealth is said to be instituted when a multitude of men do agree, and covenant, every one with every one, that to whatsoever man or assembly of men, shall be given by the major part, the right to present the person of them all, that is to say, to be their representative; every one, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgments, of that man or assembly of men, in the same manner as if they were his own, to the end, to live peacefully amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.

Thus, we might imagine a multitude of ten men whom we might designate p1-p10, each of whom retains his right of nature, and none of whom has yet agreed to transfer his decision making power to any other person. Hobbes is keen to emphasize that even though the actions of many men can concur to one end, such actions must be understood to proceed from the several wills of the men who constitute that multitude. Indeed, he asserts that "[s]ince the conspiring of many wills to the same end doth not suffice to preserve peace and to make a lasting defense, it is requisite that in those necessary matters which concern peace and self defense, there be but one will of all men."³³ Thus, we might imagine that each person p1-p10, residing in the state of nature of some variety, individually desires that some state of affairs be brought about. We might imagine, for example, that each person recognizes that the course of a certain river must be diverted before the flow from that waterway is able to cause a severe flood in the plain in which all of them live. It

would seem that according to Hobbes, even before any variety of commonwealth is instituted, the various persons can (more or less) spontaneously join together to help achieve some common mutually beneficial goal.

In the example of the conforming of many wills to one end, namely, to the end of diverting the course of the immanently destructive river, each person desires that the river be diverted, and each person separately and of his own volition decides to enter into the cooperative project of diverting the course of this body of water. That is to say, in this prepolitical state, each person enters into this project because he has a will to do so and not because he had been instructed or ordered to do so by a sovereign individual or council to whom he had formerly transferred his decision-making power. However, Hobbes believed such spontaneously initiated cooperative projects to be of insufficient strength to form the basis for any long-lasting or durable civil arrangement.³⁴

Surprisingly, Hobbes suggests that a number of men can, in some cases, repulse attacks or defend territory without being led by the will of a formally established permanent sovereign power (although, as was mentioned earlier, in order for any common goal to be achieved, some system or order-issuing, and rule-following, even if it is exceedingly rudimentary and evanescent, would need to be in existence) Accordingly, he contends that it is not enough³⁵

for the security which men should desire should last all the time of their life, that they be governed, and directed in *by one judgment* for a limited time; as in one battle, or one war. For though they obtain a victory by their unanimous endeavour against a foreign enemy; yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they must needs, by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a war amongst themselves.

Moreover, he contends that if the actions of a multitude of men³⁶

be directed according to their particular judgments and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defense, nor protection, neither against a common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help but hinder one another and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to nothing, whereby they are easily not only subdued by a very few that agree together; but also, where there is no common enemy, they make war upon each other, for their particular interests.

Thus, given the diversity of individual passions, and the predominantly self-seeking behavior of human beings, it is impossible that a multitude of human beings left to their own devices, and thus unrestrained by any established sovereign power, will naturally organize into cooperative and defensible civic units. Indeed, Hobbes contends that "there be something else required besides covenant, to make their agreement constant and lasting: which is a common power to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit."³⁷ Ergo, Hobbes believed that in order

to procure a more certain, safe, and comfortable life, a number of men will enter into a series of contractual agreements with one another to confer sovereign decision-making power on a single individual or assembly.

Hence, we can imagine that person p_1 enters into a covenant with person p_2 which specifies that both contracting parties agree to be bound by the decision of some sovereign individual or assembly and to accept and "authorize all the actions and judgments, of that man or assembly of men. . . as if they were his own."³⁸ Hobbes asserts that in instituting the commonwealth, "each individual enters into a contract with every other" so that p_1 must be understood to contract with persons p_3 - p_{10} as well as with p_2 . (see my previous discussion of persons p_1 - p_{10} on pp. 143-144) Moreover, Hobbes contends that in entering into the contract, each party agrees to transfer his decision-making power to the individual or assembly of men which is selected by the greater part of that multitude. Thus, after every man enters into a contract with every other, an election is conducted in order to choose an individual person or assembly as the depository of the sovereign power.

Hobbes contends that after the individual enters into the covenant with his fellow subjects, he agrees to obey the natural person or group of natural persons that is offered the gift of sovereignty by the majority of him and his

fellow contractors. Indeed, Hobbes asserts that if this contractor³⁹

voluntarily entered into the congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will, and therefore tacitly covenanted, to stand to what the major part shall ordain: and therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make protestations against any of their decrees, he does contrary to his covenant, and thus unjustly.

Moreover, Hobbes points out that the alternative to accepting the decree of the greater part is life in the state of nature "wherein [each man] might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever."⁴⁰ Thus, Hobbes proposes two reasons why a man should agree to be ruled by whomever the majority chooses, even if the majority's choice does not conform to his own. First, since this man has entered into a contractual agreement, he is bound to perform the terms to which he has agreed, in this case to accept as his sovereign the man or assembly of men that is chosen by a majority of the contractors. Second, Hobbes points out that failure to accept as sovereign the man or assembly that is chosen by a majority of the contractors will result in being excluded from the incipient commonwealth, and thus, returning to the solitary and uncertain conditions of the state of nature. Indeed, in such a situation, one acts justly and prudently by remaining within the commonwealth, that is, by accepting as one's sovereign the man or assembly which is elected or chosen by the majority.

Hobbes cautions that it is not enough to obtain the requisite security that every one covenants with the rest "either by words or writing, not to steal, not to kill, and to observe the like laws; for the pravity of human disposition is manifest to all, and by experience too well known how little. . . men are kept to their duties through conscience of their promises."⁴¹ Thus, Hobbes contends that some coercive mechanism must be established which will guarantee the keeping of contracts, as well as the keeping of the natural and civil laws through the use of punishments. Even though the individual members of a multitude of men might uniformly enter into a cooperative arrangement with the intention to follow the laws of nature (which Hobbes claimed to be easily known to all men), Hobbes believed that the self-serving passions of men would eventually lead to law breaking, dissention, and eventually the dissolution of this group. Further, Hobbes believed that in order to prevent such an unappealing eventuality, it is necessary to establish a sovereign mechanism which is of sufficient power to guarantee that contracts are kept and laws are obeyed. Once the sovereign is instituted, he can then develop a system of penalties according to which the punishment assigned to be administered to the person who violates a given law is greater than the benefit which is likely to be realized by the violator as a result of breaking that law.

If an effective system of penalties is in place, individuals, who are able to observe that the penalties assigned to the violation of laws exceed in severity the probable benefits of violating them, and that such penalties are likely to be imposed for violations, will be deterred from violating these laws. Once a sufficient number of citizens is so discouraged from breaking these laws, a general climate of safety will ensue. This, in turn, will lead to the further reduction of the number of violations of the law, and thus, to the realization of a condition of greater safety. This "climate of safety" can be understood to result from the perception on the part of a substantial portion of the commonwealth's (or COMMONWEALTH'S) populace that the laws can be kept without running a substantial risk of being harmed or being taken advantage of by one's less conscientious fellow-citizens.

Clearly, however, this transformation from a condition in which human beings are unwilling to keep covenants and observe the other laws of nature, to a condition in which they are so willing involves a bit of finesse on the part of Hobbes. Indeed, Hobbes's account of this transformation seems less than compelling for reasons which will be detailed in the following two chapters. At this point in the presentation, let it suffice to say that Hobbes does not believe that the nature of the human organism will undergo a transformation once a COMMONWEALTH is instituted. Indeed,

after the COMMONWEALTH has been established, the individuals who constitute that COMMONWEALTH will remain the "predominantly egoistic" creatures which they had been when they "inhabited" the state of nature.

NOTES

1. Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 106.

2. When reviewing this chapter, it should be remembered that multiperson sovereign units, i.e., commonwealths, are composed of human beings, whom Hobbes believed to possess a specific and inflexible nature. Verily, Hobbes claimed that human beings constitute the "matter" of such political bodies. (see for example, Hobbes, Man and Citizen, pages 98-99.) Thus, before discussing the manner in which multiperson sovereign groups (which are, after all composed of human beings) can be conceived as interacting with, and combining with one another, it will be relevant, instructive, and thus worthwhile, to consider how unfettered individuals (who do not belong to multiperson sovereign organizational units) *would* interact with one another in the Hobbesian hypothetical condition which I have labeled the state of nature-1. Indeed, it should be kept in mind that during his analytical discussions of the origin of, and basis for allegiance within, commonwealths by acquisition and commonwealths by preservation, Hobbes chooses to consider matters from the standpoint of the state of nature-1. (See Chapter 20 of Leviathan (Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 127-132), Chapters 8 and 9 of De Cive (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 205-217.), and Chapters 3 and 4 of Part II of The Elements (Hobbes, Elements of Law, pages 127-135.))

3. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 130.

4. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 130. In De Cive, Hobbes contends that dominion is acquired "if a man taken prisoner in the wars, or overcome, or else distrusting his own forces, to avoid death promises the conqueror or the stronger party his service, that is, to do all whatsoever he shall command him." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 106.) And finally, in the Elements of Law, Hobbes claims that when a man submits to an assailant for fear of death "thereby accrueth a right of dominion." (Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 127.)

5. Leviathan, p. 131.

In De Cive Hobbes claims that it is not

the obligation of a servant to his lord, ariseth not from the simple grant of his life; but from hence rather that he keeps him not bound or imprisoned. For all obligation derives from contract; but where there is no trust, there can be no contract. . . . There is therefore a confidence and trust which accompanies the benefit of pardoned life whereby the lord affords him his corporal liberty. (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, pages 206-207.)

Hobbes further contends that

when a servant taken in the wars is bound in natural bonds or chains, and the like or in prison; there hath passed no covenant from the servant to the master; for those natural bonds have no need of strengthening by the verbal bonds of covenant; and they show the servant is not trusted. (Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 128.)

Hobbes again forcefully makes this point in The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance when he asserts, in reply to Bishop Bramhall's claim that "the laws of conquerors who come in by the power of the sword, were made *without our assent*," that the "conquered makes no law by virtue of his power: but by virtue of their assent that promised obedience for the saving of their lives." (See Hobbes, English Works, Vol. V, pages 178-79 and 180,) In the same section, Hobbes characterizes as "gross" the Bishop's claim that conquerors make laws without the assent of the conquered, and ridicules the position that a man is "presently obliged without further ado to obey all of [the conquered's] laws" simply because the latter is in a position to kill the former. (See, Hobbes, English Works, Vol. V, page 180)

6.Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 206.

7.Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 207.

8.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 131.

9.This would seem to represent a rather significant change from the doctrine set forward in Hobbes's earlier works The Elements of Law and De Cive (see this, and the two immediately subsequent paragraphs in the text of this chapter)

Clearly, extending this privilege to the masters of small commonwealths by acquisition (or Hobbesian "families") can be seen to conflict with Hobbes's earlier stated claim (on Leviathan, pp. 130-131, section [10].) that the master enters into a valid contractual agreement with his subject or subjects, and is thus bound to perform the terms to which he had previously agreed. Simply stated, if the master is permitted to renege on the terms of the contract whenever he believes it fitting or advantageous to do so, in what sense can he be understood to be bound to honor the terms of his previously undertaken contract with his servant or servants?

10. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 131.

11. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 131. In this context, Hobbes makes reference to a practice which he believed to exist during times of war, by which a person (or group of persons) which has (have) been defeated by an invading army attempts to evade the "present fury" of his conqueror by agreeing to submit to the latter's will.

12. Hobbes, Man and Citizen, pages 206-207.

13. See, for example, section 7 of Chapter 3 of Part II of the Elements of Law, where Hobbes claims that the "servant that is no longer trusted, but committed to his chains and custody, is thereby discharged of his obligation *in foro interno*, and therefore if he can get loose, may lawfully go his way." (Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 130.) Compare this with Hobbes's assertion in Section 9 of Chapter 8 of De Cive, that "the servant that is put in bonds, or by any other means deprived of his corporal liberty is freed from that other obligation of contract. For there can be no contract where there is no trust, nor can that faith be broken which is not given." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 209.) In the corresponding passage from Leviathan, however, Hobbes presents a rather different interpretation of the limits of the servant's obligation to obey his master when he writes

The master of the servant, is master also of all that he hath: and may exact the use thereof: that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servants, of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he holdeth his life of his master, by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning and authorizing whatever his master shall do. And in case the master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise punish him for his disobedience, he is the author of the same; and cannot accuse him of injury. (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 131.)

Nevertheless, in the following chapter of Leviathan, Hobbes does maintain that "if a man be held in prison, or bonds, or is not trusted with the liberty of his body; he cannot be understood to be bound by covenant to subjection; and therefore may, if he can, make his escape by any means whatsoever." (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 145.) Thus, in this latter quotation from Leviathan Hobbes appears to be maintaining the position which he had propounded in De Cive and the Elements, but had repudiated in the former quotation from that work.

14.Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 213.

15.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 128.

16.Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 212.

17.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 128; Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 132; Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 213.

18.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 128.

19.Though Hobbes does (perhaps unwittingly) leave open the possibility that dominion over the child *naturally* attaches to the male parent for some other reason.

20.Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 212.

21.Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 213.

22.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 129.

23.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 130.

24.That is, the state of nature-1.

25.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 129.

26.That is, in the state of nature-3, rather than the state of nature-1.

27.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 130; Cf. Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 213.

28.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 129.

29.During the course of his discussion of this issue, Hobbes emphasizes that in the absence of matrimonial laws, dominion over the child belongs to the mother, even though within commonwealths (where such laws do exist) "the sentence is [for the most part] in favor of the father."

Hobbes observes that this is the case "because for the most part, commonwealths have been erected by the fathers, not by the mothers of commonwealths." (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 129.)

30. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 130.

31. The question naturally arises as to how one can account for the child's obligation to obey the parent or preserver *before* that child has reached the level of maturity requisite for an understanding of the contractual apparatus.

It would seem that during the period of the child's minority, the parent or preserver exercises authority over that child through the application (or the threat of the use) of his superior physical force. Indeed, in such a dyadic relationship, the preserver can be understood to exercise irresistible force over the still weak and dependent child. Of course, once the child attains a state of *de facto* equality with his preserver, the former's subordinate status to the latter can be conceived as being established artificially through a contract entered into by both parties. Although Hobbes's account of the contractual agreement which establishes a "commonwealth by preservation" is rather odd, no discussion of this apparent oddness will be presently undertaken since including such a discussion would take us far afield from the issue currently at hand. It should be noted that Hobbes discusses the bond which ties an individual to his parent or preserver on pp. 128-129 of Leviathan, pp. 132-133 of The Elements, 211-214 of De Cive, and p. 180 of English Works, Vol V.

32. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 110.

33. Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 169.

34. Indeed, in the Elements of Law, Hobbes contends that

[f]or [a] multitude, though in their persons they run together, yet they concur not always in their designs. For even at that time when men are in tumult, though they agree a number of them to one mischief, and a number of them to another; yet in the whole, they are among themselves in a state of hostility; like the seditious Jews besieged in Jerusalem, that could join against their enemies, and yet fight amongst themselves; whensoever therefore any man saith, that a number of men hath done any act: it is to be understood, that every particular man in that number hath consented thereunto, and not the greatest part only. (Hobbes, Elements of Law, pages 108-109.)

- 35.Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 107-108.
- 36.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 107.
- 37.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 109.
- 38.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 110.
- 39.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 112.
- 40.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 112.
- 41.Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 176.

CHAPTER V

THE GENERATION OF STATES

A. Introduction

Given the model of the state of nature which I presented in chapter three, and the three types of commonwealth which I discussed in chapter four, one can conceive of nine possibilities of the manner in which a commonwealth or a cooperative grouping can arise from the state of nature. One can, for example, consider how a commonwealth by acquisition might arise from the state of nature-1, how a commonwealth by acquisition might arise from the state of nature-2, and so on. These various possibilities can be represented in the following fashion:

HOW A COMMONWEALTH BY

	<u>Institution</u>	<u>Acquisition</u>	<u>Preservation</u>
CAN BE UNDERSTOOD TO ARISE FROM OUT OF THE			
State of Nature-1	1	2	3
State of Nature-2	4	5	6
State of Nature-3	7	8	9

In this fifth chapter, I will examine how a commonwealth by institution and how a commonwealth by acquisition can be conceived as arising from each of the three conceptions of the state of nature which we have seen to be contained in

Hobbes's works. Thus, in this chapter, I will consider the six modes of generation designated 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 in the above printed table.

Before beginning this exploration, a number of remarks must be made. First, it should be noted that in this table, the numerals 1 through 9 function merely as names of the modes by which various types of commonwealth can be conceived of as "growing out of" the various types of the state of nature.

Second, when I refer to the establishment of a commonwealth, it is not necessary that the type of grouping I have in mind is a COMMONWEALTH of the state of nature-3 variety. Thus, in this chapter a 'commonwealth' will refer to a fully-fledged COMMONWEALTH of the state of nature-3 variety, or to a small despotical or patrimonial group which I have identified as being characteristic of the state of nature-2.¹ It should be noted that the latter type of grouping can contain as few as two members; indeed, a two-member grouping represents the limiting case of a paternal or a despotical government.

Third, though this chapter *could have* contained discussions of all nine of the modes of generation represented in this table, I have decided to refrain from presenting discussions of modes 3, 6, and 9. Even though, in each of his three principal works of political philosophy, Hobbes does discuss "preservation" as one of the three

procedures by which a collective organizational unit can be conceived to arise, I've decided to forego considering modes of generation 3, 6 and 9 precisely because these three modes bear little direct relevance to, and are thus comparatively unimportant from the standpoint of the foundation (or "establishment") and maintenance of such actually existing modern political units as COMMONWEALTHS.

Finally, as I mentioned earlier in this dissertation, the taxonomy which I present represents a reconstruction of Hobbes's state of nature which I believe can legitimately be culled from various of his texts. I admit that this taxonomy represents my own reading or interpretation of Hobbes's texts and that these divisions, as presented by Hobbes, are far from distinctly drawn.

B. Mode 1

In his classic description of the manner in which a commonwealth is instituted, Hobbes asserts that²

[a] commonwealth is said to be instituted, when a multitude of men do agree, and covenant, every one, with every one, that to whosoever man or assembly of men, shall be given by the major part, the right to present the person of them all, that is to say, to be their representative: every one, as well he that voted for it as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgments, of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peacefully amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.

Thus, we might envision the rational though passionate human beings who inhabit the state of nature-1 as instituting a

commonwealth in roughly the following manner: We might imagine that persons p_1 , p_2 , p_3 , p_4 , and p_5 confront each other in a condition where there exists neither a common sovereign mechanism nor contractually-generated interpersonal relationships of any kind (see the description of the conditions which characterize the state of nature-1 in chapter 3 of this dissertation). It must again be emphasized that the persons who inhabit the state of nature-1 are to be conceived of as abstract human individuals who exist in no particular historical epoch, and who are considered as if inhabiting no *specific* geographical area. In fact, as I attempted to make clear during my earlier presentation of the three conceptions of the state of nature, the state of nature-1 might properly be interpreted as an analytic model which allows one to understand (or assists one in understanding) how a number of abstract individuals can be expected to interact with one another when they are constrained by no sovereign power, and are thus left to their own devices.

It must be remembered that the individual persons (or natural human organisms) who inhabit the state of nature-1 are endowed with the faculty of reason and are thus able to formulate instrumental plans or strategies intended to secure themselves access to desired material objects, or to bring into existence desired states of affairs. Further, it must be remembered that Hobbes describes the behavior of

human beings as being importantly influenced or determined by the presence of such bodily "passions" as (1) a desire for the possession of those objects which will provide bodily sustenance, (2) a fear of violent death, and (3) a hope to establish and maintain a condition of peace and commodious existence. Finally, according to Hobbes, the faculty of reason can best be understood as providing a guiding role for the attainment of the material objects or states of affairs which are the "particular objects" of the various human passions. That is to say, for Hobbes, as for Hume, a judgment of human reason can be understood to motivate a human action only if that judgment is united with or serves to guide an autonomously (and presumably, previously) existing passion such a desire, an aversion, and so on.

It should be clear to us, as well as to those who occupy the state of nature-1, that even though forming cooperative groups could lead to the realization of greater benefits than one could achieve on one's own, keeping to oneself, that is, attempting to maintain a solitary existence, constitutes the safer of the two options.

We will recall, moreover, that Hobbes draws a distinction between moderate men "who are satisfied with an equality of nature," and dominators "who take pleasure in contemplating their own power in acts of conquest."³ Since Hobbes includes individuals of the latter variety among

those who inhabit the state of nature, we might reasonably suggest that as time passes, such dominators will attempt to demonstrate their presumed, though spurious, superiority over other men through "acts of conquest" or instances of offensive violence. Moreover, we might reasonably expect that such acts would, from time to time, be performed in full view of other individuals so that these acts would be sensed, noticed, and retained as memories within the minds/sensory organs of both those who are the direct victims of such violence and those who are simply interested observers.⁴

Thus, by the time the state of nature-1 has, in essence, "played itself out" through the passage of time, the resulting interactional situation will have developed into a rather inhospitable forum. Suspicion of one's fellowmen will abound, an initial uncertainty concerning the motives and probable voluntary behavior of one's fellows will give way to a widespread perception that those around one are unworthy of trust. Indeed, each inhabitant will recognize that engaging in anticipatory activity constitutes a necessary means to his continued survival. For this reason, all or most men can be expected to engage in such activity.

Thus, Hobbes's striking description of the remarkably civilized process by which "a multitude of men do agree and covenant" to be bound by the decision of the sovereign upon

whom the members of that multitude have conferred their powers, strikes the reader as being entirely out of keeping with the description of the state of nature which Hobbes presents.⁵ If the individuals who occupy the state of nature are forced to adopt and maintain an attitude of vigilance and a generally-held willingness to attempt to dominate others, it appears impossible to envision scenarios in which offers to establish conditions of peace are not met with jeers, rebukes or acts of anticipation.

One might suggest that this problem can be eliminated if we consider the individuals who inhabit the state of nature to be purely rational actors who are not affected by such passions as pride and a desire for glory. Indeed, one might aver that by eliminating such antisocial passions from this model, human beings can be imagined to relate to one another in a purely rational manner, can recognize the benefits likely to be bestowed upon them as a result of cooperative activity, and can thus put into practice such strategies as are designed to institute a system of cooperative group activity.

Although concentrating on a model of the state of nature which construes human beings as rational actors whose decisions are not affected by such passions as pride and a desire for glory may provide a fruitful exercise in determining if, and if so, how a group of purely rational beings can be conceived as coming together to form a

cooperative union, such a strategy would be clearly inappropriate to deal with the likely behavior of individuals construed according to Hobbes's anthropology. As I mentioned in chapter 2 of this dissertation, Hobbes takes as given that a significant, though never precisely specified, proportion of human beings can be characterized as dominators, and that the behavior or voluntary activity of such individuals can be expected to profoundly affect the behavior of those moderate men who dwell in their vicinity. Given the previously described character of the fully developed state of nature-1, it would seem virtually impossible that a commonwealth by institution could be established among this "state's" inhabitants.

If, *per impossible*, such a miraculous transformation of human nature could be effected, the establishment of a commonwealth by institution from out of the state of nature-1 might be envisioned as occurring in the manner indicated on pages 142-149 of chapter 4 of this dissertation.

C. Mode 2

One can easily envision how a commonwealth by acquisition might arise from out of the state of nature-1. For example, we might propose that such a two-person commonwealth would come into existence as the result of a contract in which one man agrees to obey the directives of another in order to avoid the present stroke of death. Indeed, dominion "acquired by consent or victory in war,"

including presumably, the so-called war of each against all, is described by Hobbes as⁶

that which some writers call despotical. . . and is the dominion of the master over the servant, and this dominion is then acquired to the victor when the vanquished, to avoid the present stroke of death covenanteth. . . that so long as his life and the liberty of his body are allowed him, the victor shall use thereof at his pleasure.

Clearly, however, in the state of nature such an agreement would be evanescent and precarious for at least two reasons.

In the first place, Hobbes believes that despotical groupings of this type are held together by the servant's fear of the master. That is, the servant agrees to serve the master ostensibly because the master refrains (or refrained) from killing him, but additionally because he fears (the powers of) his master. Admittedly, servant S would have a compelling reason to fear, and more significantly, to promise to render obedience to master M precisely when M has a clear advantage over him. However, once the covenant is instituted, and M allows S a partial liberty, S ceases to be in clear danger of immediate death (in the same sense that he had been when a blade was situated next to his throat). In a one-to-one encounter in the state of nature (that is, one in which the master has no other servants or sons), S would recognize that M is merely a human being and is thus subject to a quick death (as is any other human being). Recognition of this fact, coupled with the aforementioned

overvaluing tendency which afflicts "almost all men,"⁷ would almost certainly lead S to eventually break the covenant by refusing to obey, or by attempting to subdue or destroy his putative master.

Secondly, it appears unreasonable to believe that M would be imprudent enough to trust S with a partial liberty in exchange for a pledge of obedience. Surely, M would recognize that S will retain his cunning and his physical power even after he has promised to obey M. Indeed, M has little reason to believe that S will help to defend him when he [M] commands such obedience, or even that S will not attempt to subdue him "by force or wiles." Hence, we have strong reason to believe that in the state of nature-1, it is more reasonable for M to plunge his dagger into S's throat than it is to attempt to strike a deal for future defense with his opponent. Clearly, since the fear of M which S feels at that moment will surely diminish when S later comes to consider the slender basis of his relationship of servitude, M would be foolish not to slay his adversary.

On the other hand, we might contend that if individual S, who had previously been conquered by M, and who had previously agreed to obey M (for as long as the latter refrains from placing him in chains or other impediments to corporeal motion), faces the further choice of either remaining a part of the defensive grouping which is headed

by M, or of attempting to compromise the integrity of this group by defecting from, or by attacking the leader of this group (and thus forfeiting the advantage of living within a viable defensive grouping), S would be a fool to choose the latter option. Since life in the state of nature-1 will, in all likelihood, be deemed by S to be inferior to life as a subject or a servant within a multi-person (if only a two-person) grouping, S can, in all likelihood, be expected to adopt the latter option since it represents, in effect, the less unpleasant of the two available alternatives.

Furthermore, in this situation, S can be understood to have entered into a contractual agreement with M, and as such, to have bound himself through his own free decision to obey the commands of M in exchange for M's having spared S's life and M's continuing to refrain from placing M in fetters, bonds, chains or other impediments to physical motion.

Therefore, although in this situation S would certainly recognize that M is merely a human being and, as such, is subject to a quick and relatively easily executed death, and that S will inevitably confront M in a situation where the latter is vulnerable to the aggressive attacks of, and the physical destruction at the hands of the former, it is plausible to suppose that S will have some reason to forego the "benefits" of living a free and unencumbered independent life in order to increase the probability of surviving through a longer (though less unencumbered) existence as

part of a (somewhat) viable defensive grouping. Conversely, although M would surely recognize that S, if he is not killed, will retain his cunning and his physical powers, and thus, his capacity to utterly destroy M in an unguarded moment, it would not thereby be irrational for M to propose to enter into the above described covenant with S, and thus to trust S with a partial liberty. (understood simply as M's continuing to refrain from restricting the corporeal freedom of S) For in this situation, M will likely perceive that S will come to recognize that he [S] stands a better chance of survival within a two-person group than he does on his own. For this reason, M will have some reason to suppose that S will refrain from attacking him [M] after this contract has been made.

Importantly, the success of such a covenant would seem to depend upon whether S is a dominator or a moderate, and in fact, M's willingness to enter into such an agreement (or to propose such conditions of peace) would seem to depend upon whether M perceives S to be a dominator or a moderate. Since a moderate is envisaged as a person who recognizes and rightly values the benefits of peace and who "is satisfied with an equality of nature," a moderate would seem to be less likely than a dominator, to attempt to subvert the social unit of which he is a part by attacking its leader (that is, in our example, M).

Thus, if in this scenario, M were to consider S to be a moderate, he would be more willing to attempt to strike a mutually advantageous bargain with S than he would be were he to consider S to be a dominator. In fact, it seems that if M knows that S is a dominator, he will be completely unwilling (that is, will flatly refuse) to enter into such a covenant with S. Crucially, one might reasonably maintain that if M is uncertain as to whether S is a moderate or a dominator, that is, if M does not possess a compelling reason to believe that S is a moderate, M will, in all likelihood, refrain from attempting to enter into a contractual agreement with S. I believe this to be the case since in this scenario, M cannot be certain that S is sufficiently trustworthy to be relied upon to discharge the responsibilities to which he will have previously agreed. Thus, it seems evident that the success of, and even the genesis of the contractual agreement which provides the basis for a two-person commonwealth by acquisition depends upon whether (1) M perceives S to be a dominator or a moderate, and whether (2) S truly is a dominator or a moderate.⁸

Unfortunately, Hobbes seems committed to a belief in the impossibility (or in any case, the extreme difficulty) of accurately identifying a person in the state of nature as a moderate rather than a dominator despite the fact that in at least a small number of cases, the information necessary

to make such an identification would be disclosed to the "identifier" *via* empirical observation. Thus, we might suppose that even though a majority of the instances of the type of encounter represented in the scenario above (namely, that in which one person stands above another with a sword drawn) would conclude with the former destroying the latter, a small number of instances of this scenario would conclude with M proposing a deal to S, S accepting M's deal and thus, S's becoming subjugated to M's will.

Therefore, there does appear to exist some *slim basis* for expecting the generation of viable two-person despotical defensive units from out of the state of nature-1. This is true even though Hobbes's comments concerning the possibility of identifying moderates in the state of nature, and his expressed belief that even moderates can be expected to act in an "anticipatory" fashion, serve to render such an eventuality exceedingly remote.⁹

D. Mode 4

As we will recall from an earlier section, Hobbes believed that a commonwealth is instituted "when a multitude of men do agree and covenant . . . to authorize all the actions and judgments of whatsoever man or assembly," is chosen by a majority of that multitude.¹⁰ Further, it has been noted that such a COMMONWEALTH¹¹ was conceived by Hobbes as being created from out of some preexistent matter (namely, the natural human beings who

come to compose that political unit). Additionally, it has been noted that Hobbes believed such units to be voluntarily instituted by the various contracting parties, each of whom enters into a covenant with all other contracting parties (and each of whom thus becomes a citizen of the COMMONWEALTH), though none of whom enters into a covenant with the natural person or persons who become(s) the sovereign of the newly-instituted COMMONWEALTH. In a famous passage from Leviathan, Hobbes claims that while the individuals who enter into a COMMONWEALTH by acquisition do so out of fear of the conquering party, the individuals who decide to institute and enter into a COMMONWEALTH by institution do so because they fear their fellow contracting parties.¹²

A COMMONWEALTH by institution can be envisioned to arise from out of the state of nature-2 in no fewer than two distinct ways. First, a COMMONWEALTH can be imagined to be instituted when the natural persons who function as the rulers of the various "families" that inhabit this condition enter into contracts with one another; and second, a COMMONWEALTH can be imagined to be instituted when all of the natural persons, both servants and leaders, who live within the bounds of some number of state of nature-2 type units, enter into a contract with every other such natural person. According to this second method of formation, all contracting parties (who in this case are natural persons)

agree to transfer their respective rights of nature to some newly-instituted sovereign (the latter of whom enters into no contractual agreement with any of the natural persons who consent to become his subjects).

Though Hobbes is disinclined to believe that many historical COMMONWEALTHS have been established through such a smoothly executed conventional process, such a process does constitute a legitimate procedure in which a COMMONWEALTH can be brought into existence through the voluntary acts of human beings. The more plausible of the two previously-mentioned methods by which a COMMONWEALTH by institution can arise from out of the state of nature-2 is the first, that is, through a procedure by which the respective leaders of each of several "families" enter into a contractual agreement with each of the other leaders. Through this procedure, each leader agrees to transfer his decision-making power over both himself and his servants, to some person who is not a party to that contract.

For example, we might imagine that (natural) person A_1 , who commands (natural) persons A_2 - A_{10} , person B_1 , who commands persons B_2 - B_{10} and person C_1 , who commands persons C_2 - C_{10} enter into a series of contracts with one another to transfer the decision-making power of all of their respective group members to some person D. (According to this process, A_1 will enter into a contract with B_1 , B_1 will enter into a contract with C_1 and A_1 will enter into a

contract with C_1). In such a scenario, not only does A_1 transfer to D decision making power over himself [A_1], but moreover, A_1 transfers decision making power over A_2 - A_{10} , the latter of whom had previously transferred their decision making power to A_1 through some earlier acts of their own.

Quite simply, in this scenario, natural persons A_2 - A_{10} are in no position to transfer their own decision making power to D (or to any other person), since they have already transferred such power to natural person A_1 . Hence, in this (temporally later) contract, A_1 , B_1 and C_1 act as agents or repositories for the powers which had previously been transferred to them by A_2 - A_{10} , B_2 - B_{10} and C_2 - C_{10} , respectively.¹³

This completed contract results in a transferral of allegiance to D, so that after the contract has been made, all of the members of the previously existing constituent families come to be subject to the absolute will of D. This is true even though A_2 , for example, does not directly consent to such a transfer of allegiance, and irrespective of whether A_2 prefers to remain under the absolute control of A_1 .¹⁴

E. Mode 5

The most historically plausible manner by which larger state of nature-2 type "families" can be envisioned as resulting from the consolidation of smaller ones is through

conquest. In a previously quoted passage from chapter 17 of Leviathan, Hobbes specifies that it is not¹⁵

the joining together of a small number of men, that gives them . . . security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great as is sufficient to carry the victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an invasion.

Thus, when the master of a small family comes to notice that an even smaller family in his group's vicinity stands vulnerable to a successful invasion and conquest by his own group, he is thereby "encouraged" to launch such an invasion and attempted conquest. Such a manoeuvre might be undertaken in the hope of making less probable an invasion of his own family by the leader of a slightly (though significantly) larger family (or defensive group) in his vicinity. Thus, person M, the master of family A, which contains 7 members, might launch an offensive attack against family B, which contains 5 members, in order to prevent a suspected attack upon family A by the leader of family C, a group which consists of ten members. Thus, over the course of time, the members of smaller state of nature-2 type groups can be expected to be conquered by the members of, and to be "absorbed into" larger state of nature-2 type groups. Moreover, Hobbes points out that¹⁶

[t]he multitude sufficient to confide in our security, is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the enemy we fear; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of war, as to move him to attempt.

Thus, after a family reaches a certain size (determined by a comparison with the size of the other families in its vicinity), it is no longer capable of being conquered by the other families in its vicinity in a relatively effortless and bloodless manner, and thus, is no longer vulnerable to the indiscriminate offensive attacks of the leaders of such groups. Purportedly, when a family reaches a particular critical size, leaders of other groups are less willing to risk the integrity of their respective group by attacking the first group so that within that first group a certain level of security is guaranteed. Thus, when a family achieves some particular size, it ceases to be a state of nature-2 type group, and becomes a fully fledged COMMONWEALTH, though, as had been noted in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, Hobbes does not make a special effort to inform his readers precisely when this occurs.

We might imagine that when person *p*, the leader of a smaller state of nature-2 type group comes to recognize that his group is on the verge of being overcome by a larger state of nature-2 type group, he will choose to contractually transfer his right of nature, as well as his dominion over his subjects, to the leader of that larger group. Such a strategy would have the advantage of saving *p*,

as well as his various subjects, from falling victim to¹⁷ the offensive attacks of the members of that larger group. This would clearly be a reasonable strategy to implement if p does believe that the likely result of a confrontation between (the members of) his group and (the members of) the larger group will be a wholesale slaughter of the former by the latter. Thus, if he is a reasonable person who values his continued existence and safety, p can be expected to contractually transfer sovereignty over his servants, as well as his own right of nature, to the leader of the larger group.

However, if p is a dominator, whose reasoning process is frequently interfered with or vitiated by the incidence of such violent passions as pride and an unrealistically high level of self-esteem, we would expect the probability of p's refusing to surrender to the leader of the larger (aggressive) group to be greater than it would be if p were a moderate. Since a moderate can be expected to maintain an attitude consistent with the strength of his group *vis-à-vis* that of the larger group, while a dominator can be expected to exaggerate his own group's chance of successfully fending off an attack by the larger and stronger group, a dominator can be expected to be more willing than a moderate to mount a struggle in the face of overwhelming odds. (and in all likelihood, to procure the slaughter of many or all of his subjects)

It is perhaps for reasons of this type that Hobbes allows to subjects or servants within state of nature-2 type units the option of using "one's own reason in time of danger to save his own life, either by flight or submission to the enemy as he shall think best"18

Specifically, if q is a subject within a small group headed by p, if q recognizes that p is about to enter their group into a defensive battle with a larger group (which in all likelihood, in q's estimation, will result in the destruction of the members of that group (including q)), then q is permitted to either flee from his group, or to submit to the command of the enemy, despite p's directive that he [q] engage in battle. This is a situation which will purportedly not arise (or will arise far less frequently) within a fully fledged COMMONWEALTH since the latter type of group can be expected to possess adequate means of defense to render unreasonable q's contention that his group will certainly be completely destroyed if it engages in battle with some rival COMMONWEALTH. (and thus, to render void or unacceptable q's claim to refuse to obey p's command to enter into battle based upon the foresight of his own (that is, q's own) immanent destruction)19

Thus, if within the state of nature-2, a situation arises in which p, the leader of a small group S is given the opportunity to either (1) submit to the leadership of, or (2) refuse to submit to the leadership of, and thus to

hazard a war of his group S against some larger and stronger group L, and if the odds are overwhelmingly in favor of S's members being destroyed if it engages in battle with L, then the rational strategy for p to pursue is to submit to the will of his adversary. However, if p refuses to enter into a contractual agreement with the leader of group L, then q, a subject within S, would be fully justified in refusing to honor the terms of the contractual agreement into which he had previously entered with p.

Thus, as a member of a state of nature-2 type grouping, q is given greater leeway in determining whether, in situations where his group is under attack, he will choose to remain a member of, or to defect from his group than he would be afforded were he a member of a fully fledged COMMONWEALTH.

Even though, at the expected locations in his various political writings, Hobbes fails to advance an unambiguous criterion which serves to distinguish large "families" from small COMMONWEALTHS, and at one point in Leviathan refers to cities and kingdoms as "but great families,"²⁰ it is clear that the means of defense against external attackers are much more robust within COMMONWEALTHS than they are within families.

Given the emphasis Hobbes places upon the individual's (in principle untransferable) right to guard against or obviate his own (violent) death, and to resist the

directives of even his sovereign *in extremis*, it can be plausibly asserted that if the subject has strong reason to believe that remaining a part of his present COMMONWEALTH will result in his immanent (and seemingly, immediate) death, while choosing to defect from his COMMONWEALTH will have the effect of preserving his life, he is permitted to exercise the second option. This would be true even though he had previously entered into a contractual agreement to obey the directives of his sovereign. However, it can be equally plausibly asserted that within a COMMONWEALTH, a subject would, except in extremely unusual circumstances, be required to preserve the integrity of his COMMONWEALTH, to obey the directives of his sovereign, and thus, to refrain from breaking the contractual agreement into which he had previously entered.

F. Mode 7

A COMMONWEALTH can be conceived to be instituted from out of the state of nature-3 when the sovereigns who respectively command each of a number of COMMONWEALTHS come to transfer their decision-making power over themselves and their respective subjects to some other natural person or set of natural persons. By virtue of this new contract, the recipient of this transfer of power comes to be sovereign over all of the natural persons who had formerly comprised the various constituent COMMONWEALTHS (sovereigns and citizens alike).²¹ This mode of generation will, in all

likelihood, approximate that described earlier as MODE 4, with the primary difference being that by MODE 4, a COMMONWEALTH is brought into existence from the individual persons or the preexistent matter which compose state of nature-2 type families, while by MODE 7, a COMMONWEALTH is established through the consolidation of two or more previously existing COMMONWEALTHS. Thus, by MODE 4, a COMMONWEALTH is formed from two or more families, while by MODE 7, a COMMONWEALTH is formed from two or more COMMONWEALTHS. As with MODE 4, the most plausible manner by which a COMMONWEALTH can be conceived as being *instituted* from two or more already existing COMMONWEALTHS is through a contract in which the sovereigns of two or more already existing COMMONWEALTHS (rather than all the natural persons who constitute those COMMONWEALTHS) enter into a contract with each other. In such an agreement, each contracting party promises to transfer the decision-making power over all the members of his COMMONWEALTH (himself included) to some common newly established sovereign power.

G. Mode 8

Probably the most historically plausible manner by which a COMMONWEALTH can be conceived as arising from, or being formed out of some combination of already existing COMMONWEALTHS is by conquest in an organized, *bona fide* war in which actual fighting occurs.¹² As mentioned above, wars waged between the artificial groups known as COMMONWEALTHS

are likely to be conducted with a greater degree of regularity, predictability and routinization than are likely to be those which are conducted between families. Moreover, it seems that the sovereign of one COMMONWEALTH can engage in war with another COMMONWEALTH while continuing to preserve a relatively normal and peaceful state of affairs within the boundaries of his own territory. By contrast, it is difficult to imagine a significant degree of "domestic tranquility" being maintained within the artificial units of the state of nature-2 variety, especially since such units are described as having weak if any established safeguards against the encroachments of the members of other groups.

Though COMMONWEALTHS have, throughout history, devoted a substantial amount of resources to the fortification and defense of their territories and borders, it has of course happened that COMMONWEALTHS have been defeated and conquered by rival COMMONWEALTHS. Moreover, it confronts us as an empirical fact, and Hobbes was certainly willing to admit, that not all COMMONWEALTHS are equally mighty, and that not every COMMONWEALTH faces every other on strictly equal terms. Indeed, Hobbes admits that if a weaker prince makes a disadvantageous bargain or agreement with a stronger one, due to considerations of fear, he is bound to honor that agreement.²³ As such, Hobbes acknowledges a clear distinction between weaker and stronger COMMONWEALTHS.

However, despite the fact that some COMMONWEALTHS are capable of defeating in battle and conquering other COMMONWEALTHS, we would expect that the supreme commander of the armed forces, that is, the sovereign of the former type of COMMONWEALTH, will normally undertake such offensive attacks only after he has engaged in a sustained deliberative process in which he carefully weighs the probable benefits and disadvantages involved in initiating such an action. This will be true since we can expect the borders of even relatively small and weak COMMONWEALTHS to be fortified with some means of defense against external aggressors, and to be guarded by the members of a standing army.

Thus, because even weak and small COMMONWEALTHS can be expected to stage some defensive resistance when attacked by an encroaching army, the commander of that encroaching army will, in all likelihood, think twice before deciding to risk the lives of his subjects and a loss of some portion of his COMMONWEALTH'S military resources. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that new COMMONWEALTHS will, from time to time, be formed as a result of the (bellicose) interaction between various COMMONWEALTHS in the international forum.

Clearly, the sovereign of a larger COMMONWEALTH can be conceived as extending his/its dominion over a smaller COMMONWEALTH as the result of a contract entered into by the sovereigns of the respective (that is, the larger and the

smaller) COMMONWEALTHS after the forces of the larger COMMONWEALTH have defeated (the forces of) the smaller COMMONWEALTH in a military battle.

Moreover, one could envision the sovereign of the smaller COMMONWEALTH *choosing* to voluntarily enter into a contact with the sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH even before any military action has been undertaken. Such a contract, which would effectively entail a transfer of sovereignty over the citizens as well as the sovereign of the smaller COMMONWEALTH to the sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH, would most likely be entered into in the hope of saving from death and lesser physical damage the citizens within that smaller COMMONWEALTH.²⁴

In Chapter 21 of Leviathan, Hobbes claims that²⁵

[t]he liberty , whereof there is so frequent and honorable mention . . . is not the liberty of particular men; but the liberty of the commonwealth : which is the same that every man then should have, if there were no civil laws, nor commonwealth at all. And the effect of it also be the same, namely a condition of perpetual war.

"The Athenians and the Romans," Hobbes goes on to inform his readers,²⁶

were free; that is, free commonwealths; not that any particular man had the liberty to resist their own representative; but that their representative had the liberty to resist, or invade other people.

Until the point in time at which the sovereign of the smaller COMMONWEALTH relinquishes, *via contract*, to the sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH the sovereignty over his subjects, the former continues to possess "the liberty to resist, or invade other people [sc. the people who do not belong to his COMMONWEALTH]." However, once he agrees to be bound by the decisions of the sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH, he thereby transfers or renounces the liberty which he had previously possessed to resist the will of the latter. Even though the sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH might allow the (former) "sovereign" of the smaller COMMONWEALTH to exercise some *limited control* over his former subjects, absolute control over both the former sovereign and his former subjects belongs to the sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH.

H. Concluding Remarks

Thus completes my presentation of the most plausible methods by which the Hobbesian commonwealth by institution and the Hobbesian commonwealth by acquisition can be conceived as arising from each of the three varieties of the state of nature. In the sixth and final chapter of this dissertation, I will further examine the likelihood that commonwealths of the earlier described varieties, once established, will remain in existence for any extended period of time, especially in light of Hobbes's apparent insistence that dominators will be present within any

sizable group of human beings. I will then explain why I take Hobbes's asseveration that any sizable group of human beings will contain the type of natural persons referred to as dominators [whose antisocial tendencies are incorrigible, and whose disruptive influence upon the social order is seemingly ineradicable,]²⁷ to effectively render unworkable the type of governmental apparatus suggested by this author. During this portion of my discussion, I will explain why I construe Hobbes's model of a viable governmental apparatus to be eminently unworkable, and why the inevitable presence of dominators would serve to undermine the solidarity of virtually any political grouping which is composed of Hobbesian men.

NOTES

1. This same point was made in endnote # 13 to chapter 3 of this dissertation.
2. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 110.
3. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75. Hobbes adds in the corresponding passage from the 1668 Latin edition of Leviathan that "there are those who from pride and a desire for glory would conquer the whole world." (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.)
4. The retention of such memories would appear to have the effect of making the onlooker (or the victim of such assaults) even less likely to attempt establishing cooperative enterprises precisely by providing him with an assurance that there exist within his milieu persons who are unequivocally undeserving of his trust. Thus, the moderate individual's initial hesitancy to enter into potentially destructive (though potentially beneficial) ventures with other persons comes, over time, to be more pronounced and to develop into an attitude of suspiciousness and uncertainty. Further, since within the state of nature-1, persons can be conceived as being in competition with one another for the (temporary) control of desired objects, it can be expected that such competitive struggles will give rise to a widespread "diffidence" of one's fellow men and foster a widespread "endeavour to destroy or subdue one another." (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.)
5. The seeming incompatibility of these two descriptions becomes abundantly clear when one compares, side by side, Hobbes's description of the state of nature contained in paragraphs 3 through 9 of Chapter 13 of Leviathan (See Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 75-76.) and Hobbes's description of the manner by which a commonwealth is instituted in paragraphs 1 through 3 of Chapter 18 of the same work. (Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 110-111.) Additionally, see my extended discussion of Hobbes's Leviathan derivation of the state of nature on pages 61-75 of this dissertation, as well as my discussion of Hobbes's commonwealth by institution on pages 142-149 of this dissertation.
6. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 103. See my extended discussion of commonwealth by acquisition on pages 131-135.
7. See Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.

8. The latter factor determining the success of such an endeavor, and the former factor determining whether such a contractual endeavor is actually undertaken or initiated.

9. Interestingly, while discussing the conditions which prevail in the state of nature in Chapter 13 of Leviathan, Hobbes claims that because of the diffidence with which men in the state of nature regard each other

there is no way for a man to secure himself so reasonably as anticipation, that is, by force or wiles *to master the persons of all men he can*, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him, and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there are some that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires, if others (that would otherwise be glad to be at ease within moderate bounds) should not by invasion increase their powers, they would not be able, long time, by standing on their own defense to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation over men being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

(Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75.)

What can immediately be gleaned from this passage is the claim that in order to survive in the state of nature, even moderate men must engage in the augmentation of dominion over other men, that is, in the extension of servitude over other men so that effective defensive groupings can be established. Clearly, in this passage, Hobbes is interpreting the necessity of the formation of such groups from the perspective of the person who is "forced" to extend his dominion over other persons, that is, from the standpoint of the conqueror or the potential or probable master.

However, one would do well to remember that in order for a two-person commonwealth by acquisition to be contractually established, one of the two members will have to agree to obey the orders of, and thus, to become subservient to, the other. Even though, in this passage, Hobbes stresses the benefit that will accrue to the master of a commonwealth by acquisition by virtue of his commanding one or more potential defenders, one might additionally point out that those men who are conquered do, in all likelihood, stand a better chance of survival (or survival for a longer period of time) than they would had they not been offered, and had they not accepted the terms proposed by their conqueror/master.

Thus, such "augmentation of persons" can be regarded as a mutually beneficial strategy since it would appear to foster the conservation of both the conqueror and his servant(s).

10. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 110.

11. That is, such a fully fledged COMMONWEALTH since a state of nature-3 variety COMMONWEALTH appears to be the type of unit which results from the process of institution.

12. Leviathan, page 127.

13. Given the conditions which characterize mode of generation 4, we could maintain the conceit that each citizen of the resulting COMMONWEALTH enters into a contractual agreement with every other citizen in no fewer than two ways. First, we could interpret the group leaders A_1 , B_1 , and C_1 as entering each of their respective (contractually established) subordinates into a (separate) contract with each of the other citizens of the resulting COMMONWEALTH. This could be imagined to take place precisely because the respective group leaders (A_1 , B_1 , and C_1) had previously been granted the authority to act on behalf of each of their subordinates (specifically, through the transfers of right which established the state of nature-2 type groups A, B and C). According to this interpretation, each of the natural persons $\{A_2-A_{10}\}$, $\{B_2-B_{10}\}$, and $\{C_2-C_{10}\}$, can be understood to enter into a separate contract with each of the other natural persons who become citizens of the newly instituted COMMONWEALTH, but can, in every case, be imagined to do so through the agency of his respective group leader (viz, A_1 , B_1 , or C_1). As such, A_1 , B_1 , and C_1 would essentially function as the (respective) contractually-established custodians of the natural decision-making powers of the subjects within "families" A, B, and C.

Alternatively, in order to buttress the claim that in the newly-established COMMONWEALTH, each citizen enters into a contractual agreement with every other citizen, we *could* specify that immediately before the members of the three previously existing "families" A, B, and C coalesce into the newly established COMMONWEALTH, the group leaders A_1 , B_1 , and C_1 free their respective subordinates from the contracts which had previously established the subordinate status of the latter. (Recall Hobbes's claim of page 86 of Leviathan that one can be freed from a covenant by being forgiven) If this were to happen, then each of the (formerly) subordinate natural persons, upon being forgiven by his group leader, would thereby recover his right to rule himself, which he could then immediately transfer to the newly-established (or, soon-to-be established) sovereign.

The procedure outlined in this second interpretation, however, must be looked upon as being a rather perilous one since, at least in its literal form, it needlessly introduces a condition of momentary lawlessness and allows for the possibility of sustained social breakdown. (Such a sinister eventuality could be imagined to obtain if some of these men, after being freed by their respective group leader, refused to enter into the COMMONWEALTH-instituting covenant, and thus encouraged others to similarly decline to enter into this covenant) Additionally, see endnote # 14 of the present chapter of this dissertation.

14. By contrast, according to the second, and less plausible method of generation which I mentioned above, each of the natural persons who belongs to the groups headed by either natural persons A_1 , natural person B_1 or natural person C_1 would contract with each of the others to be bound by the will of natural person D. I consider this second method to be the less plausible of the two from a Hobbesian perspective, precisely because there would clearly be no necessity that all of the citizens actually take part in the COMMONWEALTH establishing covenant. On the contrary, it would be true that since the servants within the three families which combine to form the COMMONWEALTH have already entered into contracts with the leaders of their respective families, such subjects are in no condition to transfer decision-making power over themselves to any other person, precisely because they no longer possess their respective rights of nature or powers of self-determination.

As textual confirmation of the claim that Hobbes was committed to a "transitivity of covenanting," see this author's statement that

[s]ince . . . both the servant himself, and all that belongs to him are his lord's, and by the right of nature every man may dispose of his own in what manner he pleases; the lord may either sell, lay to pledge, or by testament convey the dominion he hath over his servant, according to his own will and pleasure.

(Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 208.),

as well as his assertion that

seeing the servant and all that is committed to him is the property of the master, and every man may dispose of his own, and transfer the same at his pleasure, the master may therefore alienate his dominion over them, or give the same by his last will, to whom he lists.

(Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 129.)

Additionally, see Hobbes's remark that

the master of the servant is the master of all he hath. . . For he holdeth his life of his master, by the covenant of obedience, that is, of owning and authorizing whatsoever the master shall do.
(Hobbes, Leviathan, page 131.)

15.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 107.

16.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 107.

17.And, in all likelihood, being killed as a result of.

18.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 132.

19.But note what Hobbes has to say about men of a naturally timorous nature on page 142 in chapter 21 of Leviathan.

20.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 132.

21.For textual confirmation of the claim that Hobbes was committed to a "transitivity of covenanting," see endnote # 14 of the present chapter of this dissertation.

22.Or in which there is a strong threat of such an actual war.

23.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 86.

24.An additional relevant factor might be the expectation of the sovereign of the smaller COMMONWEALTH that after he enters into a contract with the sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH, the latter will permit the former to continue to exercise some control over his former subjects (that is, those natural persons who had formerly been subjects within the smaller COMMONWEALTH). Such a concession would be granted to the (former) sovereign of the smaller COMMONWEALTH through an act of grace. That is to say, in such a scenario the sovereign of the smaller COMMONWEALTH would not forward as a term of the contract into which he enters with the sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH the demand that the latter grant to the former absolute sovereignty over his former subjects. Rather, in such a case the sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH would grant to the sovereign of the smaller COMMONWEALTH limited regulative powers over his former subjects, while retaining absolute dominion over all of the subjects within the newly consolidated SUPERCOMMONWEALTH.

25.Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 139-140.

26.Hobbes, Leviathan, page 140.

27.I believe that the view regarding the nature of dominators set forward in this parenthetical statement can be legitimately attributed to Hobbes. For example, in Chapter 15 of Leviathan, Hobbes claims that because of "the stubbornness of [their] passions," those men who "will strive to retain those things which to [themselves] are superfluous and to others necessary. . . . *cannot be corrected.*" [my emphasis] (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 95.) Moreover, Hobbes describes such men as stubborn, insociable, froward and intractable. (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 96.)

In the corresponding passage from De Cive, such men are portrayed as "being *incorrigible* [my emphasis] by reason of the stubbornness of [their] affections." ["*neque præ affectum contumacia corrigi potest.*"] (my emphasis)] (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 141; Hobbes, Opera Latina, Vol. II, page 187.)

CHAPTER VI

THE WORKABILITY OF HOBBS'S SYSTEM

A. The Objectives of Hobbes's Political Project

Hobbes famously described the faculties of human nature to consist of bodily strength, experience, reason and passion.¹ It is the opinion of the present writer that in recent years, several commentators on Hobbes have failed to recognize the significance of the passions, and especially the passions which Hobbes designates "the perturbations of the mind which frequently obstruct right reason"² in determining the content or character of human behavior.

As we will recall from an earlier discussion, Hobbes was of the opinion that nature rendered human beings unfit for life within collective organizational units, and that certain of these human beings, whom we have been calling dominators, are especially unsuited to conform to the norms of behavior required within such units.³ It is my contention that the "antisocial passions," which purportedly affect all human beings, but which are described as being especially prominent among dominators, constitute the most significant feature which militates against the establishment and maintenance of such organizational units as (Hobbesian) "families" and *bona fide* COMMONWEALTHS.

In chapter 5 of this dissertation, I presented a discussion of why it seems plausible that extremely small, i.e. two person defensive groupings (if such groupings could

come to be established) would stand a slight chance of persisting for any extended period of time. During the course of the remainder of this chapter, I will explore how plausible it is that somewhat larger social groupings composed of Hobbesian men and women will remain viable and durable units.

During the course of his writings on political philosophy, Hobbes attempts to provide answers to the following six crucial questions:⁴

- (1). What is the nature of human beings?
- (2). Given the nature of human beings, why do men form commonwealths?
- (3). In what manner are commonwealths formed, or, in what manner can commonwealths be conceived of as being formed?
- (4). Why do commonwealths remain in existence (rather than quickly dissolving)?
- (5). What strategies and structures must the sovereign of a commonwealth implement in order to make most probable the continued existence of the COMMONWEALTHS?
- (6). How must citizens behave in order to make most probable the continued existence of the COMMONWEALTH?

In the next several paragraphs of this chapter, I will review and discuss why Hobbes believed that organized political units, in this case, specifically of the state of nature-3 variety, can be expected to remain in existence (or persist over time). I will then present what I take to be Hobbes's answer to the sixth of these questions (6), that is, to the question of how citizens must behave in order to

make most probable the continued existence of the COMMONWEALTH to which they belong.⁵

I will conclude this dissertation by discussing these issues in light of the conception of human nature which Hobbes forwarded so that I might determine whether Hobbes's answers to the aforementioned descriptive and prescriptive questions are consistent with his view of the human organism.

B. Why Hobbes Thought Commonwealths Remain in Existence

Purportedly, Hobbes offered his philosophy of politics in order to demonstrate why human beings are obliged to obey the directives of the sovereign of the COMMONWEALTH to which they belong. Specifically, Hobbes believed that citizens are bound to obey their sovereign not because they have (necessarily) entered into an explicit contractual agreement to do so, but rather because being a citizen within a COMMONWEALTH involves the performance of duties which are tantamount to those which one would incur were one to enter into such an explicit contractual agreement.⁶ This belief is perhaps most clearly enunciated in chapter 17 of Leviathan where Hobbes proclaims that the unity which combines the numerous men who compose the COMMONWEALTH "is more than consent or concord," and is rather⁷

a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every other man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man. . . on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner.

Hence, even though a citizen might not enter into an explicit contract of the above-specified variety, he does, nevertheless, by virtue of constituting part of the matter of the COMMONWEALTH (and of course, by virtue of benefitting from the advantages which are made possible by the existence of that COMMONWEALTH) owe a debt of allegiance to the sovereign of that COMMONWEALTH. Therefore, Hobbes's theory of political obligation can be understood to have significance not only for those men and women who can be imagined to have *explicitly* entered into covenants which effectively establish very small multi-person defensive units, but moreover, to those natural persons who have been born into, or who otherwise find themselves to be part of an already established or existing COMMONWEALTH.

Of course, Hobbes famously offered the opinion that a properly regulated COMMONWEALTH, if it is not destroyed by, or incorporated into some rival COMMONWEALTH, can be expected to endure perpetually.⁸ When considering this issue in the present chapter, we will be less concerned with the question of how precisely the COMMONWEALTH under consideration came to be established, and will instead concentrate upon whether the COMMONWEALTH can be expected to

contain sufficiently strong cohesive forces to prevent the self-seeking and socially disruptive tendencies of its constituent members from rending it asunder, that is, from effecting its dissolution.

Surely, when a servant within a state of nature-2 type grouping takes the time to observe and consider the nature of the organizational unit of which he is a part, as well as his own level of physical and intellectual power *vis-à-vis* that of his master (that is, his group's leader), he will soon come to recognize the rather thin basis of the relationship of servitude in which he finds himself involved. Even though the servant can be assumed to have entered into some type of contractual agreement with his master, he will doubtless recognize that he confronts his master on approximately equal terms *qua* adult human being, and that his relationship of servitude to his master is based entirely upon conventional (i.e., contractual) rather than natural factors. Moreover, the servant, especially if he happens to be a member of a two-person group, cannot fail to be struck by the fact that his master is extremely vulnerable to physical attacks, and indeed is susceptible to a relatively quick and easily accomplished destruction by any other adult (including the servant himself). Finally, as I mentioned in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, Hobbes draws a clear distinction between (1) slaves, who are not trusted by, and who are thus kept imprisoned or shackled in bonds,

chains or other impediments to corporeal motion by their masters, and (2) servants, who are trusted by their masters and, as such, are afforded a degree of corporeal freedom. It seems clear that a servant, by virtue of being trusted by his master, and by virtue of being afforded a certain level of corporeal freedom, is in a favorable position to strike out against and to attempt to kill his master.

Indeed, as I suggested earlier in this dissertation, one might plausibly suggest that in many cases, this recognition on the part of the servant, especially if he happens to be part of a two person grouping, will *encourage* him to disobey the orders of his master or to attempt to kill his master. Surely, the servant's exercising such a strategy, which would involve his failing to discharge the obligation which he had earlier taken upon himself through the contractual apparatus, would almost certainly have the effect of destroying the integrity of his group.⁹

The situation within larger groupings, and especially within fully-fledged COMMONWEALTHS, would be somewhat different for a variety of reasons. In the first place, since the internal peacekeeping and punitive mechanism within the COMMONWEALTH will certainly be more organized, more highly developed and more ominous a presence than will be the case within smaller groupings, we might reasonably expect that citizens within COMMONWEALTHS would be less likely to believe that they can strike out against their

sovereign (or their master) with impunity than would be servants within "families."¹⁰

Secondly, as was mentioned in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, a citizen of a COMMONWEALTH will likely enjoy a much more comfortable, creative and predictable mode of existence than will a natural person who constitutes part of a state of nature-2 type social unit. Since the citizen within a COMMONWEALTH can be supposed to have the perception that his physical safety is not in danger, while the subject within a Hobbesian "family" cannot be assumed to be assured of his own continuing physical safety, the former will, *in all likelihood*, come to recognize the profound value of the social grouping of which he is a part. In turn, the citizen will likely come to desire that his COMMONWEALTH continues to exist in the future, and will thus be motivated to take all reasonable (or necessary) steps to support the continued existence of his COMMONWEALTH. By contrast, the subject within a "family" will, *in all likelihood*, not feel such a devoted commitment to preserving or maintaining the integrity of his social group. Since we might reasonably contend that the servant within a "family" will often (correctly) perceive that his social group is insufficiently robust and stable to be reckoned upon to adequately preserve his life, save him from a violent death at the hands of an assailant or provide him with a requisitely tranquil social situation to enable him to procure for himself the means for

a (physically and psychologically) comfortable existence, he will therefore feel a much weaker stake in seeking to insure that his present social group continues to exist.¹¹

Additionally, and related to the latter point, Hobbes indicates that a servant within a "family" will be much more apt than a subject within a COMMONWEALTH to encounter situations where he is justified to disobey the directive of his group leader, and thus *ostensibly* fail to discharge the obligation which he had earlier incurred upon himself. Since human beings enter into social or political groups principally for the sake of assuring their own physical safety and saving themselves from the prospect of suffering a violent death, and since a smaller social or political grouping can be assumed to provide to its members a weaker or less frequently manifested level of physical safety (and protection from suffering a violent death) than is available within a COMMONWEALTH, natural persons who live within "families" can be assumed to have a somewhat weaker and less steadfast commitment to preserving the integrity of their group than can members of fully fledged COMMONWEALTHS.

Admittedly, an individual's degree of commitment to preserving the social or political grouping of which he is a part should not be thought of as a bivalent quality according to which an individual either does or does not have a strong motivation to do all he can to preserve the integrity of his group. Rather, the degree of commitment to

such a goal, and in fact, the absence of an individual's tendency to defect from his group, can be assumed to be very low within (highly unstable) two person groupings, somewhat greater within large state of nature-2 type "families," even greater within comparatively weak COMMONWEALTHS, and the highest within strong COMMONWEALTHS.¹²

Thus, we may assert that a person's degree of commitment to the active preservation of the group to which he belongs will gradually vary from a very low level within two person defensive groupings¹³ to a very high level within highly developed, well-regulated state of nature-3 type units. (which Hobbes believed, at the very least, to be within the organizational capability of human beings)

Even though Hobbes was somewhat unspecific about what precisely differentiates a large state of nature-2 type "family" from a small fully fledged COMMONWEALTH, he was nevertheless committed to the position that life within a state of nature-3 type COMMONWEALTH is characteristically more comfortable, tranquil and creative than is life within a state of nature-2 type "family."

C. Why Should the Citizen Obey?

In A Review and conclusion to Leviathan,¹⁴ Hobbes expresses the belief that with respect to subjects within existing governments, there exists a reciprocal relation between protection and obedience. That is to say, according to Hobbes, if an individual finds himself living under a

government which is sufficiently powerful to preserve the civil order, and to protect the individual from the aggressive attacks of either his fellow citizens or the citizens of some external power, then the individual owes allegiance to the sovereign of his COMMONWEALTH.¹⁵ Lurking behind his pronouncement concerning the reciprocal relation between protection and obedience is Hobbes's recognition that life within any effective COMMONWEALTH is vastly superior to life in the state of nature,¹⁶ or more relevantly from an historical standpoint, to the type of life which awaits a man who lives in a condition of civil war similar to that which existed in Britain in the 1640s.

According to Hobbes, given the character which social relations can be expected to assume in a condition where men who had previously lived under an effective sovereign authority find themselves bereft of such a sovereign mechanism, reason dictates that men who currently live under an effective sovereign authority endeavor, to the utmost of their abilities, to prevent the occurrence of a condition of the former (sovereignless and inhospitable) type. One reasonable means of avoiding such an unappealing eventuality is to willingly obey and support the efforts of one's sovereign whenever the latter is able to effectively maintain a condition of peace and safety.

Thus, if a man finds himself in a position where he can either willingly submit to the authority of the present

sovereign, who is capable of maintaining the public order, or else refuse to submit to the authority of that existing sovereign (by openly rebelling against, or by otherwise failing to obey the directives of that power), that man would be a fool to pursue the second option. Since in this example, the alternative to submitting to the established sovereign involves the establishment of, or the reversion to a condition in which the danger of violent death is probable and omnipresent, one would be well advised to pledge one's allegiance to the existing government. We must now examine how well this explanation holds up when subjected to further scrutiny.

Hobbes believed that the main factor or the main feature of the human organism which causes men and women to enter into, and to remain members of a COMMONWEALTH is fear, either that of one's group leader, or of the human beings in one's vicinity, or of the prospect of returning to a less hospitable social condition.¹⁷

During his discussion of covenants and oaths in chapter 14 of Leviathan, Hobbes notes that even though "the force of words" is "too weak to hold men to the performance of their covenants," there are, nevertheless, "two imaginable helps to strengthening it."¹⁸ And these are¹⁹

either a fear of the consequences of breaking one's word, or a glory or pride in appearing not to need to break it. This latter is a generosity too rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of wealth, command or sensual pleasure; which are the greatest part of mankind.

Rather, opines Hobbes, in most of these instances, "the passion to be reckoned upon is fear."²⁰ As Hobbes further points out, such fear can be of powers invisible or of one's fellow men, and "even though the former be the greater power, yet the fear of the latter is commonly the greater fear."²¹

In this respect, Hobbes claims that sovereignty by institution differs from sovereignty by acquisition "only [sic] in this, that they who choose their sovereign, do it for fear of one another and not him they institute but" in the case of sovereignty by acquisition, "they subject themselves to him they are afraid of."²² "In both cases," he concludes, "they do it for fear."²³

Since Hobbes voiced his agreement with the ancient maxim *Salus populi suprema lex est*,²⁴ that is, the safety of the people is the supreme law, and thus the primary responsibility with which the sovereign is charged, and since most reflective citizens will come to realize that even a minimally effective sovereign will guard the public order, maintain a condition of safety for his/its citizens, and thus deliver each citizen from the strong likelihood of suffering a violent death (the *summum malum*, after all, for

human beings), many or most of these citizens will come to realize that *each* citizen possesses a strong reason to support the efforts of his existing sovereign. A desire to save oneself from a violent death, coupled with a recognition of the above mentioned fact can be expected to motivate many reflective citizens to act in the appropriate fashion, that is, to indeed support the efforts, and follow the directives of the existing sovereign.

We must keep in mind, moreover, that each citizen is to be conceived as having entered into a contractual bargain in which he has agreed to be bound by the will of the sovereign; to fail to do so would, after all, be a violation of the terms of his contract, and thus, constitute an unjust action. This would surely have some motivational force upon the citizen's eventual action. Nevertheless, the most pressing factor which motivates a citizen to become a part of, or to remain a part of his COMMONWEALTH, is a fear of his fellow citizens, and specifically, a fear of the effects of the unpredictable actions of his present fellow citizens. This being said, I will now move on to actually consider the viability of COMMONWEALTHS which are composed of Hobbesian men and women.

D. How Compelling is Hobbes's Advice to Citizens of Commonwealths?

It would seem that the maintenance of the internal order within such a multi-person unit as a modern

COMMONWEALTH depends upon (A) the perception among a substantial majority of its citizens that the existing sovereign enjoys a sufficient level of support among a sufficient proportion of the population to enable him to insure that such citizens will not fall victim to death or serious injury due to internal strife (or external aggression), and (B) the actual willingness of a substantial majority of its citizens to actively discharge the obligations which they have (formerly) incurred by virtue of having entered into an actual or hypothetical social contract²⁵. Specifically, citizens could be understood to discharge such obligations by acting in accordance with the directives issued by the sovereign, and thus, by actively obeying those pronouncements which can be identified as the "public will" or the will of the sovereign.

We must recall at this point that Hobbes considered one of the preeminent benefits of life within an organized COMMONWEALTH to be the ability to safely observe the laws of nature (*in foro externo*) with the assurance that the behavior of most of one's fellow citizens will conform to the civil law (which ideally encompasses the laws of nature). Hence, with the establishment of the COMMONWEALTH comes a level of predictability (with respect to the behavior of the natural persons in one's vicinity), which is absent, or at the very least, much less able to be counted upon, in the state of nature (-2).

It quickly becomes clear to us, however, that (1) the sum of the actual (combined) physical power wielded by the natural human being (or human beings) who constitutes (or constitute) the sovereign²⁶ and the actual combined physical power of the natural human beings whose function it is to regulate the public peace within that COMMONWEALTH pales in comparison with (2) the actual (combined) physical power wielded by the members of the COMMONWEALTH who constitute neither part of its sovereign mechanism nor part of its peace-keeping force.²⁷ Thus, *from one standpoint*, each citizen who composes a part of, or dwells within an existing COMMONWEALTH, has more to fear from his fellow citizens than he does from either the sovereign or from those who have been designated by the sovereign to maintain a condition of internal peace.²⁸ For this reason, it can be inferred that each citizen has a compelling pragmatic or prudential reason to agree to be bound by the will of the sovereign, provided that the latter does command a sufficient level of obedience to maintain the public order.

Unfortunately, however, it appears that in offering his advice to sovereigns and citizens, Hobbes is essentially "preaching to the converted ." (or, at any rate, to those who are capable of being easily convinced and converted) By this, I mean that within his political writings, Hobbes can be understood to be attempting to convince his readers that behavior which has the effect of destabilizing one's

COMMONWEALTH should be avoided or suppressed. Thus, if the ideas contained in his writings are to be effective, that is, if such ideas are to have practical value, Hobbes must appeal to, and attempt to alter the behavior of those men and women whose actions are frequently of a socially disruptive nature. Indeed, in order for Hobbes's recommendations to have a beneficial effect upon the condition of existing COMMONWEALTHS, he must somehow convince those whom we have been referring to as dominators that they should recognize that they are fundamentally (naturally) equal to all of their adult fellow citizens, and that, for the sake of fostering a harmonious and smoothly-run COMMONWEALTH, they should resolve to suppress their urge to demonstrate their supposed natural superiority over other men and women.²⁹

While the arguments contained within Hobbes's writings can easily be imagined to convince moderate men, that is, men who are satisfied with an equality of nature (with their fellow men), these arguments will be reckoned somewhat less effective in convincing dominators, whose imperialistic, socially disruptive passions were described by Hobbes as being ineliminable natural constituent features of such dominators' corporeal selves. Thus, if they are to effectively serve the function for which this author intended them, Hobbes's arguments must have the power to alter the attitude, or at the very least, the behavior of

dominators.³⁰ However, since the behavior of dominators was regarded by Hobbes to be incorrigible, unalterable, and not susceptible to appeals to reasoned principles, Hobbes's prescriptions would seem to be precluded from having the desired effect upon the constituent nature, and the level of overall stability of the COMMONWEALTH.

Unhappily, the presence of dominators within the COMMONWEALTH would have the additional undesirable effect of rendering even moderate men unwilling to observe the types of principles suggested to citizens by Hobbes in Leviathan and other of his political writings. Specifically, given Hobbes's commitment to the belief that dominators will be present within any sizable social grouping, and thus, within every COMMONWEALTH, and more relevantly, given the eventual recognition, on the part of the moderate men who populate that COMMONWEALTH, that dominators are present within their COMMONWEALTH, even moderate men, fearing that they might be taken advantage of by such dominators, will in all likelihood, be deterred from acting in a peaceable, mutually accommodating fashion.

As mentioned above, the established sovereign's ability to effectively preserve the public order, and thus to maintain the viability of the COMMONWEALTH, depends upon the perception on the part of a substantial majority of that COMMONWEALTH'S citizens that their sovereign does indeed possess the requisite level of public support to preserve a

condition of peace.³¹ Moreover, if the sovereign is unable to maintain the citizens' confidence by convincing them that the civil order is not in danger of breaking down, and if the citizens' confidence in the sovereign falls below some critical level, the public order will in fact begin to break down. One could easily imagine how an atmosphere of uncertainty, fostered by a lack of the sufficient degree of public confidence in the ability of the sovereign to force his subjects to honor their contracts and observe the civil laws, would lead even moderate men who are uncertain that they can "bank upon" lawful behavior on the part of their fellow citizens to "err on the side of safety" by failing to discharge their contractual obligations. Consequently, in this scenario, even moderate men, (i.e. those who harbor a sincere desire and willingness to foster the continued existence of the COMMONWEALTH by following the directives of the sovereign), can be expected to be prompted by the urgings of fear to behave in such a manner as will, in all likelihood, foster that COMMONWEALTH'S dissolution. Indeed, in this respect, a kind of "domino theory of the COMMONWEALTH's dissolution" can be imagined to be manifested.

By this, I mean that if doubts of this kind initially appear among a small number of (even moderate) citizens of some COMMONWEALTH, it is plausible that such doubts could, and in all likelihood, would,³² gradually spread to larger

and larger segments of the population and eventually cause a sufficient degree of social instability to destroy the COMMONWEALTH. These initial doubts can be imagined to spread throughout the population in no fewer than three ways: first, by the dissemination of rumour and word of mouth; second, through an unwillingness on the part of citizens to observe the civil laws of the COMMONWEALTH; and third, through an unwillingness on the part of citizens to repose the degree of trust in one's fellow citizens which is necessary to maintain a strong and viable COMMONWEALTH. While the first method of transmission can be imagined to be primarily of a verbal nature, the attitude associated with the second and the third methods of transmission from one citizen to another will be manifested primarily in behavior, which will be observed by those natural persons within the diffident citizen's (or citizens') environment.³³

Of course, we (or Hobbes) could specify that within a well regulated COMMONWEALTH, the sovereign will provide effective means to suppress the socially disruptive passion-based behavior of dominators, thus eliminating a significant source of social instability within that grouping. That is, even though we might concede that the behavior of dominators is not subject to correction or alteration through rational persuasion or reasoned argumentation, we might nevertheless maintain that part of a COMMONWEALTH'S effective internal peace-keeping mechanism consists of provisions for the

coercive suppression of such passion-based socially disruptive behavior. However, at this juncture, we must seriously ask ourselves how effective such provisions can be expected to be.

Indeed, to contend that the formation and maintenance of an internal peace-keeping mechanism which is capable of effectively controlling or constraining the socially destructive passion-based behavior which dominators would otherwise exhibit is a relatively easy or unproblematic process, seems to seriously underestimate the tenacity of such dominators' passions. Even though the effectiveness of such a mechanism to suppress or control the behavior of the citizens of a COMMONWEALTH can be assumed to vary inversely with the percentage of dominators who constitute that COMMONWEALTH,³⁴ Hobbes's classic descriptions of the behavior characteristic of dominators clearly indicate that the problem of dominators will significantly affect any social grouping.

Interestingly, although he is frequently represented as a proponent of repressive authoritarian methods of governing, Hobbes's political philosophy actually reflects a concern with allowing a substantial amount of freedom to the citizens of the COMMONWEALTH.³⁵ Moreover, it would seem that even though the exercising of a requisite level of social control to convince the citizens that they are safe to carry on the conduct of daily life is a necessary

constituent feature of any effective governmental organization, it would additionally appear that in many instances, actually exercising this level of social control could have effects of a seriously counterproductive or destabilizing nature. Indeed, a rather serious problem can be envisioned to emerge when we consider that, on the one hand, the sovereign or leader of a COMMONWEALTH can be expected to need to employ some rather severe authoritarian methods of governing in order to effectively suppress the socially disruptive behavior of dominators while, on the other hand, the citizens of a COMMONWEALTH whose sovereign routinely employs such methods are likely to resent the severity of such measures. Citizen resentment can be expected to arise precisely because such severe authoritarian measures are likely to be perceived by both the dominators and the moderates within the COMMONWEALTH as constituting overly harsh restrictions on personal liberty. That is to say, by inadvertently creating the perception that he and his agents are exercising unjustifiably harsh methods of social control (methods of social control which, in all likelihood, will be necessary to keep the socially disruptive behavior of dominators in check), the sovereign is likely to undercut the *freely given* support of his citizens, the latter of which is, after all, required to insure the COMMONWEALTH'S continued existence.³⁶ Hence, the problem related to the suppression of the behavior of

dominators within COMMONWEALTHS can be understood to be two-pronged: In the first place, it is doubtful that methods of social control which are adequate to suppress the antisocial behavior of dominators can be formulated and implemented, and in the second place, even if such methods could be developed and successfully implemented, it seems likely that the utilization of such methods would result in an unintended diminution of public support for the program of the sovereign. Simply, the employment of the severe authoritarian methods which are necessary to accomplish this task is likely to be resented by much of the citizenry. In turn, the employment of these techniques would, in all likelihood, have the effect of eroding the citizens' support for their sovereign. Finally, such an erosion of citizen support would likely bring disastrous effects upon the COMMONWEALTH precisely because (1) the persistence of such citizen support is necessary to foster the continued existence of the established COMMONWEALTH and because (2) such citizen support cannot be extorted from those citizens but rather, must be freely given.

E. Is Hobbes's Justificatory Project Successful?

Needless to say, there is something artificial or unrealistic about Hobbes's account of the generation of a COMMONWEALTH by institution. As was noted in chapter 5 of this dissertation, Hobbes provides a detailed description of the remarkably civil process by which a multitude of

Hobbesian natural persons who inhabit the same geographical region come to peacefully agree to obey and be bound by the will of some designated sovereign authority. In this respect, an obvious criticism of Hobbes's position is that one can hardly expect the predominantly self interested, death aversive individuals who inhabit the state of nature-1 to willingly attempt to forge a peace-keeping agreement with those who live in their vicinity, especially in light of the fact that such individuals lack a guarantee that their overtures to peace will not be met with violence. Quite simply, in the state of nature-1, one cannot expect Hobbesian individuals to assume the enormous personal risks that are involved in taking upon oneself the role of peacemaker.

A fairly likely response to this objection on the part of a supporter of Hobbes is that although we should not expect a COMMONWEALTH by institution to arise from out of the state of nature-1 in the manner indicated by this author, Hobbes's account of the institution of such an "artificial" COMMONWEALTH is not intended to chronicle an actually instantiated historical event, but is meant rather to demonstrate why men and women who find themselves living within actually existing COMMONWEALTHS have an obligation to obey their sovereign. In light of this, we might claim that Hobbes's account is intended not to describe the genesis of, but rather to justify the continued existence of an

established COMMONWEALTH and to shed light on the nature of the social bonds which unite or tie a number of disparate individuals into one coherent social unit. Thus, political philosophers as well as men and women who dwell within COMMONWEALTHS are to regard the obligation of the citizens to the sovereign of their COMMONWEALTH as being identical to that which would be explicitly acknowledged were a disparate group of solitary individuals to form a society "by institution" in the manner indicated by Hobbes. If this is true, then Hobbes's main objective in discussing COMMONWEALTH by institution is not to describe to the citizen the actual process by which his COMMONWEALTH was set up, but rather, to show the citizen how he must behave in order to make most probable his own long and relatively fulfilling life (and importantly, to show the citizen how he must conceive of his relationship to his sovereign).

Although such a defense of Hobbes's position does possess a certain degree of plausibility, I contend that this account is still flawed since it fails to take adequate account of the human behavioral tendencies which would,³⁷ in all probability, effectively prevent the COMMONWEALTH by institution being formed in the manner indicated by Hobbes. That is to say, even if we (correctly) conceive of Hobbes's project not as one of explaining the actual historical process by which COMMONWEALTHS are instituted, but rather as one of explaining the basis of the citizen's obligation to

obey his sovereign (and of convincing the citizen that he should behave in a particular fashion), Hobbes in his account nevertheless fails to acknowledge that human antisocial tendencies and an abiding uncertainty among the citizens of a COMMONWEALTH that their fellow citizens will act in the required manner, will very likely³⁸ prevent citizens from confidently complying with the directives of their sovereign. Moreover, given man's self-seeking tendencies, man's apparent willingness to violate contracts when he believes that he may do so without being detected, and the very evident constraints which limit the natural power of even the mightiest of sovereign "persons," we may conclude that the prospect of any COMMONWEALTH existing for a substantial period of time is rather bleak.

Granted, even though the project of justifying allegiance to an already existing social institution stands a greater chance of success than that of demonstrating that such an institution arose from a general convention attended by a multitude of human beings who do not enjoy the benefit of any social ties, even the former task will strike the reader as a formidable one given Hobbes's rather extreme and inflexible conception of human nature. Indeed, given the divisive behavioral tendencies which Hobbes attributes to human beings, and given the fact that Hobbes believed such tendencies will remain a constituent part of the human organism even after they have "entered into" a COMMONWEALTH

instituting social agreement, one would have little reason to simultaneously accept Hobbes's conception of human nature (and behavior) and the proposition that socially established COMMONWEALTHS will endure for any sustained period of time. Upon recognizing this truth, however, a significant problem with Hobbes's philosophy of politics glaringly emerges.

Specifically, we must acknowledge as an empirically verifiable truth that COMMONWEALTHS do persist, in some cases for hundreds of years. We might better understand the nature of this difficulty by considering the following argument:

- (1) If Hobbes's conception of human nature is correct, then
COMMONWEALTHS should not be expected to persist for
substantial periods of time
- (2) COMMONWEALTHS do (as a matter of fact) persist for
substantial periods of time
- (3) Therefore, Hobbes's conception of human nature is
incorrect.

Hobbes's harsh conception of human nature and his dismal assessment of human associative potential, if accurate, would appear to render unworkable any long-lasting collective social unit such as a COMMONWEALTH.

Though Hobbes had little praise for the manner in which theretofore existing COMMONWEALTHS had been designed or organized, he nevertheless believed that he had introduced

monumental innovations into the science of governing. Indeed, Hobbes famously insisted that civil philosophy is "no older than my own book De Cive,"³⁹ and rather immodestly observed that⁴⁰

[t]ime, and industry, produce every day new knowledge. And as the art of well building is derived from principles of reason, observed by industrious men, that had long studied the nature of the materials, and the divers effects of figure, and proportion, long after mankind began, though poorly, to build: so, long time after men have begun to constitute commonwealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder, there may principles of reason be found out, by industrious meditation, to make their constitution, excepting by external violence, everlasting. And such are those which I have in this discourse set forth.

Thus, Hobbes believed that the principles of justice and sovereignty which he propounded in Leviathan and De Cive, could be employed by an interested ruler or sovereign to prevent his (i.e., the latter's) COMMONWEALTH from dissolving or being torn asunder by internal destabilizing influences.

Though Hobbes clearly maintained that a COMMONWEALTH organized in accordance with his own prescriptive principles could, barring a successful external invasion, be expected to endure perpetually, he was much less sanguine about the possibility of COMMONWEALTHS not organized in accordance with his principles enjoying such success. Additionally, Hobbes believed that no society which existed either in his own time or in earlier stages of history was or had been

organized in accordance with his principles, and in Leviathan, he expressed his fervent hope that his "short" book would someday find its way⁴¹

into the hands of a sovereign who will consider it himself. . . without the help of any interested or envious interpreter: and by the exercise of entire sovereignty, in protecting the public teaching of it, convert this truth of speculation, into the utility of practice.

Notwithstanding his rather self-vaunting pronouncements on this issue, Hobbes could hardly have denied that many of the COMMONWEALTHS which have been established over the course of history have, for whatever reason, managed to endure, in some cases for hundreds of years, despite not having been organized in accordance with his own propounded political principles. However, given Hobbes's generally pessimistic estimate of human associative potential, his contention that human beings are born naturally unfit for life within societies, and his stark view of the influence of the socially disruptive human passions upon individual persons (as well as upon social groups that are composed of such persons), such a result should not have obtained. Indeed, the fact that COMMONWEALTHS have, as a matter of fact, been chronicled to have endured for substantial periods of times seems strikingly inconsistent with Hobbes's presuppositions, especially in light of his claim that his principles of political organization have never been put into effect by a sovereign or civil ruler. Thus, we are left

with the conclusion that Hobbes's philosophical anthropology or theory of human nature portrays human beings in unjustifiably harsh colours; for if a significant proportion of human beings were as naturally self-interested and rapacious as Hobbes contends, virtually any human social enterprise would be doomed from the start.

F. Concluding Remarks

A careful reading of his philosophical writings reveals that Hobbes forwards no fewer than three distinct conceptions of the pre-political situation which he labels "the natural condition of humankind," or "the state of nature." By examining the relevant passages from The Elements of Law, De Cive and Leviathan, Hobbes's three principal works of political philosophy, I have shown that Hobbes's state of nature should not be interpreted as a single invariant concept but rather as a series of three distinct heuristic or expository models. It is my contention that Hobbes's complex model of the state of nature gradually took shape during the course of his political writings as Hobbes successively attempted to imagine how human beings, whom he believed to be endowed with a specific invariant human nature, would behave when subjected to differing levels of social control and individual freedom. It is important to realize that even though the representative units involved in the various conceptions of the state of nature do differ from conception to conception,⁴² the

natural qualities attributed to individual persons remain constant across the three conceptions. It is precisely the fact that human nature remains constant irrespective of whether the individual under consideration (1) lives in or constitutes part of a COMMONWEALTH, (2) lives in or constitutes part of a "family," or (3) is considered to inhabit the state of nature-1 which militates against the successful formation and maintenance of any collective social enterprise. (even one as putatively stable as a fully fledged COMMONWEALTH)

In the final analysis, the internal consistency of Hobbes's system is undermined by this author's forwarding an unjustifiably severe doctrine of human nature and behavior. I characterize Hobbes's doctrine of human nature as "unjustifiably severe" precisely because it appears highly improbable that human associative groupings composed of such biological organisms could (1) be instituted or established in accordance with any of the techniques indicated by Hobbes throughout the course of his writings or (2) remain viable units even if such units were brought into existence either in the manner indicated by Hobbes, or through some other method. This first point of inconsistency (1) would seriously impugn Hobbes's project of demonstrating that viable social or political units can be conceived as arising in accordance with the processes indicated in his writings, while the second point of inconsistency (2) would cast

serious doubt upon Hobbes's justificatory project of convincing the interested reader that he [the latter] has a compelling reason, and is indeed obligated, to support the efforts of the established sovereign mechanism in the area where he dwells, by scrupulously complying with the directives of that sovereign.

Though Hobbes might be reckoned by some to have offered sage advice to those men and women who are confronted with the choice of either (A) complying with the directives of their existing sovereign or of (B) refusing to comply with such directives and thus helping to foster the degeneration of the COMMONWEALTH to which they belong, we must conclude that the philosophical basis of Hobbes's propounded prescription is seriously undercut by his refusal to embrace and urge as accurate a conception of human nature which will allow for the formation and maintenance of viable, multiperson units. In the absence of his offering such a conception, we must conclude that Hobbes's *philosophical* project of convincing men and women that they have a compelling reason to obey the directives of their sovereign, stands a dim chance of success.

Because Hobbes endorses a model of the human organism which renders extremely unlikely the possibility of viable and sustained human associative groups, Hobbes's recommendation that citizens of existing COMMONWEALTHS should take all the steps necessary to preserve the given

regime by obeying the laws and supporting the cause of their sovereign, strikes this reader as a well-conceived strategy for guaranteeing one's own demise and destruction. For if Hobbes's severe model of the human organism were accurate, acting in such a "prosocial" manner would almost inevitably lead to being taken advantage of, and perhaps being destroyed by the hostile (or perhaps merely preemptive or anticipatory) acts of other men.

The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this dissertation is that in presenting his philosophy of politics, Hobbes forwards an unrealistically or unjustifiably harsh conception of the nature of human beings, a conception which, if taken seriously, would prevent this author from insisting that stable and secure political units such as COMMONWEALTHS could be consistently established or maintained.

The most obvious solution to this predicament is to revise one's conception of human nature and human associative potential to a model which is more in keeping with what has been shown to be the case throughout the course of human history, and which is more amenable to the formation and maintenance of stable social groupings. To do so would not require the theorist to forward a conception of the human organism which construes such beings as naturally sociable, or as capable of forming (much less spontaneously forming) stable multi-person groups in which each individual

member lives in perfect harmony with every other.

Unfortunately, the limited scope of this research project prevents the present writer from offering specific concrete answers to the question of how the theorist's conception of human nature can be changed so as to more faithfully reflect the truths which we see manifested before us, and to salvage Hobbes's descriptive and prescriptive projects from the charges of irrelevance and unworkability.⁴³

NOTES

1. See, for example, Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 109.

2. Or "perturbationes animi." See Chapter 12 of De Homine in Hobbes, Man and Citizen, pages 55-62.

3. For textual confirmation of the first claim made in this sentence, namely, that Hobbes was of the opinion that nature rendered human beings unfit for life within collective organizational units, see Hobbes's contention that "man is made fit for society, not by nature, but by education." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 110.) For textual confirmation of the second claim, specifically, that certain human beings, whom we have been calling dominators, are especially unsuited to conform to the norms of behavior required within collective organizational units, see my extended discussion of the behavior of dominators in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. In order to see that Hobbes did not consider human beings to be naturally sociable creatures, one need only read "The Author's Preface to the Reader" and section 2 of chapter 1 of De Cive. (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, pages 95-106; 110-113) Additionally, see Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 108-109; Hobbes, De Cive, pages 167-169, and Hobbes, Elements of Law, pages 102-103.

4. I attempted to present Hobbes's answer to the first of these questions (1) in the first chapter of this dissertation, Hobbes's answer to the second of these questions (2) in the second chapter of this dissertation, and Hobbes's answer to the third of these questions (3) in the third, fourth and fifth, chapters of this dissertation. At various points throughout this dissertation, I have endeavored to show why Hobbes believed that citizens of organized political units can be expected to actually remain parts of such units; thus, at various places throughout this dissertation, I have presented what I take to be Hobbes's answer to the fourth of these questions.

5. Though considerations of brevity prevent me from presenting a full-scale discussion of Hobbes's answer to question (5), above, it should be noted that Hobbes's advice to sovereigns of political units can be found primarily in chapters 22-30 of Leviathan. (Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 146-233.)

6. And, of course, since the laws of nature require that one actively perform in a manner consistent with this 'as if' consideration.

7. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 109.

8. See Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 220-221.

9. See my explanation of why this might plausibly be supposed to occur in the paragraph which begins with the words "In the first place," on pages 165-166 of this dissertation.

10. I judge this to be a reasonable expectation since (1) a stable state of nature-3 type COMMONWEALTH will almost certainly contain a more sophisticated and more reliable punitive and peace-keeping apparatus than will a relatively unstable state of nature-2 type "family," and since (2) the citizens or the subjects within the respective type of grouping will, in all likelihood, form accurate beliefs regarding the effectiveness and reliability of the peace keeping apparatus of their own group via empirical observation.

11. Even though a state of nature-2 type "family" can be expected to provide its members with some degree of protection against the predatory attacks of external aggressors, because such groups are described by Hobbes as being unstable and factious units, and because human beings living within such units are described as being deprived of the bases or prerequisite conditions for a commodious existence, a subject within such a unit can be supposed to believe that he has much less to lose if his present social group were to dissolve than he would be were he a citizen within a fully fledged COMMONWEALTH.

12. "Strong COMMONWEALTHS" can be characterized as those COMMONWEALTHS in which the citizens possess the greatest degree of confidence in the state's ability to insure their own physical safety, are able to most fully enjoy the fruits of science, industry and the trappings of a "commodious" society, and most fully understand that their relatively comfortable, stable, and anxiety-free lifestyle is directly attributable to living within such a political unit.

13. Which were conceived by Hobbes as theoretically possible, though *seldom* actually existing historical units. Recall Hobbes's discussions of Adam's relationship to Cain in The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance on pages 183-184 of Vol. V of English Works, and on page 344 of Vol. VII of English Works.

14. Leviathan, p. 490. See also Hobbes, Leviathan, page 144: Hobbes, English Works, Vol. IV, pages 420-25; Hobbes, English Works, Vol. V, pages 178-80; and Hobbes, English Works, Vol. VII, page 344.

15. According to Hobbes, this includes the obligation to "protect in war the authority, by which he is himself protected in time of peace." (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 490.) Hobbes explains that a citizen incurs such an obligation because "he that pretendeth a right of nature to preserve his own body, cannot pretend a right of nature to destroy him, by whose strength he is preserved." (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 490.)

16. That is in a conception of the state of nature other than the state of nature-3.

17. Admittedly, asserting that Hobbes believed fear to be the main or preeminent factor which motivates men and women to enter into, and "persuades" them to remain members of the COMMONWEALTH, does not do full justice to Hobbes's thoughts on this topic. For example, in a famous passage from the final paragraph of chapter 13 of Leviathan, Hobbes claims that "(t)he passions that incline men to peace are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them." (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 78.) Thus, Hobbes mentions a desire for the means necessary for a commodious life and a hope to obtain the material trappings which characterize such a lifestyle as among the passions which incline men to seek peace through the establishment of a COMMONWEALTH. Significantly, however, in this oft-quoted passage Hobbes lists the "fear of death" as the first passion which inclines men toward peace.

18. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 87.

19. Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 87-88.

20. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 88.

21. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 88.

22. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 127.

23. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 127.

24. See Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 179; Hobbes, Leviathan, page 219, and Hobbes, English Works, Vol. V, page 178.

25. With one's fellow citizens in the case of sovereignty by institution, and with one's sovereign in the case of sovereignty by acquisition.

26. I make this claim in full knowledge of the fact that within Hobbes's system, the human being who singly composes, or the human beings who collectively compose the COMMONWEALTH'S sovereign constitutes, in its political capacity, an artificial (as opposed to a natural) person. Nevertheless, it should be noted that within this sentence, I am referring to the natural (as opposed to the artificial, or contractually established) power which is possessed by the natural human beings who comprise the sovereign, the sovereign's peace-keeping agents, etc.

27. Admittedly, this statement would be patently false were we considering an *authentic* democracy of the variety described by Hobbes on pp. 109-110 of The Elements of Law. Nevertheless, it must be recalled that Hobbes consistently maintains that, with respect to governmental effectiveness, monarchies are superior to aristocracies and aristocracies are superior to democracies. Thus, we must conclude that Hobbes's preferred type of government is one in which the above recounted statement is true, that is, a government in which the combined physical power of the natural persons who constitute the citizenry surpasses the combined physical power of the natural persons who constitute the sovereign and the sovereign's peace keeping forces. Note well, however, Hobbes's somewhat inflated claim in The Author's Preface to De Cive that although he has endeavored "to gain a belief in men that monarchy is the most commodious government," it is the "one thing alone I confess in this whole book not to be demonstrated, but only probably stated." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen, page 104.)

28. Of course, this fact makes it imperative that the sovereign somehow manages to "win over the hearts," or maintain the support of those men and women whom he governs; for if the citizens of a COMMONWEALTH take the time to consider that the total physical power of the governed exceeds (perhaps far exceeds) that of the sovereign and his/its minions, such citizens will come to recognize that the sovereign's ability to maintain the public order will depend directly upon the citizens' willingness to behave as if the sovereign does indeed possesses the actual physical power to compel them to observe the civil laws. (and thus, to discharge their contractual obligation) Hence, the citizens' fear of their sovereign's power can be recognized to rest on a rather shaky or uncertain basis, specifically upon the widely-held belief that the sovereign can maintain the requisite level of support among the populace [or the citizenry]. In this sense, we can understand that the sovereign's power to control the actions of his/its citizens is not a natural quality, but rather something which is artificially generated (and sustained) through the contractual apparatus.

29. It should be noted that Hobbes did not believe that a direct reading of his political writings would provide the most likely mode of transmission of his ideas to the majority of the citizens of the commonwealth. Rather, Hobbes registered the belief that his ideas regarding sovereignty and obedience should be proclaimed to the common people in sermons delivered by clergymen who are to learn the tenets of Hobbes's political philosophy while at university. Such a conviction lies at the basis of Hobbes's contention that Leviathan should be adopted by, and taught to students by the members of the faculty of English universities. (See Hobbes, Leviathan, page 496.)

30. As John Robison has pointed out to me, such arguments can also be used to persuade moderates to keep dominators in check. Of course, one would expect that moderate citizens would actively take steps to control the behavior, or to restrict the corporeal motion of their socially-disruptive dominator fellow citizens, only when they are called upon to do so by their sovereign. (or by his authorized representative)

31. Recall Hobbes's pronouncement that the "[r]eputation of power is power; because it draweth with it the adherence of those that need protection." (Hobbes, Leviathan, page 51.)

32. See endnotes # 37 and # 38, below.

33. If for the sake of argument, we were to conceive of a COMMONWEALTH composed solely of moderate men who "are satisfied with an equality of nature," who recognize the profound benefits of living in a condition of peace, and who are able and willing to consistently act in accordance with the directives of the sovereign (as encapsulated in his COMMONWEALTH'S civil laws), we would have some reason to believe that this COMMONWEALTH is an effective and stable unit. We would expect this to be the case since the citizens' level of suspicion that the sovereign is unable to effectively maintain public order will, in all likelihood, be rather low. This characteristic, i.e. the low level of suspicion among the populace, would be attributable to the fact that most or all of the citizens within this COMMONWEALTH are motivated, and are generally recognized to be motivated, to support the efforts of their sovereign by, among other things, refraining from attempting to disobey the sovereign's directives.

However, for Hobbes, such a harmonious social condition would constitute an unattainable ideal state since, as has been mentioned a number of times already in this dissertation, this author was committed to the position that any sizable grouping of human beings will contain some (never precisely specified) percentage of dominators.

34. So that COMMONWEALTHS which contain smaller percentages of dominators can be expected, all other things being equal, to contain more effective means of internal peace keeping (and behavioral control !) than COMMONWEALTHS which contain smaller percentages of dominators.

35. See, for example, Hobbes, Leviathan, page 229, especially the sections entitled "Good Laws, What?" and "Such as are Necessary."

36. Given the aforementioned differential in the level of combined physical power between (1) the sovereign and the members of the sovereign's peace keeping forces, and (2) the members of the citizenry, and the likely recognition of such a differential on the part of a large number of those who comprise the latter category (2), we must conclude that such support cannot be physically extorted from the members of the citizenry but must, rather, be freely offered.

37. It should be noted that the word 'would' in this sentence is being used conditionally. To wit, in this sentence, I am claiming (among other things), that if Hobbes's doctrine of the human organism were accurate, then it would be the case that a COMMONWEALTH by institution could not be formed in the manner indicated by Hobbes. (barring the occurrence of exceptionally preternatural conditions--see endnote # 38, below).

38. It should be noted that I am employing the phrase 'will very likely' and not simply the term 'will' in this sentence since the latter usage would, in this context, indicate demonstrative certainty. That a collection of Hobbesian human beings could spontaneously come together, and subsequently live with each other in perfect harmony for the remainder of all their natural lives is, strictly speaking, possible despite Hobbes's frequently trumpeted pronouncements concerning man's antisocial nature and man's natural unfitness to form, to follow the laws of, and to remain members of collective organizational units.

Strictly speaking, it is not impossible that upon entering into the social contract, the sovereign and the citizens of the newly-instituted COMMONWEALTH will, despite their frequently-remarked-upon antisocial nature, live together in perfect accord.

On the other hand, given Hobbes's straightforward pronouncements concerning man's antisocial nature (which were discussed at great length earlier in this dissertation), it seems *overwhelmingly more likely* (1) that the human antisocial tendencies would prevent a collection of Hobbesian men from forming societies in the manner indicated by this author, and (2) that a recognition of the human antisocial tendencies on the part of most or all of the citizens of a COMMONWEALTH, accompanied by an abiding uncertainty regarding the future behavior of one's fellow citizens and a fear of losing one's life in a violent encounter, would discourage many if not most citizens of the COMMONWEALTH from confidently complying with the directives of their sovereign.

Obviously, because one cannot draw conclusions in this matter with demonstrative certainty, one must be satisfied to make claims concerning what is plausible or probable given Hobbes's repeatedly stated proclamations concerning human nature and human behavior.

39.Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page ix.

40.Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 220-221.

41.Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 243-244.

42.So that the representative unit in the state of nature-1 is the individual natural person, the representative unit in the state of nature-2 is the small unstable social group which Hobbes designates the "family," and the representative unit in the state of nature-3 is the COMMONWEALTH.

43.Providing such an alternative model of human nature might prove difficult within the parameters of Hobbes's overall system, since in his writings, this philosopher did expend a good deal of effort in order to demonstrate that his model of human behavior follows directly from that of his mechanical view of human perception and conation (or motivation). (See chapters 1-2 of this dissertation)

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